

SYLLABUS PLSC 551
INSTITUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY
Fall, 2015

Thursday, 9:30 am – 12:30 pm, 108 Oak Building

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Office Hours: Thursdays 3:00-4:00 and by appointment.

Course Description:

This class aims to provide an introduction to and an overview of the role of domestic political institutions in current research in comparative and international political economy. Political economy in its entirety explores how domestic and international political configurations (institutions, structures, etc.) and events (elections, coups, oil shocks, currency crisis, etc.) systematically produce certain specific economic policies, and influence their effects. In this class we will focus *only* on the first of these two broad categories of work – the role of domestic political institutions in initiating, enacting and implementing economic outcomes. The class assumes students have taken the comparative seminar.

The class is divided into three segments, (i) theories of institutional origins (ii) institutional influence on key actors and delegated institutions and, (iii) specific economic outcomes. For section (ii) we will consider the theoretical and empirical body of work which studies how institutions affect political party systems, special interest groups, the bureaucracy and the judiciary. We will then look at some of the most prominent models of policymaking and how they incorporate institutional factors before finally moving on to study specific policy issues. For section (iii), I have provided a list of 6 topics from which we as a class will choose 3 topics to focus on. Please look at these and jot down your preferences before we meet in class for the first time. We will cover both democracies and autocracies among developing and developed countries.

As a class in comparative politics, one of the aims of the discussion in the class will be to test abstract theories of political economy using in-depth knowledge of specific cases, and to further our understanding of cases by applying lessons from theoretical and statistical work. As such, I highly encourage you to choose a couple of countries, preferably one you are familiar with and one you have very little familiarity with, as countries you can study through these frameworks as the class progresses. Comparative varies very widely methodologically and one of our tasks is to assess the appropriateness of the various methods employed in this research. Here again, familiarity with a couple of cases will help you perform these assessments.

Format:

We meet on Thursday mornings for some mixture of lecture and discussion of the week's required readings. The readings listed under further readings provide additional resources for exploring the topic in-depth and frequently lists classic readings and more alternative viewpoints.

Needless to say, *everyone* is responsible for being **prepared** to discuss *all* of the required material every week. Discussion will focus on the required readings however you are welcome to draw on additional materials and information. I may occasionally change the readings for some week to suit the needs of the class. Readings are available online directly through journal websites and jstor. I will place copies of book chapters outside my office. Please make a copy for yourself and return it to the folder so others may do so. I will try to make these available online via angel as well.

As part of the written requirements of the class, you will be required to submit 3 4-5 page memos on the topics of 3 weeks of your choosing. I will also require that each student emails 3 questions based on each week's material to me and the entire class by Wednesday evening i.e. the evening before class by 8 pm. The memos will also be due at the same time. The weeks for which you choose to write response memos, you will also be one of the assigned discussants for that class. As such you will be part of the team responsible for presenting a 30 minute summary and critique of that week's readings. I encourage all assigned discussants to meet as a group to discuss the readings and decide on their presentation strategy. This is not meant to be a formal presentation but rather should be approached as presenting and leading a discussion based on a thorough analysis of that week's readings.

Your discussion should address the main questions posed for that week in the syllabus and raise any further questions, concerns, issues, you consider pertinent. Some important points to consider when doing the readings are listed below at the end of this section. I will typically follow the presentation by providing additional background on the topic of the week and discuss any pertinent economic and technical material required to understand and critique the readings for about 15 minutes. We will take a short break of 15 minutes at this time. After this, I will initiate and mediate class discussion based on the questions submitted by you and by the discussants for that week. I may intervene and stop a discussion if I feel that it is going off topic or if it has taken too much time.

Discussion Framework: Some points to consider when reading the materials for class.

Theory:

- What questions motivate the paper? What is the specific theoretical idea being presented in the paper and how does it relate to the larger literature and important theoretical frameworks on that topic?
- What are the theoretical assumptions being made by the researcher and how are they being justified? Which assumptions are heroic and which ones are common for research in that literature?
- What is the unit of analysis? What are the observable implications of the theory? How do they relate to prior claims in the literature? What is the theoretical contribution of the paper?

Empirics:

- What is the central empirical strategy of the author? What is the nature of the data being used to test the hypotheses? Are the theoretical concepts validly measured by the data? How are alternative theories being tested by the author?
- Does the author's research design adequately test his theoretical claims?
- How can the research design be improved? Can the measures be improved? Are there any additional techniques which may be applied to improve or elaborate further on the analysis?
- Can the case selection be improved? Are there countries or time periods which challenge the claims of the paper? How should an analysis of these cases be incorporated into the larger analysis?
- What extensions, elaborations, etc. can be undertaken based on this paper's analysis?

Written Assignments:

- **3 page empirical trend summary.** For week 1, I would like you to examine the available empirical datasets and explore various distributions and trends in the institutions and economic outcomes of countries. The data sources and variables I would like you to examine are listed in the readings section of the syllabus under week 1. Consider the geographic distribution and, temporal trends and clusters. Based on this examination I would like you to write a 4-5 page report which summarizes the important trends you find and raises any issues of definition and measurement. You can use tables, graphs, maps, etc any method for summarizing your information that you feel conveys the key trends. This exercise is meant to fix in your mind some of the important patterns that form the empirical context for this class and to generate a handy reference for you. This memo will be due Wednesday, September 2.
- **4 response memos, length 4-5 pages each.** List the 4 weeks in which you would prefer to write memos and lead discussions in the order of your preference and please email me your preferences by Monday, September 7. Each memo should aim to address the topic of the week in a manner that synthesizes all the readings rather than simply summarizing individual readings. Consider using the discussion points raised above as guidelines in doing the readings and in writing the memo. The memo will be due Wednesday evening before class by 8 pm via email or hard copy.
- **Research Paper (20-22 pgs).** Your research paper should present an original piece of research. Start thinking about topics that interest you early in the class. By October 5, you will need to submit a 2 page annotated research proposal for your paper. I will meet with each of you individually and give you feedback on this proposal before you embark on the analysis and writing of the paper itself. You should aim to write a research paper which you can develop and polish for submission. Due December 15.

