

009 Sparks Building Wednesday 1:30 to 4:30 PM

Professor Wright

Office: Pond Lab 233

Office Hours: Thursday 9AM to 11AM, or by appointment

Email: joseph.g.wright@gmail.com

COURSE DESCRIPTION: This course is intended for advanced graduate students in political science. It will be most beneficial for students who have completed an introductory sequence of graduate statistical methods courses and one or two graduate-level courses in non-cooperative game theory. The seminar begins with a brief introduction to classical theories of authoritarian rule, and then surveys the current literature on comparative authoritarianism. Students are expected to produce original research on a topic related to authoritarian politics.

REQUIREMENTS: Students are expected to: (1) attend all seminars; (2) read assigned material and be prepared to discuss the material before each seminar meeting; (3) submit questions to the class before each seminar meeting; (4) participate with comments and questions during seminar; (5) lead seminar discussion; (6) complete an original research paper; and (7) present research findings in seminar.

SEMINAR PARTICIPATION: [items (1) - (4)] Students are expected to attend each seminar, read the assigned material before each class, and be prepared to discuss assigned material. Before 12 noon each Wednesday preceding the seminar, each student is expected to post three discussion questions on CANVAS.

Each week, the class time will be spent: (1) discussing the assigned readings and discussion assignment; or (2) presenting original research. For each week, we discuss and present assigned readings, one student will critique the readings. The instructor will present formal models in readings denoted with a †.

Each class period will be divided into two 80 minutes periods. During the first period, we will do two things: (1) the instructor will present the set-up for the formal model in the assigned reading and the student discussants will present a brief critique of the assigned readings. Following a 15 minute break, the second period of the class will be open discussion of the readings, during which all students are expected to participate by discussing the questions they prepare ahead of time and post on CANVAS.

DISCUSSION LEADER: [item (5)] The discussant's presentation should **NOT** be a summary of the readings. Everyone should have read the material; simply summarizing the material is typically boring and wastes our time. Instead, the presentation of the critique of the readings should accomplish the following.

- What do we need to know and why? (**cocktail napkin**) Each reading has a take-away point. The discussant should outline one take-away point for each reading. (all readings)
- Discuss the **theoretical assumptions**. Are they accurate? plausible? How do the results change if we relax the key assumptions?
- Discuss the **testable implications** of the theory.
- Assess the quality of main **empirical finding**.
- What is the next step in this **research agenda**? The bulk of the presentation should address this point. Propose something: it doesn't have to be right, just plausible. If you could have any type of data, how would you extend this research? Is there a case you know of that doesn't fit the theoretical assumptions? How would you amend the theory to accommodate this evidence? Think about the readings as a whole.

WRITTEN ASSIGNMENTS: [item (6)] There will be two written assignments for this course.

1. A five (5) page research memo that discusses the research question, as well as motivating evidence, assumptions, theory and research design. The 1st written assignment is due on Friday February 15 at 9:00 AM (paper copy).
2. An original research paper. For students who have completed an MA, this paper must be a **theoretical or empirical chapter of your dissertation**. If your dissertation paper is not on a topic related to authoritarianism, the instructor recommends that you drop the course. For second-year students, the **research paper must be your MA paper**. If your MA paper is not on a topic related to authoritarianism, the instructor recommends that you drop the course. For first year students, the instructor will assign each students a research paper topic. First draft of 2nd written assignment is due electronically to the entire class by **12 noon on Monday April 15**. Final draft of 2nd written assignment is due on Monday April 29 at 9:00 AM (paper copy).

RESEARCH PRESENTATION: [(item 7)] Students are expected to present the results from their final research project during the last two seminar sessions. Presentations should be modeled after a conference presentation, which is 12 minutes in length.

GRADING: Seminar participation, including submitting questions on readings each week (20%); **Discussion leader** (20%); **Research paper** (40%); **Research presentation** (20%).

GRADE SCALE: A: 95-100; A-: 90-94.9; B+: 87.9-89.9; B: 83.33-87.8; B-: 80-83.32; FAIL: 0-79.9

READING MATERIALS: The following books are available at your favorite online bookshop, a University Press, or the library. Readings from these books will not be posted on CANVAS. The rest of the required reading materials are available on Google scholar, journal websites, the PSU library, or will be provided by the instructor on [CANVAS](#).

