

236 Pond Lab Thursday 1:00 PM to 4:00 PM

Professor Wright

Office: Pond Lab 233

Office Hours: Wednesday 10AM to 12PM or by appointment

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COURSE DESCRIPTION: This course is intended for advanced graduate students in political science. It will be most beneficial for students who have completed an introductory sequence of graduate statistical methods courses and one or two graduate-level courses in non-cooperative game theory. The seminar begins with a brief introduction to classical theories of authoritarian rule, and then surveys the current literature on comparative authoritarianism. Students are expected to produce original research on a topic related to authoritarian politics.

REQUIREMENTS: Students are expected to: (1) attend all seminars; (2) read assigned material and be prepared to discuss the material before each seminar meeting; (3) submit questions to the class before each seminar meeting; (4) lead seminar discussion; (5) complete seminar discussion assignment; (6) complete an original research paper; and (7) present research findings in seminar.

SEMINAR PARTICIPATION: [items (1) - (3)] Students are expected to attend each seminar, read the assigned material before each class, and be prepared to discuss assigned material. Before 12 noon each Wednesday preceding the seminar, each student is expected to post three discussion questions on CANVAS.

Each week, the class time will be spent: (1) discussing the assigned readings and discussion assignment; or (2) presenting original research. For each week, we discuss and present assigned readings, one student will present and critique the readings. The instructor will present formal models in readings denoted with a †.

Each class period will be divided into two 80 minutes periods. During the first period, we will do two things: (1) the instructor will present the set-up for the formal model in the assigned reading and the student discussants will present a brief critique of the assigned readings and present the discussion assignment. Following a 10-15 minute break, the second period of the class will be open discussion of the readings, during which all students are expected to participate by discussing the questions they prepare ahead of time and post on CANVAS.

DISCUSSION LEADER: [item (4)] The discussant's presentation should **NOT** be a summary of the readings. Everyone has read the material; simply summarizing the material is typically boring and wastes our time. Instead, the presentation of the critique of the readings should accomplish the following.

- What do we need to know and why? (**cocktail napkin**) Each reading has a take-away point. The discussant should outline one (at most two) take-away point for each reading. (all readings)
- Discuss the **theoretical assumptions**. Are they accurate? Are they necessary? How do the results change if we relax the key assumptions?
- Discuss the **testable implications** of the theory.
- Assess the quality of main **empirical finding**.
- What is the next step in this **research agenda**? The bulk of the presentation should address this point. Propose something: it doesn't have to be right, just plausible. If you could have any type of data, how would you extend this research? Is there a case you know of that doesn't fit the theoretical assumptions? How would you amend the theory to accommodate this evidence? Think about the readings as a whole.

DISCUSSANT ASSIGNMENT: [item (5)] For one discussion (also a discussion the student leads), each student should complete the topic-specific assignment and present the findings to the class. More on this later.

WRITTEN ASSIGNMENTS: [item (6)] There will be two written assignments for this course.

1. A 5-6 page research memo that discusses the research question, as well as motivating evidence, assumptions, theory and research design. The 1st written assignment is due on Thursday October 20 at 9:00 AM (electronic copy).
2. An original research paper. For students who have completed an MA, this paper must be a theoretical or empirical chapter of your dissertation. If your dissertation paper is not on a topic related to authoritarianism, the instructor recommends that you drop the course. For second-year students, the **research paper must be your MA paper**. If your MA paper is not on a topic related to authoritarianism, the instructor recommends that you drop the course. For first year students, the instructor will assign each student a research paper topic. First draft of 2nd written assignment is due electronically to the class by **12 noon on Wednesday November 30**. Final draft of 2nd written assignment is due on Thursday December 15 at 9:00 AM (paper copy).

RESEARCH PRESENTATION: [(item (7))] Students are expected to present the results from their final research project during the last two seminar sessions. Presentations should be modeled after a conference presentation (12 minutes in length).

GRADING: Seminar participation, including submitting questions on readings each week (10%); **Discussion leader** (10%); **Discussion assignment** (20%); **Research paper** (50%); **Research presentation** (10%).

GRADE SCALE: A: 95-100; A-: 90-94.9; B+: 87.9-89.9; B: 83.33-87.8; B-: 80-83.32; FAIL: 0-79.9

READING MATERIALS: The following books are available at Amazon, Cambridge University Press, or the library. Readings from these books will not be posted on CANVAS. The rest of the required reading materials are available on Google scholar, or **will be PROVIDED** by the instructor.