Grading:

- Empirical summary and 4 memos = 20% @4%

- Leading discussions and general participation = 30%
- Research Paper = 50%

Academic Dishonesty:

The Department of Political Science, along with the College of the Liberal Arts and the University, takes violations of academic dishonesty seriously. Observing basic honesty in one's work, words, ideas, and actions is a principle to which all members of the community are required to subscribe. All course work by students is to be done on an individual basis unless an instructor clearly states that an alternative is acceptable. Any reference materials used in the preparation of any assignment must be explicitly cited. Students uncertain about proper citation are responsible for checking with their instructor. In an examination setting, unless the instructor gives explicit prior instructions to the contrary, whether the examination is in-class or take-home, violations of academic integrity shall consist but are not limited to any attempt to receive assistance from written or printed aids, or from any person or papers or electronic devices, or of any attempt to give assistance, whether the one so doing has completed his or her own work or not. Lying to the instructor or purposely misleading any Penn State administrator shall also constitute a violation of academic integrity. In cases of any violation of academic integrity it is the policy of the Department of Political Science to follow procedures established by the College of the Liberal Arts. More information on academic integrity and procedures followed for violation can be found at: <http://tinyurl.com/n3q8ym>

Disabilities:

The Pennsylvania State University encourages qualified people with disabilities to participate in its programs and activities and is committed to the policy that all people shall have equal access to programs, facilities, and admissions without regard to personal characteristics not related to ability, performance, or qualifications as determined by University policy or by state or federal authorities. If you anticipate needing any type of accommodation in this course or have questions about physical access, please tell the instructor as soon as possible. Reasonable accommodations will be made for all students with disabilities however it is the student's responsibility to inform the instructor of any required accommodations early in the semester. Please do not wait until just before an exam to decide you want to inform the instructor of a learning disability; any accommodations for disabilities must be arranged well in advance. Email me in advance and we can discuss how to make up lost time. For official university policy, see: <http://tinyurl.com/mcth6t> and <http://tinyurl.com/mzyqgw>

List of CPE relevant books that are good to have on the shelf:

1. North, Douglass. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
2. Alt, James and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*, Cambridge UP 1990.

3. Alesina, Alberto and Howard Rosenthal, *Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy*, Cambridge UP 1995.
4. Drazen, Allan, *Political Economy in Macroeconomics*, Princeton UP 2000
5. Alvarez, M., Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi and Adam Przeworski. 2000.
6. *Democracy and Development: Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1944-2000*. Cambridge UP.
7. Persson, T., and G. Tabellini. 2002. *Political Economic: Explaining Economic Policy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
8. Franzese, Robert J., Jr., *Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies*, Cambridge UP 2002.
9. Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*.
10. Joseph Stiglitz. 2003. *Globalization and its Discontents*. W.W. Norton & Company: New York
11. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
12. Bates, Robert H. 2005. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*
13. Jensen, Nathan. 2006. *Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
14. Michael Tomz. 2007. *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries*. Princeton University Press.
15. Daniel Treisman. 2007. *The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization*. Cambridge University Press.
16. Nita Rudra. 2008. *Globalization and the Race to the Bottom in Developing Countries: Who Really Gets Hurt?* Cambridge University Press.

Good sources of general references on CPE and institutions relevant topics:

1. Oxford Handbooks on Political Economy, Institutions and Comparative Politics – good updated literature reviews on a variety of topics.
2. Annual Reviews of Political Science – depth and quality vary across articles
3. Thomas Oatley IPE textbook – good starting point for IPE references
4. Clark and Golders Undergrad Comparative Politics textbook – good starting point for comparative topics
5. Journal of Economic Literature
6. Journal of Political Economy

Accessible intermediate level economics theory references:

1. *International Economics: Theory and Policy*, by Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld. Addison Wesley
2. *Macroeconomics: Principles, Problems, and Policies*, Campbell R. McConnell and Stanley L. Brue. McGraw-Hill.

3. *Intermediate Microeconomics*. Hal Varian.
4. *Game Theory for Applied Economists*. James Gibbons. MIT Press.
5. *Game Theory for Political Scientists* – Adam Meirotwitz and Nolan McCarty. 2007. Cambridge University Press.

WEEK 1 – August 27

TOPIC: EMPIRICAL MAP OF THE INSTITUTIONAL WORLD

Questions:

- What are the consensual definitions of the institutions listed in the table below?
- What are the global geographic distributions of these institutional choices?
- What are the temporal trends in the adoption and diffusion of these institutions?
- What measures of these institutions are available to researchers? From what sources?
- How are these institutional choices distributed across income levels?
- What are the global and regional trends and distributions for basic economic outcomes such as per capita and gross income, Human Development Index, measures of inequality, health, literacy, inflation, debt, trade openness, FDI and financial flows?
- What are some methodological issues in the definitions and measurements of these variables?

Regime type (varieties of democracies & autocracies)	Legislative institutions	Judicial
Electoral institutions	Federal/Unitary	Political Parties
Executive regime type	Bicameral/Unicameral	International Institutions

- Your memo should characterize global, regional and time trends for these institutions and economic variables and note any patterns you find interesting, puzzling or inconsistent across sources. You are welcome to use additional data sources. Creative use of tables, graphs, maps, etc over textual descriptions is highly encouraged! Other than making you familiar with these empirical patterns, I also want these materials to be available to you as a handy resource you can consult in your own work. Your memo should therefore be written and formatted in a manner that produces the most useful reference for your use.

Some sources to consult for definitions, distributions and data:

- Polity IV
- Przeworski, A., M. Alvarez, J. A. Cheibub, and F. Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Regimes and Economic Well-being in the World, 1950–1990*. New York: Cambridge University Press. See Cheibub’s website for updated dataset.