- Magaloni, Beatriz. 2007. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Svobik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Melanie Manion. 2015. *Information for Autocrats*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Caitline Talmadge. 2015. *The Dictator's Army*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. 2016. *Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change*. Princeton University Press
- Rory Truex. 2016. *Making Autocracy Work*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2018. *How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

ADDITIONAL POLICIES

- **SYLLABUS SUBJECT TO CHANGE:** Note that the instructor reserves the right to change the syllabus, subject to providing an updated syllabus to all student on CANVAS and informing all students of the change.

- **ACADEMIC INTEGRITY STATEMENT:** Academic integrity is the pursuit of scholarly activity in an open, honest and responsible manner. Academic integrity is a basic guiding principle for all academic activity at The Pennsylvania State University, and all members of the University community are expected to act in accordance with this principle. Consistent with this expectation, the Universitys Code of Conduct states that all students should act with personal integrity, respect other students dignity, rights and property, and help create and maintain an environment in which all can succeed through the fruits of their efforts.

Academic integrity includes a commitment by all members of the University community not to engage in or tolerate acts of falsification, misrepresentation or deception. Such acts of dishonesty violate the fundamental ethical principles of the University community and compromise the worth of work completed by others.

- **DISABILITY ACCOMMODATION STATEMENT:** Penn State welcomes students with disabilities into the Universitys educational programs. Every Penn State campus has an office for students with disabilities. Student Disability Resources (SDR) website provides contact information for every Penn State campus: <http://equity.psu.edu/sdr/disability-coordinator>.

For further information, please visit the Student Disability Resources website:

<http://equity.psu.edu/sdr/>.

In order to receive consideration for reasonable accommodations, you must contact the appropriate disability services office at the campus where you are officially enrolled, participate in an intake interview, and provide documentation.

See documentation guidelines at: <http://equity.psu.edu/sdr/guidelines>.

If the documentation supports your request for reasonable accommodations, your campus disability services office will provide you with an accommodation letter. Please share this letter with your instructors and discuss the accommodations with them as early as possible. You must follow this process for every semester that you request accommodations.

- **COUNSELING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES STATEMENT:** Many students at Penn State face personal challenges or have psychological needs that may interfere with their academic progress, social development, or emotional wellbeing. The university offers a variety of confidential services to help you through difficult times, including individual and group counseling, crisis intervention, consultations, online chats, and mental health screenings. These services are provided by staff who welcome all students and embrace a philosophy respectful of clients' cultural and religious backgrounds, and sensitive to differences in race, ability, gender identity and sexual orientation.

Counseling and Psychological Services at University Park (CAPS)

(<http://studentaffairs.psu.edu/counseling/>): 814-863-0395

Penn State Crisis Line (24 hours/7 days/week): 877-229-6400

Crisis Text Line (24 hours/7 days/week): Text LIONS to 741741

- **EDUCATIONAL EQUITY/REPORT BIAS STATEMENT :** Penn State takes great pride to foster a diverse and inclusive environment for students, faculty, and staff. Consistent with University Policy AD29, students who believe they have experienced or observed a hate crime, an act of intolerance, discrimination, or harassment that occurs at Penn State are urged to report these incidents as outlined on the Universitys Report Bias webpage: <http://equity.psu.edu/reportbias/>.

READINGS: All readings are REQUIRED, except noted with a *. † indicates the required reading contains a formal model that the instructor will present the model set-up in class.

- **Week 1: Introduction & Scheduling (January 9)**

Classic works

1. *Machiavelli, Nicolo. 1984. *The Prince*. Bantam Classics. [CANVAS](#)
2. *Arendt, Hannah. 1958. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt & Brace. 305-326, 364-437. [CANVAS](#)
3. *Friedrich, Carl J. & Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. 1956. *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 15-27, 45-59, 70-81 [CANVAS](#)

Required readings

1. Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *American Political Science Review* 87: 567-576.
2. Haber, Stephen. 2006. "Authoritarian Government." In Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, (Oxford University Press), pp. 693-707. [CANVAS](#)
3. Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-21
4. Svobik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-17.
5. Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2018. *How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-13.