- Magaloni, Beatriz. 2007. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Svobik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Michael Albertus. 2016. *Autocracy and Redistribution*. New York: Cambridge University Press

ADDITIONAL POLICIES

- Disabilities: The Pennsylvania State University encourages qualified people with disabilities to participate in its programs and activities and is committed to the policy that all people shall have equal access to programs, facilities, and admissions without regard to personal characteristics not related to ability, performance, or qualifications as determined by University policy or by state or federal authorities. If you anticipate needing any type of accommodation in this course or have questions about physical access, please tell the instructor as soon as possible. Reasonable accommodations will be made for all students with disabilities, but it is the student's responsibility to inform the instructor early in the term. Do not wait until just before an exam to decide you want to inform the instructor of a learning disability; any accommodations for disabilities must be arranged well in advance.
- Academic Dishonesty: The Department of Political Science, along with the College of the Liberal Arts and the University, takes violations of academic dishonesty seriously. Observing basic honesty in one's work, words, ideas, and actions is a principle to which all members of the community are required to subscribe. All course work by students is to be done on an individual basis unless an instructor clearly states that an alternative is acceptable. Any reference materials used in the preparation of any assignment must be explicitly cited. Students uncertain about proper citation are responsible for checking with their instructor. In an examination setting, unless the instructor gives explicit prior instructions to the contrary, whether the examination is in class or take home, violations of academic integrity shall consist but are not limited to any attempt to receive assistance from written or printed aids, or from any person or papers or electronic devices, or of any attempt to give assistance, whether the one so doing has completed his or her own work or not. Lying to the instructor or purposely misleading any Penn State administrator shall also constitute a violation of academic integrity. In cases of any violation of academic integrity it is the policy of the Department of Political Science to follow procedures established by the College of the Liberal Arts. More information on academic integrity and procedures followed for violation can be found at: <http://tinyurl.com/n3q8ym>

READINGS: All readings are REQUIRED, except noted with a *. † indicates the required reading contains a formal model that the instructor will present the model set-up in class.

• **Week 1: Introduction & Scheduling (August 25)**

1. *Machiavelli, Nicolo. 1984. *The Prince*. Bantam Classics. available at: <http://bit.ly/1cNopvV>
2. *Arendt, Hannah. 1958. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt & Brace. 305-326, 364-437. PROVIDED
3. *Friedrich, Carl J. & Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. 1956. *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 15-27, 45-59, 70-81 PROVIDED
4. Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *American Political Science Review* 87: 567-576.
5. Haber, Stephen. 2006. "Authoritarian Government." In Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, (Oxford University Press), pp. 693-707. available at: <http://bit.ly/JZ7Wyj>
6. Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1.

• **Week 2: Distributional Foundations I (September 8)**

1. Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Mark S. Boncheck. 1997. *Analyzing Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. pp. 82-91, 103-127. PROVIDED
2. †Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 92-109, 118-151. PROVIDED
3. Boix, Carles. 2003. "Democracy and Redistribution." New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1. PROVIDED
4. Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. "Inequality and regime change: Democratic transitions and the stability of democratic rule." *American Political Science Review* 106(3): 1-22.
5. *Comparative Democratization Newsletter*. "Inequality and Democratization: What Do We Know?" October 2013. read Ansell and Samuels, Haggard et al., Boix, and Acemoglu et al.

• **Week 3: Distributional Foundations II (September 15)**

1. Daniel Ziblatt. 2008. "Does Landholding Inequality Block Democratization? The 'Bread and Democracy' Thesis and the Case of Prussia". *World Politics*. 60 (4): 610-641.
2. Ardanaz, Martin, and Isabela Mares. 2013. "Labor shortages, rural inequality, and democratization." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(12): 1639-1669.
3. Michael Albertus. 2016. *Autocracy and Redistribution*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-2, 4-5.
4. †Michael Albertus. 2016. *Autocracy and Redistribution*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3.

• **Week 4: Regimes and Typologies (September 22)**

1. Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What do we know about democratization after twenty years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2(1): 115-144.
2. Levitsky, Steven & Lucan A. Way. 2002. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy* 13(1): 51-65.
3. Goemans, H.E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza. 2009. "Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders." *Journal of Peace Research* 46(2): 269-283.

4. Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. "Dictatorship and Democracy Revisited." *Public Choice* 143(1-2): 67-101.
5. Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014. "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set." *Perspectives on Politics*. 12(2): 313331.
6. Wright, Joseph. 2015. "The Structure of Autocratic Rule." unpublished manuscript. [PROVIDED](#)

● **Week 5: Personalism (September 29)**

1. Wiarda, Howard. 1968. *Dictatorship and Development: The Methods of Control in Trujillo's Dominican Republic*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press. pp. 42-59, 62-69, 74-80, 81-101. [PROVIDED](#)
2. Jackson, Robert & Carl Rosberg. 1984. "Personal Rule: Theory and Practice in Africa ." *Comparative Politics* 16(4): 421-442.
3. Bratton, Michael & Nicolas van de Walle. 1994. "Neo-Patrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa." *World Politics* 46: 453-489
4. †Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3.
5. Geddes, Barbara, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright. "How Dictatorships Work." unpublished book manuscript. Chapters 4 & 6. [PROVIDED](#)

● **Week 6: Military Rule (October 6)**

1. Nordlinger, Eric. 1977. *Soldiers in politics: military coups and governments*. Prentice Hall. pp. 47-56, 60-61, 65-85, 99-106, 141-147, 178-82. [PROVIDED](#)
2. Fontana, Andres Miguel. 1987. *Political Decision-Making by a Military Corporation: Argentina, 1976-1983*. University of Texas at Austin: PhD Dissertation. pp: 24-34, 45-52, 125-136. [PROVIDED](#)
3. †Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 5.
4. Geddes, Barbara, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright. 2014. "Military Rule." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 17(1): 147-162.
5. †McMahon, R. Blake, and Branislav L. Slantchev. 2015. "The guardianship dilemma: Regime security through and from the armed forces." *American Political Science Review*. 109(2): 297-313.

● **Week 7: Dominant Party Rule (October 27)**

1. Fainsod, Merle. 1967. *How Russia Is Ruled*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp: 463-476. [PROVIDED](#)
2. Magaloni, Beatriz. 2007. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-5.
3. Greene, Kenneth. 2010. "The Political Economy of Single-Party Dominance." *Comparative Political Studies* 43(7): 807-834.
4. Malesky, Edmund, Regina Abrami and Yu Zheng. 2011. "Institutions and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China." *Comparative Politics* 43(4): 409-427.
5. †Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 6.

● **Week 8: Elections (November 3)**

1. Gandhi, Jennifer and Ellen Lust. 2009. "Elections Under Authoritarianism." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 403-422.

2. Levitsky, Steven & Lucan Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: The Origins and Evolution of Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 2, and Appendix I. PROVIDED
3. Hyde, Susan & Nikolay Marinov. 2012. "Which Elections Can Be Lost?" *Political Analysis* 20(2): 191-210.
4. †Miller, Michael K. 2015. "Elections, information, and policy responsiveness in autocratic regimes." *Comparative Political Studies* 48: 1526-1562.
5. Knutsen, Carl Henrik, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård and Tore Wig. 2015. "Autocratic Elections: Stabilizing Tool or Force for Change?". Forthcoming. *World Politics*
6. Geddes, Barbara, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright. "How Dictatorships Work." unpublished book manuscript. Chapter 5. PROVIDED

● **Week 9: Media and Censorship in Dictatorships (November 7)**

1. †Egorov, Georgy, Sergei Guriev, and Konstantin Sonin. 2009. "Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data." *American Political Science Review* 103(4): 645-668.
2. Lynch, Marc. 2011. "After Egypt: The limits and promise of online challenges to the authoritarian Arab state." *Perspectives on Politics* 9(2): 301-310.
3. King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. 2013. "How censorship in China allows government criticism but silences collective expression." *American Political Science Review* 107(2): 326-343.
4. Gunitsky, Seva. "Corrupting the cyber-commons: Social media as a tool of autocratic stability" *Perspectives on Politics* 13(1): 42-54.
5. Hollyer, James R., B. Peter Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2015. "Transparency, protest, and autocratic instability." *American Political Science Review* 109(4): 764-784.
6. Rød, Espen Geelmuyden, and Nils B. Weidmann. 2015. "Empowering activists or autocrats? The Internet in authoritarian regimes." *Journal of Peace Research* 52(3): 338-351.

● **Week 10: Subnational Politics and Autocratic Accountability (November 17)**

1. Guo, Gang. 2009 "China's local political budget cycles." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(3): 621-632.
2. Reuter, Ora John, and Graeme B. Robertson. 2012 "Subnational appointments in authoritarian regimes: Evidence from Russian gubernatorial appointments." *The Journal of Politics* 74(4): 1023-1037.
3. Lü, Xiaobo, and Pierre F. Landry. 2014. "Show me the money: Interjurisdiction political competition and fiscal extraction in China." *American Political Science Review* 108(3): 706-722.
4. Gueorguiev, Dimitar D., and Paul J. Schuler. 2015. "Keeping Your Head Down: Public Profiles and Promotion Under Autocracy." *Journal of East Asian Studies* Forthcoming.
5. Wallace, Jeremy L. 2016. "Juking the stats? Authoritarian information problems in China." *British Journal of Political Science* 46(1): 11-29.
6. Jensen, Nathan M., and Edmund J. Malesky. 2016. "Pandering Upward: Tax Incentives and Credit Claiming in Authoritarian Countries."