- DPI – Keefer et al.
- Freedom House
- IDEAS Electoral Database
- APSA CP Page for Links to various datasets on comparative
- Fish and Koenig 2008 for legislative institutions
- Cheibub, J. and J. Gandhi. 2004. “Classifying Political Regimes: A Six-Fold Measure of Democracies and Dictatorships.” Paper prepared for annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago.
- Penn World tables for economic trends
- Quality of Governance Dataset
- Also check the websites of the World Bank, IMF, UNDP, etc for various economic data

WEEK 2 – September 3

TOPIC – Qualitative Methods for Comparative

- Gerring 2007 Chapter 5 in Case Study Research – Techniques for choosing Cases
- Bennet Ch 10 -- Process Tracing and Causal Inference in Rethinking Social Inquiry 2010
- Rihoux: Case-Oriented Configurational Research Ch 31 in OUP Handbook of Political Methodology 2008

Recommended

1. Braumuller Political Analysis 2015 – False Positives
2. Ch 29 in OUP Handbook of Pol Methodology on Interviewing
3. Bartels Ch 4 in Rethinking Social Inquiry
4. Reading on Analytical Narratives

***** EMPIRICAL MEMO IS DUE*****

WEEK 3 September 10

TOPIC: Origins I - Where do institutions come from?

Questions:

- What are the different schools of thought on institutional origins?
- When and why did certain schools become prominent or fall in prestige?
- What kind of data and techniques seem relevant for testing these theories and their rise or decline?
- Institutions versus other factors i.e. institutions in the context of interests and ideas.

Required Readings:

1. Hall, Peter and Rosemary Taylor. 1996. 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms.' *Political Studies* 44: 936-957
2. North, Douglass. 1990. *Structure and Change in Economic History*. New York: Norton Press. Chapter 5.
3. Cusack, Thomas, Torben Iversen, & David Soskice. 2007. "Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems." *American Political Science Review* 101: 373-91
4. Cox, Gary 1987. *The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1
5. Helmke, G., S. Levitsky. 2004. "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda" *Perspectives on Politics* 2(4):725-40.

Further Readings:

1. Greif, Avner, Paul Milgrom, and Barry Weingast. 1994. "Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild," *Journal of Political Economy* 102:912-50;
2. North, Douglas, Barry Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England," *Journal of Economic History* 49(4):803-32
3. Weingast and- Institutional equilibria or equilibrium institutions?
4. Ostrom, Elinor. 2008. *Collective Action*. Oxford University Press Handbook on Political Economy.
5. Zachary Elkins – Project on Constitutional Change. See online website.
6. Gallagher, Michael, and Paul Mitchell. 2005. *The Politics of Electoral Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapters 1-2.
7. Cox, Gary. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Co-ordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3.
8. Boix, Carles. 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 93(3), pp.609-624.
9. Elgie, Robert. 2005. "From Linz to Tsebelis: Three Waves of Presidential/Parliamentary Studies?" *Democratization* 12, pp. 106-122.
10. Linz, Juan. 1990. "The Perils of Presidentialism." *Journal of Democracy* 1(1), pp. 51-69.
11. Linz, Juan. 1990. "The Virtues of Parliamentarism." *Journal of Democracy* 1(4), pp. 84-91

WEEK 4 – September 17

TOPIC: Origins II - Where do institutions come from?

Questions:

- What are the various domestic sources of influence on institutional choice?
- What are the various international sources of influence on institutional choice?
- To what extent are domestic and international sources relevant in understanding institutional origins? What determines this?

Required Readings:

1. Mantzavinos, North and Shariq 2004. "Learning, Institutions and Economic Performance"
2. Pevehouse, Jon C. 2002. "Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization." *International Organization*. 56(3), 515-549.
3. Beth A. Simmons and Zachary Elkins, "The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy," *American Political Science Review* 98:1 (February 2004), 171-189.
4. Jacob Hariri, 2012 "The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood" *APSR* August 106:3 : 471-94
5. Gryzmala-Busse 2012. "Why comparative politics should take religion (more) seriously" in *Annual Review of Political Science* vol 15

Further Readings:

1. Geddes, Barbara. 1995. "Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America." in Arend Lijphart and Carlos Waismann (eds.) *Institutional Design in New Democracies*. Boulder: Westview
2. Boix, C., Stokes, S. 2003. "Endogenous Democratization," *World Politics* 55:517-49
3. Iyer, Lakshmi. "Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-term Consequences." *The Review of Economics and Statistics*
4. Kohli, Atul. 2004. *Democracies and Markets*.
5. Glaeser, Edward, and Andrei Shleifer, 2002. Legal origins, *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117: 1193-1229
6. Landes, William M. and Richard A. Posner. 1975. "Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective." *Journal of Law and Economics*. 18: 875-901

7. Carothers, T. 2006. *Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

WEEK 5- September 24

TOPIC: Institutions and Political Parties

Questions:

- How do institutions influence the internal organization and practices of parties?
- How do institutions influence party strength and party discipline?
- How do institutions influence policymaking and policy outcomes via parties?
- How does party institutionalization affect the performance of other institutions?

Required Readings:

1. Diamond, L., and R. Gunther, eds. 2001. *Political Parties and Democracy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Chapter 1.
2. Carey, John 2007. "Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 51: 92–1007.
3. Greene 2014. *Changing Course in Latin America: Party Systems in the Neo-Liberal Era* Ch 1 and 5
4. Keefer, Philip, and Stuti Khemani. 2009. "When Do Legislators Pass on Pork? The Role of Political Parties in Determining Legislator Effort," *American Political Science Review* 103(1):99-112.
5. Karp, Jeffrey A. and Banducci, Susan A. 2007. "Party Mobilization and Political Participation in New and Old Democracies" *Party Politics March 13: 217-23*
Or
Dalton, Russell J. and Steven Weldon. 2007. "Partisanship and Party System Institutionalization" *Party Politics 13: 179-196*

Further Readings:

1. Aldrich, J. H. 2008. "Political Parties in and out of Legislatures." In *Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Ed. C. Bois and S. Stokes. New York: Oxford University Press.
2. Mershon, C., and O. Shvetsova. 2008. "Parliamentary Cycles and Party Switching in Legislatures." *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(January): 99–127.
3. Janda, Kenneth. 2005. "Adopting Party Law." National Democratic Institute. Available at www.ndi.org.