- **Week 2: The Authoritarian Landscape (January 16)**

Required readings

1. †Gehlbach, Scott, Konstantin Sonin, and Milan W. Svobik. 2016. "Formal models of nondemocratic politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19: 565-584.
2. Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What do we know about democratization after twenty years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2(1): 115-144.
3. Levitsky, Steven & Lucan A. Way. 2002. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy* 13(1): 51-65.
4. Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014. "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set." *Perspectives on Politics*. 12(2): 313-331.

Additional readings for discussion

1. Goemans, H.E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza. 2009. "Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders." *Journal of Peace Research* 46(2): 269-283.
2. Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. "Dictatorship and Democracy Revisited." *Public Choice* 143(1-2): 67-101.
3. Wright, Joseph. 2019. "The Latent Characteristics That Structure Autocratic Rule." [CANVAS](#)

- **Week 3: Distributional Foundations (January 23)**

Required readings

1. Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Mark S. Bonchuck. 1997. *Analyzing Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. pp. 82-91, 103-127. [CANVAS](#)

2. †Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 92-109, 118-151. [CANVAS](#)
3. †Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1. [CANVAS](#)

Additional readings for discussant

1. Albertus, Michael. 2015. *Autocracy and Redistribution: The Politics of Land Reform*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-77. [CANVAS](#)

● **Week 4: Critiques of the Distributional Model (January 30)**

Required readings

1. Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. 2016. *Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change*. Princeton University Press. Introduction & Chapters 1–4.
2. Slater, Dan, Benjamin Smith, and Gautam Nair. 2014. “Economic origins of democratic breakdown? The redistributive model and the postcolonial state.” *Perspectives on Politics* 12.2: 353-374.

Additional readings for discussant

1. Daniel Ziblatt. 2008. “Does Landholding Inequality Block Democratization? The ‘Bread and Democracy’ Thesis and the Case of Prussia”. *World Politics*. 60 (4): 610-641.
2. Ansell, Ben, and David Samuels. 2010. “Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach.” *Comparative Political Studies* 43(12): 1543-1574 .
3. *Comparative Democratization Newsletter*. “Inequality and Democratization: What Do We Know?” October 2013.

● **Week 5: Research Week (February 6) NO CLASS**

● **Week 6: Personalism & Power Concentration (February 13)**

Required readings

1. †Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3.
2. Talmadge, Caitlin. 2015. *The Dictator’s Army*. Chapters 1, 2, & 4.
3. Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2018. *How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse*. Chapters 4 & 5.

Additional readings for discussant

1. Escriba-Folch, Abel. 2013. “Accountable for what? Regime types, performance, and the fate of outgoing dictators, 1946-2004.” *Democratization* 20(1): 160-185.
2. Sudduth, Jun Koga. 2017. “Strategic logic of elite purges in dictatorships.” *Comparative Political Studies* 50(13): 1768-1801.
3. Morgenbesser, Lee. 2018. “Misclassification on the Mekong: The origins of Hun Sen’s personalist dictatorship.” *Democratization* 25(2): 191-208.

● **Week 7: Repression (February 20)**

Required readings

1. Policzer, Pablo. 2009. *The rise and fall of repression in Chile*. University of Notre Dame Press. Chapters 2–4. [CANVAS](#)

2. †Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 5.
3. Ritter, Emily Hencken, and Courtenay R. Conrad. 2016. "Preventing and responding to dissent: The observational challenges of explaining strategic repression." *American Political Science Review* 110(1): 85-99.
4. Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2018. *How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 7.
5. †Dragu, Tiberiu, and Adam Przeworski. 2018. "Preventive Repression: Two Types of Moral Hazard." *American Political Science Review*. Published online.

Additional readings for discussant

1. Barany, Zoltan. 2011. "The role of the military." *Journal of Democracy* 22(4): 24-35.
2. Blaydes, Lisa. 2018. *State of Repression: Iraq under Saddam Hussein*. Princeton University Press. Chapters 2 & 10. [CANVAS](#)

• **Week 8: Coups & Military rule (February 27)**

Required readings

1. Roessler, Philip. 2011. "The enemy within: Personal rule, coups, and civil war in Africa" *World Politics* 63(2): 300-346.
2. Geddes, Barbara, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright. 2014. "Military Rule." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 17(1): 147-162.
3. Singh, Naunihal. 2014. *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. Chapter 2. [CANVAS](#)
4. Marinov, Nikolay, and Hein Goemans. 2014. "Coups and democracy" *British Journal of Political Science* 44(4): 799-825.
5. Powell, Jonathan, Mwita Chacha, and Gary Smith. 2019. "Opening up, or Digging in? Failed coups, Democratization, and Authoritarian Entrenchment." *African Affairs*. forthcoming.

