

**The Lexus vs. the Olive Tree: Individual Choice between Globalization
and Nationalism**

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Abstract

Globalization supposedly creates two antagonistic groups of individuals. One supports globalization because it increases economic prosperity, while the other opposes globalization because it eliminates difference and instead, embraces nationalism. Whether and how individuals choose between these attitudes has not been theoretically explained or empirically analyzed. I examine the distribution of individuals into globalists and nationalists and find that a majority of individuals divide themselves in the postulated manner. I argue that personal and national economic conditions explain the incidence of globalism and traditional nationalism. I test my hypotheses on 11,354 individuals in 20 countries in 2003 using a multilevel multinomial regression model. I find that higher-skilled individuals, citizens of richer countries, and individuals with access to greater public social protection are more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists. Residence in a wealthier country increases the effect of skill level on globalism. Socioeconomic status influences neither globalism nor traditional nationalism.

In a popular account of the characteristics and implications of contemporary globalization, Thomas Friedman (1999) identifies two groups of individuals. The first group, symbolized by the Lexus, is “dedicated to modernizing, streamlining, and privatizing their economies in order to thrive in the system of globalization” (27). In contrast, the second group, symbolized by the olive tree, seeks to maintain the customs and institutions that provide a sense of belonging in and identification with a community, tribe, nation, and/or religion. These groups do not coexist peacefully because, according to Friedman, the “Lexus” group with its “anonymous, transnational, homogenizing, standardizing market forces and technologies” threatens the “olive trees” survival (29). Benjamin Barber (1992) echoes this categorization by arguing that we are witnessing both the “onrush of economic and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity...pressing nations into one commercially homogenous global network” and a “retribalization of large swaths of humankind by war and bloodshed.” Therefore, globalization creates two antagonistic groups, one which supports globalization because it may expand economic prosperity and one which opposes globalization because it may eliminate difference.

Are individuals divided into “Lexuses” and “olive trees” as Friedman suggests? Is there a group of globalists and another group of nationalists? More importantly, given the supposedly increasing irrelevance of national borders and national governments under globalization, are there individuals who remain nationalistic? The literature on globalization and nationalism has not addressed these questions empirically, nor has it adequately examined how individuals choose between these allegedly conflicting attitudes, if they do so at all. While the prevailing view is that globalism and nationalism are incompatible and individuals ascribe to only one position (e.g. Kaldor 2004), there is little explanation for why this is the case. I draw on

economic and political science arguments to motivate hypotheses about a number of economic, political, and social factors influencing individual choice.

I first examine the distribution of individuals into nationalists and globalists to determine whether a significant number of individuals remain nationalistic under globalization. I thus assess the accuracy of Friedman's conceptualization of the "Lexus" and the "olive tree." I find that the vast majority of individuals divide themselves in the manner postulated by Friedman and that nationalism persists at the individual level.

I then argue that economic conditions are central to the choice between globalism and nationalism. Drawing upon the factor endowment model and arguments regarding support for financial liberalization (see Quinn and Inclan 1997), I contend that a higher skill level (especially in wealthier countries) and a higher socioeconomic status correlate with globalism. But, personal economic conditions do not fully explain preferences for globalism or nationalism. Since the environment in which individuals are embedded helps shape their opinions and choices, the state of the national economy must be considered as well. Residence in a more prosperous country or one with greater public social protection should encourage globalism.

Yet, economic theories only go part of the way in clarifying attitude formation. I therefore control for various political and demographic characteristics of individuals, such as political affiliation, employment sector, sex, age, and place of residence. I also account for the degree to which a country is globalized as the greater probability of a negative experience with globalization may cause individuals to retreat to economic and cultural nationalism.

I test these arguments using data from 11,354 individuals in 20 countries in 2003. Employing a multilevel multinomial regression model, I ascertain whether these variables influence the choice between four attitudes: globalism, traditional nationalism, enlightened

nationalism, and anti-ism. However, I primarily focus on the determinants of the first two attitudes because I want to address directly the “Lexus”/“olive tree” dichotomy.