4. Cheibub, J. 2007. *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
5. Desposato, S. 2006. "The Impact of Electoral Rules on Legislative Parties: Lessons from the Brazilian Senate and Chamber of Deputies." *Journal of Politics* 68: 1018–1030.
6. Laver, Michael and K. Benoit. 2003. "The Evolution of Party Systems between Elections" *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 2: 215–233.
7. Carothers, T. 2006. *Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
8. Tavits, M. 2009. "The Making of Mavericks: Local Loyalties and Party Defection." *Comparative Political Studies* 42: 793.
9. Benedetto, G. S. Hix 2007. "The Rejected, the Ejected, and the Dejected: Explaining Government Rebels in the 2001–2005 British House of Commons." *Comparative Political Studies* 40: 755–781.
10. Shomer, Y. 2009. "Candidate Selection Procedures, Seniority, and Vote-Seeking." *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (2009): 945
11. Cox, G. W., W. B. Heller, and M. D. McCubbins. 2008. "Agenda Power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2000." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 33: 171–222.
12. Cox and Mathew McCubbins. 2007 [1993]. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
13. Cox, Gary, M. Masuyama, and M. D. McCubbins. 2000. "Agenda Power in the Japanese House of Representatives." *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 1: 1–21.
14. Carey and Shugart 1997. *Presidents and Assemblies*
15. Golder, M. 2006. "Presidential Coattails and Legislative Fragmentation." *American Journal of Political Science* 50: 34–48.
16. Cox, Gary 1992. *Making Votes Count*
17. Hix, S. 2004. "Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament." *World Politics* 56: 194–223.
18. Hix, S. 2002. "Parliamentary Behavior with Two Principals: Preferences, Parties and Voting in the European Parliament." *American Journal of Political Science* 46: 688–698.
19. Laver, M. J. 2006. "Legislatures and Parliaments in Comparative Perspective." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Ed. Barry Weingast and Don Wittman. New York: Oxford University Press.
20. Peter Mair. 2003. Editors. *Handbook of Political Parties*.

WEEK 6 – October 1

TOPIC: Institutions and Coalitions

Questions:

- How do institutions affect the stability and composition of coalitions?
- What is the policymaking impact of coalition politics?

Required Readings:

1. Cheibub, Jose, A. Przeworski, and S. Saiegh. 2004. "Government Coalitions and Legislative Success under Parliamentarism and Presidentialism." *British Journal of Political Science* 34 (October): 565–587
2. Lanny W. Martin and Georg Vanberg. 2005. "Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review," *American Political Science Review* 99 (1):93-106.
3. Tavits, Margit. 2008. The Role of Parties' Past Behavior in Coalition Formation." *American Political Science Review* 102, pp. 495-507
4. Duch, R. M, J. M. David, A. Armtroug II. "Coalition-directed Voting in Multiparty Democracies" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 104, No. 4 November 2010

Further Readings:

1. Rosenbluth, Frances and Kathleen Bawn 2006. "Coalition Parties vs. Coalitions of Parties: How Electoral Agency Shapes the Political Logic of Costs and Benefits." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2): 251-266
2. Golder, Sona. *The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation*. Ohio State Press.
3. Volden, C., and C. J. Carruba. 2004. "The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 48: 521–537.
4. Matthew O. Jackson, Boaz Moselle. 2000. *Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game*
5. Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. 2007. 'Coalition Formation in Nondemocracies.' MIT mimeo. (forthcoming in the *Review of Economic Studies*).
6. Austen-Smith, David and Banks. 1988. Elections, coalitions, and legislative outcomes. *American Political Science Review*
7. Shepsle, Kenneth and Michael Laver. 1996. *Making and Breaking Governments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-5.
8. Martin, Lanny and Randolph Stevenson. 2001. Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies" *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1), pp. 33-50.
9. Lanny W. Martin and Georg Vanberg. 2011
10. Laver, Michael and Norman Schofield. 1998. *Multiparty Government. The Politics of Coalition in Europe*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
11. Strom, Kaare, Muller, Wolfgang, Torbjorn Bergman (eds). 2003. *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapters 1-3.
12. Thies, Michael. 2001. \Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(3), pp. 580-98.
13. Martin, Lanny W. and Georg Vanberg. 2005. \Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review." *American Political Science Review* 99(1), pp. 93-106.

14. Tsebelis, George. 2002. *Veto Players*. Chapter 4.
15. Strom, Kaare. 1984. "Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies. The Rationality of Nonwinning Cabinet Solutions." *Comparative Political Studies* 17(2)
16. Huber, John. 1996. "The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 90(2), pp. 269-282.
17. Tsebelis, George. 1999. "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis." *American Political Science Review*. 93(3), pp. 591-608.
18. Muller, Wolfgang and Kaare Strom. 2000. *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
19. Rasch, Bjorn Erik. 2000. "Parliamentary Floor Voting Procedures and Agenda Setting in Europe." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25(1), pp. 3-23.

Week 7 – October 8

TOPIC: Autocratic Institutions

Questions:

- What political and policymaking problems are authoritarian institutions aimed at solving?
 - What has been their performance in solving these problems?
 - What have their consequences been?
1. Gandhi, Jennifer and Ellen Lust. 2009. "Elections Under Authoritarianism." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 403-422
 2. Greene, Kenneth. 2010. "The Political Economy of Single-Party Dominance." *Comparative Political Studies*
 3. Boix, Carles and Milan Svolik. 2008. "The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and Power-sharing in Dictatorship." Forthcoming, *Journal of Politics*, April 2013. (also University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Mimeo)
 4. Joseph Wright. 2008. "Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment," *American Journal of Political Science* 52(3): 322-43.
 5. Albertus, Michael and Victor Menaldo. 2012. "If You're Against Them You're With Us : The Effect of Expropriation: on Autocratic Survival" *Comparative Political Studies* 45: 973

Further Readings:

1. Myerson, Roger B. 2008. 'The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State.' *American Political Science Review*. 102(1): 125-139.18
2. Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2004. 'Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition.' *Comparative Politics*. 36(2): 159-179.
3. Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson and Thierry Verdier. 2004. 'Kleptocracy and Divide and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule.' Alfred Marshall Lecture, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, April-May 2(2-3): 162-192.
4. Besley, Timothy and Masayuki Kudamatsu. 2007. 'Making Autocracy Work.' London School of Economics <http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/tbesley/papers/maw.pdf>
5. Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. 2006. 'Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion under Dictatorship.' *Economics and Politics*. 18(1): 1-26.
6. Epstein, Lee, Jack Knight, and Olga Shvetsova. 2001. The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment of Democratic Systems of Government. *Law and Society Review*, 35, 1: 117-67.
7. Svobik, Milan. 2008. "Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation," *American Political Science Review* 102(2):153-68
8. Egorov, Georgy and Konstantin Sonin. 2006. 'Dictators and their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-off.' <http://ssrn.com/abstract=630503>

WEEK 8 – October 15

TOPIC: Institutions and Special Interest Groups

***** 2-PG ANNOTATED RESEARCH PROPOSAL IS DUE*****

Questions:

- How do institutions influence the number, representativeness and organization of special interest groups?
- How do institutions influence the lobbying tactics of special interest groups?
- How do institutions influence the effectiveness and success of sigs?
- Do institutions affect the welfare consequences of sig lobbying behaviours?

Required Readings:

1. Maxfield, Sylvia and Max Schneider 1997. *Business and Politics in Emerging Markets* Chapter 2.
2. Naoi, M., and E. Krauss. 2009. "Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics under Alternative Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 53: 874-892.
3. Harstad and Svensson 2011 "Bribes, Lobbying and Development" *APSR* 105(1)

4. Campos and Giovannoni 2007 *Public Choice* “Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence” 131:1-21

OR

Yadav 2011. Political Parties, Business Groups and Corruption Ch 2, 4 and 5.

Further Readings:

1. Liebert, U. 1995. Parliamentary Lobby Regimes. In *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, ed. H. Döring. Frankfurt: Campus-Verlag.
2. Persson, T., and G. Tabellini. 2002. *Political Economic: Explaining Economic Policy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chapters 6, 7 and 13.
3. Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman. 2000. *Special Interest Politics*.
4. Frieden, J. A. 1991. Invested Interests. *International Organization* 45: 425–451.
5. Gray and Lowery 2004. “A Neopluralist Perspective on Research on Organized Interests” *Political Research Quarterly* 57:164-175.
6. Baumgartner, F., and B. Leech. 2001. “Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics.” *Journal of Politics* 63: 1191–1213.
7. Bennesen, M., and S. E. Feldman. 2002. “Lobbying and Legislative Organization: The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure.” *Business and Politics* 3, no. 2: 187–203.
8. Melanie Cammett *Business Politics in Africa*. Cambridge University Press
9. Virginia Gray and David Lowery 2004. “A Neopluralist Perspective on Research on Organized Interests” *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 57, No. 1. (1 March 2004), pp. 164-175
10. Scott Kennedy 2005. *The Business of Lobbying in China*. Harvard University Press
11. Ben Ross Schneider. 2004. *Business-Politics and the State in Twentieth-Century Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.
12. Various articles in the *Journal of Public Administration*, Special Issue, 8: 15–32. Articles covering Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America, China, India
13. Campos, N. and F. Giovannoni. 2008. “Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes,” London, CEPR Discussion Paper 6962.

WEEK 9 – October 22

TOPIC: Institutions and the Bureaucracy

Questions:

- How do institutions influence the structure of delegated relationships?
- How do institutions influence the nature of delegated relationships?
- How do institutions influence the political and policy consequences of bureaucratic behaviors?

Required Readings:

1. Huber, J. D., and C. R. Shipan. 2006. "Politics, Delegation, and Bureaucracy." Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Ed. Barry Weingast and Don Wittman. New York: Oxford University Press.
2. Huber, J. D., and C. R. Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 2 and 6.
3. Iyer, Lakshmi and Anandi Mani. Forthcoming "Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India." *Review of Economics and Statistics*. Available at <http://www.people.hbs.edu/liyer/>

Further Readings:

1. Daniel Carpenter. 2001. *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Chaps. 1 and 4.
2. Bennesen, M., and S. E. Feldman 2006. "Lobbying Bureaucrats." *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 108, no. 4: 643–668.
3. Moe and Caldwell. 1994. *The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems*. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 150/1, pp. 171-195.
4. Bawn, K. 1997. "Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 13: 101–126.
5. Bawn, K. 1995. "Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures." *American Political Science Review* 89: 62–73.
6. McCarty, N. 2004. "The Appointments Dilemma." *American Journal of Political Science* 48:413–428
7. Epstein, D., and S. O'Halloran. 1994. Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion. *American Journal of Political Science* , 38: 697–722.

WEEK 10 – October 29**TOPIC: Institutions and the Judiciary****Questions:**

- How do institutions affect the adoption of various judicial and legal rules?
- How do they affect the practice of judicial independence?
- How do they affect the rule of law realized in practice in a country?