● **Weeks 11 & 12: Student Presentations (December 1 & 8)**

Additional Suggested Readings on Media and Censorship

- Petrova, Maria. 2012. "Mass Media and Special Interest Groups." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 84(1): 1738.
- Gehlbach, Scott, and Konstantin Sonin. 2014. "Government Control of the Media." *Journal of Public Economics* 118: 163171.
- ^xLorentzen, Peter. 2014. "China's strategic censorship." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(2): 402-414.
- Shadmehr, Mehdi, and Dan Bernhardt. 2015. "State Censorship." *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics* 7(2): 280307.
- ^xBreuer, Anita, Todd Landman, and Dorothea Farquhar. 2015. "Social media and protest mobilization: Evidence from the Tunisian revolution." *Democratization* 22(4): 764-792.
- Stier, Sebastian. 2015. "Democracy, autocracy and the news: the impact of regime type on media freedom." *Democratization* 22(7): 1273-1295.
- ^xHuang, Haifeng. 2015. "A war of (mis) information: The political effects of rumors and rumor rebuttals in an authoritarian country." *British Journal of Political Science*
- ^xLittle, Andrew T. 2016. "Communication Technology and Protest." *The Journal of Politics* 78(1): 152-166.

Additional Suggested Readings on Resource Wealth and Authoritarianism

- Mahdavi, Hussein. 1970. "The Patters and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: the Case of Iran." in M. Cook (editor). *Studies in Economic History of the Middle East*. Oxford University Press.
- Chaudry, Kiren. 1989. "The Price of Wealth: Business and State in Labor Remittance and Oil Economies." *International Organization*, vol. 43, no. 1, Winter, 1989.
- Luciani, Giacomo. 1990. "Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework." In *The Arab State*, ed. Giacomo Luciani. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Karl, Terry. 1997. *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States*. Ch. 3-5, 7-10
- Ross, Michael. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53: 325-361
- Herb, Michael. 2004. "No Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development, and Democracy." *Comparative Politics* 37: 297-317.
- Jensen, Nathan & Leonard Wantchekon. 2004. "Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 37: 816-841.
- Smith, Benjamin. 2006. "The Wrong Kind of Crisis: Why Oil Booms and Busts Rarely Lead to Authoritarian Breakdown." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 40(4): 55-76
- Ulfelder, Jay. 2007. "Natural Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 40: 995-1018.
- Dunning, Thad. 2008. *Crude Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-4, 5.1
- Smith, Alastair. 2008. "The Perils of Unearned Income." *Journal of Politics* 70: 780-793.
- Morrison, Kevin. 2009. "Oil, Nontax Revenue, and Regime Stability." *International Organization*. 63: 107-138.
- Dunning, Thad. 2010. "Endogenous Oil Rents." *Comparative Political Studies* 43(3): 379-410.
- Jones-Luong, Pauline and Erika Weinthal. 2010. *Oil is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-6

- Haber, Stephen & Victor Menaldo. 2011. "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse." *American Political Science Review* 105(1): 1-26.
- Ramsey, Kris. 2011. "Revisiting the Resource Curse: Natural Disasters, the Price of Oil, and Democracy." *International Organization*. 65(3): 507-529.
- Tsui, Kevin. 2011. "More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence from Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries." *The Economic Journal*. 121(551): 89-115.
- Ross, Michael. 2012. *The Oil Curse*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ahmadov, Anar K. 2014. "Oil, Democracy, and Context: A Meta-Analysis." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(9):12381267.
- Wright, Joseph, Erica Frantz, and Barbara Geddes. 2015. "Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival." *British Journal of Political Science*. 45(2): 287306.
- Mahdavi, Paasha. 2015. "Explaining the Oil Advantage: Effects of Natural Resource Wealth on Incumbent Reelection in Iran." *World Politics* 67(2):226267.
- Wahman, Michael, and Matthias Basedau. 2015. "Electoral Rentierism? The Cross-National and Subnational Effect of Oil on Electoral Competitiveness in Multiparty Autocracies." No. 272. *GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies*.
- Menaldo, Victor. 2016. *The Institutions Curse: Natural Resources, Politics, and Development*. Cambridge University Press.
- Rikhil R. Bhavnani and Noam Lupu. 2016 "Oil Windfalls and the Political Resource Curse: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Brazil".