My economic theories of attitude formation concerning globalism and traditional nationalism are mostly supported. Higher-skilled individuals and citizens of more prosperous countries are significantly more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists. Furthermore, residence in a wealthier country increases the effect of skill level on the odds of globalism. Individuals with access to greater public social protection are also more disposed toward globalism. The results for national prosperity and public social protection indicate that national characteristics must be considered when theorizing how globalist and nationalist attitudes are constructed. Socioeconomic status does not influence globalism or nationalism. In terms of the control variables, I find that females and urban residents are significantly more inclined toward globalism, while older individuals, political rightists and public sector employees favor traditional nationalism. Interestingly, the level of a country’s global integration has no effect on the probability of globalism versus traditional nationalism at the individual level.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, I define globalization and nationalism. Second, I review the literature on these phenomena. Third, I examine the distribution of individuals into globalists and nationalists. Fourth, I provide an economic theory that explains the choice between globalism and traditional nationalism. Fifth, I describe the data used and the econometric model estimated. Sixth, I present the findings and their implications. Lastly, I conclude and introduce some avenues for future research.

DEFINING GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONALISM

Before determining whether and why individuals divide themselves into “Lexuses” and

“olive trees,” globalization and nationalism must be defined. Otherwise, it will be difficult to understand nationalism’s continued salience or decline, as well as why individuals support globalization or nationalism. It is in these phenomena’s attributes that we may begin to find answers.

Defining globalization has been contentious as scholars have argued that different aspects of the trend are critical to assessing the reasons for, extent and consequences of globalization. However, most definitions emphasize one or a combination of four characteristics: the increasing political, economic, social, and geographical linkage of people around the world.

For example, Croucher (2004) treats globalization as a cluster of related changes in economics, technology, culture, and politics that further global interconnectedness (13). These changes include expanding and intensifying trade and investment, the central role of multinational corporations (MNCs) in organizing global production and financial transactions, increasing technological sophistication, the rapid and extensive flow of cultural goods, and multilayered governance. Blum (2007) also underlines globalization’s economic and cultural nature by defining it as accelerated and intensified flows of capital, people, goods, information and ideas. Yet, he adds a geographical component to his definition by characterizing globalization as greater penetration across nation-state borders leading to deterritorialization and the growing irrelevance of physical and national borders (5). Other scholars emphasize this aspect of globalization as well (e.g. Held et al. 1999 and Scholte 2005), suggesting that globalization compresses space and pulls together individuals and communities which were separate or loosely connected (Brown 1995).

This brief survey shows that globalization is a multifaceted phenomenon that cannot be reduced to one characteristic, whether it is economics or geography (see Stiglitz 2003).

Otherwise, the ability to understand the causes and consequences of globalization at varying levels of analysis is lost. Therefore, I define globalization as the growing interconnectedness between individuals, firms, governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and other groups through increasingly sophisticated technology that renders distance and location almost insignificant. As a result of this increasing interconnectedness, trade and investment expand, production structures go global, information and ideas disseminate more intensely, cultures integrate, governance diffuses, and territory is superseded.

The concept of nationalism is contested as well. Gellner (1983) provides the standard definition of nationalism as the doctrine that the political unit (the state) and the cultural unit (the nation) should be congruent. Croucher (2004: 118) agrees when she differentiates nations from ethnic groups because nations possess “a degree of political self-consciousness that manifests itself as widespread support for or mobilization in pursuit of a state.” Snyder (2000: 23) views nationalism more broadly as “the doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their culture, history, institutions, or principles should rule themselves in a political system that expresses and protects those distinctive characteristics.” This definition allows nations to be organized around characteristics other than culture and recognizes that nationalism’s aim can be something other than a sovereign state. In this regard, it is similar to that of Scholte (2005: 225, 227), who conceptualizes nationalism as a “circumstance where people construct their being, belonging and becoming first and foremost in terms of national affiliation” and nationhood depends on having a large population, a territorial homeland, a series of distinctive attributes, and uniqueness constructed via interactions with “foreigners.”

These definitions indicate that nationalism rests upon a group of people perceiving themselves as different from “others” based upon some set of characteristics that it deems vital to

creating and maintaining a sense of belonging and identity. With one exception, they suggest that nationalism involves a political project (e.g. an independent state, autonomy within an existing state, or cultural and linguistic protection) that will preserve the nation's uniqueness. Given these definitions' similarities, I employ Snyder's (2000) description because it best captures nationalism's ideational and political aspects.