Additional readings for discussant

1. Nordlinger, Eric. 1977. *Soldiers in politics: military coups and governments*. Prentice Hall. pp. 47-56, 60-61, 65-85, 99-106, 141-147, 178-82. [CANVAS](#)
2. Carey, Sabine C., Michael P. Colaresi, and Neil J. Mitchell. 2016. "Risk mitigation, regime security, and militias: Beyond coup-proofing." *International Studies Quarterly* 60(1): 59-72.
3. Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2018. *How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse*. Chapter 3.

• **Week 9: Spring Break (March 6) NO CLASS**

• **Week 10: Political Parties (March 13)**

Required readings

1. Magaloni, Beatriz. 2007. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-5.
2. †Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 6.
3. Gehlbach, Scott, and Philip Keefer. 2012. "Private investment and the institutionalization of collective action in autocracies: ruling parties and legislatures." *The Journal of Politics* 74.2: 621-635.

4. Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2018. *How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 5.

Additional readings for discussant

1. Fainsod, Merle. 1967. *How Russia Is Ruled*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp: 463-476. [CANVAS](#)
2. Greene, Kenneth. 2010. "The Political Economy of Single-Party Dominance." *Comparative Political Studies* 43(7): 807-834.
3. Reuter, Ora John. 2017. *The Origins of Dominant Parties*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2. [CANVAS](#)

• **Week 11: Institutions (March 20)**

Required readings

1. †Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 3 & 6.
2. Truex, Rory. 2016. *Making Autocracy Work*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-6.
Friday, March 22, 2019: Guest Lecturer, Rory Truex, 12:15 PM, 302 Pond

Additional readings for discussant

1. †Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4.
2. Pepinsky, Thomas. 2014. "The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism." *British Journal of Political Science*. 44(3): 631-653..
3. Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2018. *How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 190–201.

• **Week 12: Elections (March 27)**

Required readings

1. Gandhi, Jennifer and Ellen Lust. 2009. "Elections Under Authoritarianism." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 403-422.
2. †Little, Andrew T. 2017. "Are non-competitive elections good for citizens?." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 29(2): 214-242.
3. Knutsen, Carl Henrik, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård and Tore Wig. 2017. "Autocratic Elections: Stabilizing Tool or Force for Change?" *World Politics* 69.1: 98-143.
4. Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2018. *How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 6.
5. Morgenbesser, Lee, and Thomas B. Pepinsky. 2019. "Elections as Causes of Democratization: Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Political Studies* 52(1) 3–35

Additional readings for discussant

1. Levitsky, Steven & Lucan Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: The Origins and Evolution of Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 & 2. [CANVAS](#)
2. Hyde, Susan & Nikolay Marinov. 2012. "Which Elections Can Be Lost?" *Political Analysis* 20(2): 191-210.

3. Miller, Michael K. 2015. "Elections, information, and policy responsiveness in autocratic regimes." *Comparative Political Studies* 48: 1526-1562.

- **Week 13: Research Week (April 3) NO CLASS**
- **Week 14: Information and Authoritarian Control (April 10)**

Required readings

1. King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. 2013. "How censorship in China allows government criticism but silences collective expression." *American Political Science Review* 107(2): 326-343.
2. Gunitsky, Seva. 2015. "Corrupting the cyber-commons: Social media as a tool of autocratic stability" *Perspectives on Politics* 13(1): 42-54.
3. Hollyer, James R., B. Peter Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2015. "Transparency, protest, and autocratic instability." *American Political Science Review* 109(4): 764-784.
4. Manion. 2015. *Information for Autocrats*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-77.

Additional readings for discussion

1. Manion. 2015. *Information for Autocrats*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 78-154.
2. Dukalskis, Alexander, and Johannes Gerschewski. 2017. "What autocracies say (and what citizens hear): proposing four mechanisms of autocratic legitimation." *Contemporary Politics* 23.3: 251-268.