Required Readings:

1. McCubbins, Matthew and Daniel Rodriguez 2008. "The Judiciary and the Role of Law." Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Eds. Barry Weingast and Don Wittman. New York, NY: Oxford University Press
2. Feld, L., & Voigt, S. 2003. Economic growth and judicial independence: Cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 19(3), 497–527.
3. Iaryczower, M., P. Spiller, and M. Tommasi. 2006. "Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation." *American Political Science Review* 100: 85–97.
4. Stephenson, Matthew C. 2003. "When the Devil Turns . . . ": The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review" *The Journal of Legal Studies* Vol. 32: 59-89

Further Readings:

1. Ginsburg, Tom and Tamir Moustafa, eds. 2008. *Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Chavez Rebecca Bill. 2008. "The Rule of Law and Courts in Democratizing Regimes" in Gregory Caldeira, Dan Keleman, and Keith Whittington (eds.). *Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
3. Ginsburg, Tom. 2008. "The Global Spread of Constitutional Review" in Gregory Caldeira, Dan Keleman, and Keith Whittington (eds.). *Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
4. Hayo, Bernd and Stefan Voigt. 2007. "Explaining de facto Judicial Independence" in *International Review of Law and Economics* Vol. 27: 269-90
5. Landes, William M. and Richard A. Posner. 1975. "Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective." *Journal of Law and Economics*. 18: 875-901
6. Hirschl, Ran. 2004 *Judicialization of Politics*. Harvard University Press
7. Magaloni, Beatriz. 2003. *Authoritarianism, Democracy and the Supreme Court: Horizontal Exchange and the Rule of Law in Mexico*. In *Democratic Accountability in Latin America*, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna. New York: Oxford University Press. 266–305
8. Popova 2010. Political Competition as Obstacle to Judicial Independence. *Comparative Political Studies* 2010 43: 1202.
9. Staton, Jeffrey 2010. *Judicial power and strategic communication in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press
10. Helmke, Gretchen. 2002. The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina Under Democracy and Dictatorship. *American Political Science Review* 96, 2 (June): 305–20.

11. Stephen Haber, Armando Razo, and Noel Maurer (2003) *The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press), Chapters 1-3.
12. David Stasavage (2003) *Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and Great Britain, 1688-1789* (New York: Cambridge University Press)
13. Daniel Berkowitz, Karina Pistor, Jean-Francois Richard 2001. "Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect" William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series <http://ideas.repec.org/p/wdi/papers/2001-410.html>
14. Assegaf, Rifqi. 2007. "Judicial Reform in Indonesia: 1998-2006." Unpublished Manuscript.
15. Trochev, Alexei .2004. "Less Democracy, More Courts: A Puzzle of Judicial Review in Russia" *Law & Society Review* Vol. 38:513-546.

Week 11 – November 5

TOPIC: Institutions and the Policymaking Process

Questions:

- What are the important policymaking models in Political Science?
- What is the role of institutions in these policymaking models?

Required Readings:

1. Tsebelis, George. 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism." *British Journal of Political Science* 25: 289-326.
2. Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini (2003) *The Economic Effects of Constitutions* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1,2,7,8,9
3. Lijphart, Arend 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government forms and performance in Thirty-Six countries*. Chapters 1, 8
4. Sabatier, Paul. 2004. *Politics of Policymaking* chapter 1

Further Readings:

1. Persson, T., and G. Tabellini. 2002. *Political Economic: Explaining Economic Policy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

2. Cox, Gary W., and McCubbins, Mathew D. 2001. The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy, in S. Haggard, and M. D. McCubbins (eds.), *Presidents, Parliaments and Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2
3. Scartascini, Carlos. 2008. "Who's Who in the PMP: An Overview of Actors, Incentives, and the Roles They Play" in Stein, Ernesto and Mariano Tommasi Eds. 2008. *Policymaking in Latin America How Politics Shapes Policies*. Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
4. Sarah M. Brooks, "Interdependent and Domestic Foundations of Policy Change: The Diffusion of Pension Privatization Around the World." *International Studies Quarterly* 2:2005 (2005): 273–294.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=16719702&site=ehost-live>
5. Rockman, B. A. and R. K. Weaver. 1992. *Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
6. Peter Hall, "The Role of Interests, Institutions, and Ideas in the Comparative Political Economy of the Industrialized Nations," in Lichbach and Zuckerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Structure, and Culture*, 174-207.
7. Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. 1999. "Governance Matters." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2196. Available at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/govmatters2.pdf>
8. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998 Chapters 1 and 16
9. Bugarcic, Bojan. 2001. "Courts as Policy-Makers: Lessons from Transition." *Harvard International Law Journal* 42: 247–88.
10. Bjorkman, Martina and Jakob Svensson (forthcoming), "Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment of Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
11. Tim Besley and Robin Burgess. 2002. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India", *QJE*, 117(4).
<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/00335530232093506>
12. Keefer, P. 2005. "Clientelism, Credibility and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies." Presented at "The Quality of Government: What It Is, How to Get It, Why It Matters," International Conference, Goteborg, November 17–19.
13. Barbara Stallings, "International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization, and Structural Reform," in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufmann, eds. *The Politics of Economic Adjustment*. Princeton, N.J, Princeton University Press 1992, pp 41-88

TOPICS IN CPE:

WEEK 12 – November 12

TOPIC: Institutions, Development and Growth

1. “Institutions, Integration, and Geography: In Search of the Deep Determinants of Economic Growth,” in *Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth*, ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik.academic.ksg/growthintro.pdf.
2. Acemoglu & Robinson Ch. 2, pp. 15-44, Chs. 8-10, pp. 221-304.
3. Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. New York: Cambridge UP, 2000, Chapters 1-2.
4. Kitschelt and Daniel M. Kselman. 2012. “Economic Development, Democratic Experience, and Political Parties' Linkage Strategies” *Comparative Political Studies* published online 21 September 2012

Further Readings:

1. Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge UP.
2. Sachs, Jeffrey. 2003, “Institutions Don’t Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per Capita Income.” NBER Working Paper 9490 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research). <http://www.nber.org/papers/9490>
3. Douglass North. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
4. Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development” NBER WP 9305, October 2002. <http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/9305.html>
5. Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge UP. Chapters 2,4, 6.
6. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson. “Reversal Of Fortune: Geography And Institutions in The Making Of The Modern World Income Distribution.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117 (4) 1231 – 1294
<http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/qjecon/v117y2002i4p1231-1294.html>
7. North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. ‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.’ *Journal of Economic History*. 49(4): 803-832.
8. Gerring, John, Philip Bond, William T. Barndt, Carola Moreno. 2005. “Democracy & Economic Growth: A Historical Perspective,” *World Politics* 57(3):323-64
9. Acemoglu and Robinson. *Institutions as a fundamental cause of long run growth* http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~jrobinson/researchpapers/publishedpapers/jr_institution_scause.pdf