THE STATUS OF NATIONALISM UNDER GLOBALIZATION

The literature on globalization and nationalism tends to take one of two positions: globalization erodes national identity or globalization reinvigorates national identity. In the enthusiasm greeting the collapse of communism and the rapid acceleration of global integration in the 1990s, many scholars predicted that national identities would weaken, contributing to the emergence of a supranational identity or the reversion to local identities. National attachment would deteriorate in the face of globalization for four reasons (Evans and Kelley 2002: 304).

First, transnational linkages internationalize and universalize culture (Barber 1992). Second, increasing economic complexity and international market integration renders the nation-state obsolete in that states are unable to manage their economies effectively through traditional fiscal and monetary policies (Friedman 1999, Held 1990, Held et al. 1999, Ruggie 1994, and Scholte 2005; see Bhagwati 2004 and Gilpin 2001 for a counterargument). Third, the expanded scope of the market within and among countries decreases what the state can offer its citizens in terms of social welfare, undermining national attachment and pride (Croucher 2004, Kapstein 1996 and Rodrik 1997). Lastly, the strengthening of local identities, the rise of supranational identities, and the pluralization and hybridization of identities chip away at the foundations of national loyalty (Alonso 1995, Blum 2007, Croucher 2004, Dogan 1994 and Scholte 2005).

However, national identity and pride are not eroding. Evans and Kelley (2002) find that individuals in 24 developed countries have strong national pride in their country's science, economy, arts and literature, and sport in 1995. Based on individual-level data from the 1973 Eurobarometer survey and the 1981 and 1990 World Values Survey, Dombrowski and Rice (2000) conclude that national identity is not weakening in Europe in favor of a unified European identity or sub-national identities. Loyalty to territorially-based organizations has been stable for the last 20 years, despite geographic region, socioeconomic class, educational level, and age cohort (85).

Using data from public opinion surveys from 1981 to 2004, Klesner (2006) determines that Mexican national pride has not diminished. In fact, identification with the nation, as opposed to regions, states, and localities, has grown. In a 2003 Gallup Poll, 76 percent of Canadians had strong national pride with 41 percent saying that they were "extremely" proud to be Canadian (Burkholder). Similarly, in a June 2006 Gallup poll, 82 percent of Americans were "extremely" or "very" proud to be an American (Newport). Finally, the relative electoral success of some European far-right parties (e.g. Austria's Freedom Party), the persistence or eruption of national identity-based conflicts (e.g. the Kurds), and post-9/11 American foreign and domestic policies (e.g. stricter immigration controls) are further evidence of nationalism's continued salience.

What explains this enduring national attachment and pride, despite globalization's supposedly homogenizing tendencies? Kaldor (2004) argues that national pride in general and especially the more nationalistic variety are still prevalent because they respond to the growing insecurity and frustration resulting from the dramatic structural changes of globalization. With declining state provision and public employment, rapid urbanization, and large-scale migration

from the countryside to the cities and from the underdeveloped to the developed countries in the past two decades, more people are feeling economically threatened, culturally lost, and politically alienated (169). Nationalist ideologies and membership in nationalist groups offer a sense of purpose, belonging, and power that would not otherwise exist.

Globalization also threatens “to wash away all cultural difference, undermining the foundation of distinct social and political institutions” (Blum 2007: 12). It endangers the integrity of many individuals’ identities and their means of “being, belonging, and becoming” (Scholte 2005 and Rupert 2000: chapter 5). In order to protect their national identity and its supporting institutions, individuals may reject components of globalization, while affirming their unique national characteristics and “localizing” some products transmitted through globalization (Blum 2007). Individuals rely on nationalism as a way of mediating the effects of globalization.

Thus, nationalists should be hostile to free trade, foreign investment, international cultural flows, political interdependence, and globalization in general as they feel more politically, economically and culturally aggrieved than others by the new global system (see Mayda and Rodrik 2005 for evidence that nationalism fosters protectionist attitudes). Individuals should divide into two groups—those who support globalization and its institutions and those who oppose globalization and embrace nationalist policies. Within and across countries, individuals should be partitioned into a group of “Lexuses” and a group of “olive trees,” to borrow Thomas Friedman’s labels (1999).