- **Weeks 15 & 16: Student Presentations (April 17 & 24)**

Additional Suggested Readings on Media and Censorship

- Petrova, Maria. 2012. "Mass Media and Special Interest Groups." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 84(1): 1738.
- Gehlbach, Scott, and Konstantin Sonin. 2014. "Government Control of the Media." *Journal of Public Economics* 118: 163171.
- ^xLorentzen, Peter. 2014. "China's strategic censorship." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(2): 402-414.
- Shadmehr, Mehdi, and Dan Bernhardt. 2015. "State Censorship." *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics* 7(2): 280307.
- ^xBreuer, Anita, Todd Landman, and Dorothea Farquhar. 2015. "Social media and protest mobilization: Evidence from the Tunisian revolution." *Democratization* 22(4): 764-792.
- Stier, Sebastian. 2015. "Democracy, autocracy and the news: the impact of regime type on media freedom." *Democratization* 22(7): 1273-1295.
- ^xHuang, Haifeng. 2015. "A war of (mis) information: The political effects of rumors and rumor rebuttals in an authoritarian country." *British Journal of Political Science*
- ^xLittle, Andrew T. 2016. "Communication Technology and Protest." *The Journal of Politics* 78(1): 152-166.

Additional Suggested Readings on Resource Wealth and Authoritarianism

- Mahdavi, Hussein. 1970. "The Patters and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: the Case of Iran." in M. Cook (editor). *Studies in Economic History of the Middle East*. Oxford University Press.
- Chaudry, Kiren. 1989. "The Price of Wealth: Business and State in Labor Remittance and Oil Economies." *International Organization*, vol. 43, no. 1, Winter, 1989.
- Luciani, Giacomo. 1990. "Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework." In *The Arab State*, ed. Giacomo Luciani. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Karl, Terry. 1997. *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States*. Ch. 3-5, 7-10
- Ross, Michael. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53: 325-361
- Herb, Michael. 2004. "No Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development, and Democracy." *Comparative Politics* 37: 297-317.
- Jensen, Nathan & Leonard Wantchekon. 2004. "Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 37: 816-841.
- Smith, Benjamin. 2006. "The Wrong Kind of Crisis: Why Oil Booms and Busts Rarely Lead to Authoritarian Breakdown." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 40(4): 55-76
- Ulfelder, Jay. 2007. "Natural Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 40: 995-1018.
- Dunning, Thad. 2008. *Crude Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-4, 5.1
- Smith, Alastair. 2008. "The Perils of Unearned Income." *Journal of Politics* 70: 780-793.
- Morrison, Kevin. 2009. "Oil, Nontax Revenue, and Regime Stability." *International Organization*. 63: 107-138.
- Dunning, Thad. 2010. "Endogenous Oil Rents." *Comparative Political Studies* 43(3): 379-410.
- Jones-Luong, Pauline and Erika Weinthal. 2010. *Oil is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-6

- Haber, Stephen & Victor Menaldo. 2011. "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse." *American Political Science Review* 105(1): 1-26.
- Ramsey, Kris. 2011. "Revisiting the Resource Curse: Natural Disasters, the Price of Oil, and Democracy." *International Organization*. 65(3): 507-529.
- Tsui, Kevin. 2011. "More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence from Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries." *The Economic Journal*. 121(551): 89-115.
- Ross, Michael. 2012. *The Oil Curse*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ahmadov, Anar K. 2014. "Oil, Democracy, and Context: A Meta-Analysis." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(9):12381267.
- Wright, Joseph, Erica Frantz, and Barbara Geddes. 2015. "Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival." *British Journal of Political Science*. 45(2): 287306.
- Mahdavi, Paasha. 2015. "Explaining the Oil Advantage: Effects of Natural Resource Wealth on Incumbent Reelection in Iran." *World Politics* 67(2):226267.
- Wahman, Michael, and Matthias Basedau. 2015. "Electoral Rentierism? The Cross-National and Subnational Effect of Oil on Electoral Competitiveness in Multiparty Autocracies." No. 272. *GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies*.
- Menaldo, Victor. 2016. *The Institutions Curse: Natural Resources, Politics, and Development*. Cambridge University Press.
- Rikhil R. Bhavnani and Noam Lupu. 2016 "Oil Windfalls and the Political Resource Curse: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Brazil".