10. Feld, Lars P., and Stefan Voigt. 2003. "Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators", *European Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 19: 497-527.
11. Bardhan, P. 1993. "Analytics of the Institutions of Informal Cooperation in Rural Development." *World Development* 21: 633–639
12. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2000) Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective, *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115 (4): 1167-1199.
13. Przeworski, A. and F. Limongi (1997). "Modernization: Theories and Facts." *World Politics* 49(2).4.
14. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes Source: "Endogenous Democratization" *World Politics*, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Jul., 2003), pp. 517-549 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054237>
15. Evans, Peter 1997. Chapter 4 in Maxfield and Schneider 1997.
16. Valenzuela, J. Samuel y Arturo, "Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin American Underdevelopment," *Comp Pol* 10(4), July 1978, 535-52.
17. Wibbels, Erik. 2006. "Dependency Revisited: International Markets, Business Cycles, and Social Spending in the Developing World." *International Organization* Spring: 433-469.
18. Morrow, J.D., B. Bueno de Mesquita, R.M. Siverson, and A. Smith. 2008. "Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of W from Other Elements of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 102(3):393-400.
19. Robert Bates (2008) *When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press), chapters 1, 2, and 6.
20. Robert Bates. 2005. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press)
21. Timothy Besley, Rohini Pande, Vijayendra Rao "Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource" Allocation in South India
<http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/tbesley/papers/justrewards.pdf>
22. Shafer, D. Michael. *Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Development Prospects of States*. Cornell UP 1994, chs. 1,2,7.
23. Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision? An Experimental Approach", *APSR*, 101(4), 709-725.
<http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/HHPW.pdf>
24. Robert H. Bates, John H. Coatsworth, Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2009. "Lost decades: Lessons from post independence Latin America for Today's Africa"
<http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/williamson/files/w12610.pdf>
25. T. N. Srinivasan "China and India: Economic Performance, Competition and Cooperation An Update"
<http://www.econ.yale.edu/~srinivas/C&I%20Economic%20Performance%20Update.pdf>

26. Duflo, Esther, Rachel Glennerster, and Michael Kremer, "Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit", <http://econwww.mit.edu/files/806>
<http://www.nber.org/papers/t0333>
27. Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein. 2009. "Field Experiments and the Political Economy of Development" Annual Review of Political Science

WEEKS – November 19, Dec 3 and December 10

WE WILL CHOOSE 3 OF THE FOLLOWING 6 TOPICS

TOPIC: Institutions, Inequality and Redistribution

Required Readings:

1. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press: chapters 8-9.
2. Samuels and Ansell 2014. *Inequality and Democratization* CUP
3. Rickard, Stephanie. 2009. "Strategic Targeting: The Effect of Institutions and Interests on Distributive Transfers," Comparative Political Studies 42(5):670-95.
4. Volden, Craig, and Alan E. Wiseman. 2007. "Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods," American Political Science Review 101(1):79-92.
5. Iversen, Torben & David Soskice. 2006. "Electoral Systems and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others." American Political Science Review 100: 165-81.

Further readings

1. Christian Houle. 2015 World Politics
2. Drazen, Ch. 8, "Redistribution," 309-71.
3. Avinash Dixit and John Londregan, "Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency." American Political Science Review 89 (December 1995): 856-866.
4. Dixit, Avinash, and John Londregan. 1996. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics," The Journal of Politics 58(4):1132-55.
5. Dixit, Avinash, and John Londregan. 1998. "Fiscal Federalism and Redistributive Politics," Journal of Public Economics 68(2):153-80.
6. Leonard Wantchekon, "Clientelism and Voting Behavior: A Field Experiment in Benin." <http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/wantchekon/research/client.pdf>

7. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, "Inefficient Redistribution." *American Political Science Review* 95 (September 2001): 649-661.
8. Barro, Robert. 2000. "Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries." *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5: 5-32.
9. Easterly, William. "The Political Economy of Growth Without Development: A Case Study of Pakistan" in Dani Rodrik. 2003. *In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
10. Angus Deaton, 2003. "Health, Inequality, and Economic Development" *Journal of Economic Literature*, March 2003, v. 41, iss. 1, pp 113-158
11. W. Easterly and R. Levine, 'Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions' *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112, 4 (1997), 1203-50.
12. Mares, Isabela, and Matthew E. Carnes (2009). "Social Policy in Developing Countries." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12:93-113
13. Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman (2008). *Development, Democracy, and Welfare States*

TOPIC: Transition & Reform

Required Readings:

1. Fernandez, Raquel, and Dani Rodrik, "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual specific Uncertainty [The Case of Trade]," *American Economic Review* 81:1146-55 Dec 1991.
2. Hellman, Joel. 1998. "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions," *World Politics* 50(2):203-34.
3. Frye, Tim 2010 *Building States and Markets After Communism: The Perils of Polarized Democracy*. Cambridge University Press. Ch1-5
4. Levitsky 2011. *Resurgence of the Latin American Left*, Chapters 1 and 6 Johns Hopkins Press

Further Readings:

1. Drazen, Ch. 10, "Inaction, Delay, and Crisis," pp. 403-454.
2. Martinelli, Cesar, Mariano Tommasi. 1997. "Sequencing of Economic Reforms in the Presence of Political Constraints," *Economics and Politics* 9(2):115-131.
3. Benabou, Roland *Transition Economies*. Princeton University Press
4. Frye, Timothy, Edward Mansfield. 2004. "Timing is Everything: Elections and Trade Liberalization in the Post-Colonial World," *Comparative Political Studies* 37: 371-98.

5. Page, Scott E. 2006. "Path Dependence," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 1(1):87-115
6. Brooks, Sarah M. 2009. *Social Protection and the Market in Latin America*.

TOPIC: Institutions and International Trade

Required Readings:

1. Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade," *American Political Science Review* 94:2 (June 2000), 305-321
2. Fiona McGillivray. 1997. "Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs", *American Journal of Political Science*, 41:2 1997.
3. Witold J. Henisz and Edward D. Mansfield. 2006. "Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness," *International Studies Quarterly* 50, 189-211.
4. Tim Büthe, Helen V. Milner. 2008. "The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?" *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4): 741-62.
5. Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade." *International Organization*, 61(1): 37-67.