Table 1 displays a cross-tabulation of individuals in 32 countries in 2003 according to their level of globalism and nationalism.ⁱ A large majority of individuals oppose global integration, while being strongly nationalistic. I label these individuals “traditional nationalists.” At the same time, approximately 10 percent of individuals favor globalization and have weak

nationalist sentiment. These individuals are “globalists.” More than 71 percent of the sample separates in the manner postulated, though traditional nationalists dominate.

[Table 1 about here]

For the most part, the same pattern occurs within countries. In 24 out of the 32 countries in Table 1, a majority of citizens are traditional nationalists, while less than 15 percent are globalists. The exceptions to this pattern are the Netherlands, Germany, the Scandinavian countries, and Switzerland, in which individuals are more evenly distributed among the possible attitude sets.ⁱⁱ These countries are either above average in terms of global integration, multinational, or haunted by a horrific nationalist past. Nonetheless, I can conclude nationalism is alive and well, even under globalization.

Approximately 19 percent of individuals in the sample profess support for both globalization and nationalism, contrary to conventional theories. I consider these individuals “enlightened nationalists” because they may believe that globalization could usefully serve national interests. In addition, roughly 9 percent of individuals oppose globalization and nationalism and I classify them as the “antis.” This group is likely composed of disparate individuals, such as communitarians, localists, and anarchists, who abhor the idea of overarching organizations, whether they be corporations, nations or international institutions. Though the existence of these groups is unexpected and in need of explanation, I do not account for them in this paper, either theoretically or empirically. I focus on understanding the other attitude sets because they have received the most attention in the literature.

UNDERSTANDING GLOBALISM AND NATIONALISM

The choice to be a globalist or a nationalist should primarily depend on one’s personal

economic situation, as well as the state of the national economy. The factor endowment model, otherwise known as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, partly explains the first causal mechanism. Commodities differ in their factor intensities and countries differ in their factor endowments. Given the conditions of supply and demand, abundant factors tend to be less expensive inputs to production than scarce factors. A country can benefit from international trade by exporting those commodities whose factor intensities match its factor endowments while importing those products whose factor intensities fit less well with its factor endowments (Sobel 2006: 124).

As a result, trade liberalization benefits the abundant factors of production. When production shifts to commodities that employ the abundant factors due to their greater supply and lower costs, the relative prices of the abundant factors increase as demand for these factors increase. A country's abundant factors should support free trade while its scarce factors do not (Scheve and Slaughter 2001 and Sobel 2006: 124-125). For the higher-income countries included in the empirical analysis, the abundant factor is skilled labor. In order to protect their increasing income from freer trade, skilled workers should be more likely to support globalization and oppose economic nationalist policies (O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001).

The role of personal economic conditions in determining attitudes toward globalism and nationalism is further justified by Quinn and Inclan's (1997) argument regarding support for financial liberalization. Skilled workers in the higher-income countries benefit economically from financial openness compared to semi-skilled workers because their relative income increases with greater financial liberalization. Since semi-skilled workers do not have a marginal advantage in global markets due to unionization and relatively high wages, foreign capital has little incentive to invest in domestic enterprises that intensively employ semi-skilled labor. On the other hand, skilled workers, at least in capital-scarce economies, see their wages driven up as

foreign capital competes for their services. Again, skilled workers should be more inclined toward globalism than nationalism so as to maintain their increasing incomes. These expectations lead to the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: Higher-skilled individuals in the higher-income countries will be more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists.

In no way does skill level adequately capture an individual's personal economic situation, though we can roughly infer from it the type of work they do, the amount of compensation they receive for that work, and where they stand socioeconomically. It would be theoretically better to consider other aspects of an individual's economic position. I suspect that how an individual views their economic status, especially when compared to their fellow citizens, has a strong impact on whether they favor globalism over nationalism.

Those individuals who think that they are relatively well-off may feel more secure about their economic situation because their wealth affords them a financial cushion in the event of unemployment or a recession (Scheve and Slaughter 2004). Wealthier individuals also tend to be more skilled, making it easier for them to find a job quickly if they become unemployed. The financial position of the comparatively wealthy is thus less threatened by the structural changes inherent in economic globalization. For them, globalization is a phenomenon that must not necessarily be feared.

In contrast, those who perceive themselves to be relatively poor may worry about the repercussions of decreased wages, sudden unemployment, and recession due to their potentially devastating effects on their economic well-being. These individuals may not have the savings

necessary to pay their bills on time while they seek new or more gainful employment. If they think the current global economic and political environment puts them at a disadvantage, in terms of relative income and/or social standing, they might seek ways of ameliorating the situation. Economic nationalism may become an attractive option, compared to international competition, capital mobility, heightened immigration and other aspects of globalization that affect businesses' ability to maintain profitability and in turn, high wage and employment levels.

The decrease in public social protection expenditures accompanying globalization in many countries compounds the potentially precarious financial situation of relatively poorer individuals. As Scheve and Slaughter (2004) point out, if globalization limits the actual or perceived capacities of governments to provide social insurance, then economically insecure individuals may further fear globalization, especially if global integration heightens labor-market risks (662). Lower-income individuals may blame their economic insecurity on globalization and oppose policies aimed at expanding international trade, immigration, foreign direct investment (FDI) and participation in international economic regimes. Instead, they favor policies that promise to maintain domestic economic strength and autonomy. In contrast, wealthy individuals are economically secure in the present and foresee little need for government assistance in the future if they become unemployed, leading to a higher probability of globalism on their part. These expectations lead to the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals with a higher perceived socioeconomic status will be more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists.

Yet, individuals do not sympathize with globalists or nationalists solely on the basis of

their personal socioeconomic attributes. Many of these attributes shape and are shaped by the political, economic, and social context in which individuals are embedded. As insinuated by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and Quinn and Inclan's (1997) theory of financial liberalization support, the abundance of human capital and the level of domestic economic prosperity are important in the development of globalist and nationalist attitudes.

High-income countries should be associated with greater globalist sentiment among their citizens for two reasons. First, high-income countries are comparatively more endowed with skilled labor, which favors free trade and financial liberalization. Second, high-income countries have been better able to formulate and implement policies that stimulate and sustain economic growth and high standards of living. These policies have increasingly meant further integration into the global system. Free trade, FDI, immigration, and greater security through international organizations, among other components of globalization, enlarge the opportunities for additional economic growth. Citizens of advanced countries will not want to jeopardize future economic growth and their national and personal economic prosperity by forgoing global integration and supporting nationalist policies, such as trade protectionism and political isolationism. They should prefer globalism over nationalism. These expectations lead to the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3: Individuals in more prosperous countries will be more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists.

Another reason why citizens of the high-income countries may be more disposed toward globalism is that their governments have the financial resources with which to provide substantial social welfare and help their citizens deal with globalization's vagaries (Rodrik 1997

and 1998). But, the impact of social welfare is not confined to the advanced countries. As the social safety net for individuals whose wages and benefits have been reduced or who become unemployed due to foreign competition widens, the probability that an individual opposes globalization should decrease (Adserà and Boix 2002 and Hays et al. 2005). Citizens with government-sponsored social protection may see their poor economic situation as temporary and perceive opportunities for future success. They will be more optimistic about their prospects and less averse to globalization. They may also believe that the level of social protection renders nationalist policies less needed. These arguments lead me to the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4: Individuals in countries with greater public social protection expenditures are more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists.

Economic theories can only partly explain individual propensities toward globalism and nationalism as they do not account for the political and demographic characteristics of individuals nor the political and social environment in which they are embedded. In order to assess adequately the strength of the previous economic models, I must include some relevant control variables. I focus specifically on political affiliation, employment sector, sex, age, place of residence and the degree to which a country is globalized.

I suspect that right-party supporters are more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists since right parties have traditionally represented the interests of MNCs, commercial banks, capital owners, and other groups that often benefit from economic integration. On the other hand, leftists should be more inclined toward traditional nationalism. Their parties tend to represent labor interests, which are shaped in part by the disadvantaged position of semi-skilled

and unskilled labor in the developed countries.

Public sector employees should be more disposed to traditional nationalism than globalism. The shift in governance away from territorial bureaucratic national governments to municipal, provincial, national, macro-regional, global and private bodies renders the national public sector less vital to domestic regulation, and employment in it less prestigious. In addition, the need to attract foreign capital and maintain competitiveness via balanced budgets leaves less money available for national bureaucracies and state-owned industries. These threats to their livelihood convince public sector employees that policies that preserve the national public sector's role in governance and economics are superior to those that promote global integration.