Further Readings

1. Milner, Helen V., and Keiko Kubota. 2005. "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries." *International Organization* 59(1): 157-193
2. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, "A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (November 2005), 1239-1282.
3. Helen V. Milner and Benjamin Judkins. 2004. "Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy?" *International Studies Quarterly* 48: 95-119.
4. Daniel L. Nielson. 2003. "Supplying Trade Reform: Political Institutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income Presidential Democracies," *American Journal of Political Science* 47:3 July, 470-491.
5. Hankla, Charles R. 2006. "Party Strength and International Trade: A Cross National Analysis." *Comparative Political Studies* 39 (9): 1133-1156.

6. Alicia Adsera and Carles Boix. 2002. Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness, *International Organization* 56 (2): 229-262.
7. Dani Rodrik. 1998. Why do More Open Economies have Bigger Governments? *Journal of Political Economy* 106 (5): 997-1032.
8. Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. "Protection for Sale." *American Economic Review* 84: 833-850.
9. Kishore Gawande and Usree Bandyopadhyay. 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 82: 139-152.
10. Robert H. Bates. 1984. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*. University of California Press.
11. Avelino, George, David S. Brown, Wendy Hunter. 2005. "The Effects of Capital Mobility, Trade Openness, and Democracy on Social Spending in Latin America 1980-1999." *American Journal of Political Science*
12. Rudra, Nita. 2002. "Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare State in Less-Developed Countries." *International Organization* 56: 411-45.

TOPIC: Institutions and Financial Markets

Required Readings:

1. Maurice Obstfeld, Jay C. Shambaugh, and Alan M. Taylor. 2005. "The Trilemma in History: Tradeoffs Among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies, and Capital Mobility," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 87 Aug 2005 423-438.
2. Jeffrey A. Frieden. 2002. "Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration," *International Organization* 56:4, Autumn, 831-860.
3. Mukherjee, Bumba, and Will H. Moore. 2006. "Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies and Foreign Exchange Markets: Theory and Evidence From Europe." *International Studies Quarterly*. 50(1): 93-118.
4. David Bearce. "Societal Preferences, Partisan Agents, and Monetary Policy Outcomes," *International Organization*, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Spring 2003): 373-410.
5. James Raymond Vreeland, "The International and Domestic Politics of IMF Programs," working paper, October 2005

Further Readings

1. William Bernhard and David Leblang. 2006. *Democratic Processes and Financial Markets: Pricing Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1 and 2.
2. David Leblang and Shanker Satyanath, "Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises," *International Organization* 60 (Winter 2006), 245-262.
3. Andrew MacIntyre. 2001. "Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia," *International Organization* 55:1 Winter, 81-122.
4. J. Lawrence Broz and Jeffrey A. Frieden. 2001. "The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 2001: 317-343.
5. William Bernhard and David Leblang, "Democratic Institutions and Exchange-Rate Commitments," *International Organization* 53:1 (Winter 1999), 71-97.
6. Keefer, Philip, and David Stasavage. 2002. "Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments," *International Organization* 56(4): 751-74.
7. Broz, J. Lawrence. 2002. "Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes," *International Organization* 56(4): 861-88.
8. Freeman, John R. 2002. "Competing Commitments: Technocracy and Democracy in the Design of Monetary Institutions," *International Organization* 56(4): 889-910.

TOPIC: Institutions and Agrarian Development

Required Readings:

1. Bates, Robert and Steven Bock. "Revisiting African Agriculture: Institutional Change and Productivity Growth." *JOP* April 2013.
2. Engerman, Stanley L. and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 1997. 'Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States' in Stephen Haber. ed. *How Latin America Fell Behind: Essays on the Economic Histories of Brazil and Mexico, 1800-1914*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
3. Philip T. Hoffman. 1988. "Institutions and Agriculture in Old Regime France." *Politics and Society* 16, 2-3:246-64.
4. Baland, Jean-Marie and James A. Robinson. 2008. "Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile," *American Economic Association*, pp. 1737-65.
5. Banerjee, Abhijit, and Lakshmi Iyer. "History, Institutions and Economic Performance: the Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India." *American Economic Review* 95, no. 4 (September 2005): 1190-1213.

Further Readings:

1. Robert H. Bates. "Some Conventional Orthodoxies in the Study of Agrarian Change." California Institute of Technology, Social Science Working Paper 458, December 1983.
2. To be announced.

TOPIC: Institutions and Corruption

Required Readings:

1. Lambsdorff, J. G. 2006. "Causes and Consequences of Corruption: What Do We Know from a Cross-Section of Countries?" In *International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption*. Ed. Susan Rose-Ackerman. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
2. Treisman, Daniel. 2007. "What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 10:211-44
3. Kunicova, J. 2006. "Democratic Institutions and Corruption: Incentives and Constraints in Politics." In *International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption*. Ed. Susan Rose-Ackerman. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
4. Gueorguiev and Malesky 2012. "Foreign Investment and Bribery: A firm level analysis of corruption in Vietnam", *Journal of Asian Economics* 23: 111-129
5. Yadav and Mukherjee 2015. *The Politics of Corruption in Dictatorships* CUP Ch 2, 3, 7

Further Readings:

1. Gerring, J., and S. V. Thacker. 2004. "Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism," *British Journal of Political Science* 34: 295-330
2. Knack, S. 2008. "Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: A Critique of the Cross-Country Indicators." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3968. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=923275#
3. Claessens, S., E. Feijin and L. Laeven. 2008. "Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions" ECGI Finance Working Paper No, 166/2007. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=945196
4. Claudio Ferraz and Fred Finan. (2008). "Exposing Corruption politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes", *QJE*, 123(2), 703-745. <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.703>

5. Warner, C. 2007. *The Best System Money Can Buy: Corruption in the European Union* . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press
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