While feminist scholars may disagree and point to the increased hardships and inequalities for women under globalization (e.g. low pay, poor working conditions, and a disproportionate presence in informal, temporary and part-time jobs), I expect that women should be more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists. Economic globalization has helped women in terms of narrowing the gender wage gap and providing opportunities for gainful employment (Bhagwati 2004: chapter 7), while cultural globalization has diffused the norm of gender equality in politics. According to Kaldor (2004), women are less frustrated and alienated by the structural changes of globalization, and thus less inclined to seek membership in nationalist or religious groups for a sense of belonging and purpose. Smith and Kim (2006) find supporting evidence in that men express more national pride than do women (132).

Previous work on national pride and nationalism indicate that older individuals should be more likely to be traditional nationalists than globalists (Dogan 1994, Evans and Kelley 2002 and Smith and Kim 2006). National pride and nationalism have declined across generations in reaction to the nationalist extremes that triggered World War II and as the intense patriotism of

that period dissipated (Smith and Kim 2006: 132). Furthermore, younger people have spent most of their lives in a globally integrated world and should more easily adapt to its relationships, expectations, and changes. In contrast, older individuals are often excluded from globalization. Middle-aged workers find it more difficult to adjust their skill set in this period of global economic restructuring and face the prospect of long-term unemployment. Older people are also less likely to participate in new modes of communication due to, in their view, the daunting nature of computer technologies (Scholte 2005: 342).

Urbanites should prefer globalism over nationalism for two reasons. First, urban centers tend to be favored under globalization relative to rural areas. Global communications, global markets, global finance and global organizations locate their headquarters in and focus their attention on cities, not the countryside (Scholte 2005: 341). Second, urbanites are more likely to interact meaningfully everyday with people of different ethnicities, nationalities, and/or religions than those in more sparsely populated areas. This renders them less likely to harbor exclusionary nationalist sentiments and more likely to accept cosmopolitanism.

Finally, citizens of countries little touched by globalization should be less likely to be traditional nationalists, if they have a discernable attitude at all. Because these individuals have less exposure, especially of the negative variety, with globalization's economic, political and social effects, they may perceive less need for nationalistic policies. In contrast, citizens of countries deeply intertwined with the global economy or culture may hold favorable or unfavorable opinions of globalization, depending on their personal experience and their country's relative position in international relations. To a degree, the relationship between a country's level of globalization and the propensity toward globalism and nationalism is indeterminate *ex ante*.

Before describing the research design and findings, I should mention that there is a counterargument to the claim that nationalists are hostile to free trade, FDI, immigration, and economic interdependence. Some scholars maintain that nationalists do not uniformly support protectionist and autarkic policies and may support global economic integration as a means of bolstering national growth and competitiveness and reducing the influence of the nation's "other" in the region (Helleiner and Pickel 2005, Shulman 2000). For example, both the Liberal Party of Québec and the Parti Québécois support free trade and economic integration, especially with the United States, "because of the benefits they offer to Québécois autonomy through increased economic diversification and strength, despite the potential loss to Québécois identity through the threat of increased cultural penetration from the United States" (Shulman 2000: 375).

In addition, there is evidence that individuals possess "conflicting" attitudes in that they are both globalists and nationalists. Klesner (2006) finds that Mexicans demonstrate strong national pride and a willingness to deepen integration with the United States, provided they have had positive experiences with economic integration. Table 1 indicates that roughly 19 percent of individuals in 32 countries in 2003 are globalization supporters and strong nationalists. While I recognize the theoretical possibility and the empirical reality of "enlightened nationalists," I focus in this paper on delineating and understanding the determinants of globalism and traditional nationalism. I leave the explanation of enlightened nationalism to future work.

DATA AND METHODS

The objective of the empirical analysis is to assess the impact of several individual- and country-level economic characteristics on globalist and traditional nationalist attitudes. In accordance with the factor endowment model and theories of support for financial liberalization,

I evaluate how skill level, socioeconomic status, and domestic economic prosperity shape opinions of globalization and nationalism. I also estimate the effect of public social protection expenditures because greater government intervention in the economy may alleviate the negative consequences of globalization and increase globalism. To obtain the most accurate estimates, I control for political affiliation, sex, age, place of residence, employment sector, and national exposure to globalization. My data cover individuals in 20 high- and middle-income countries, providing a valuable opportunity to study the relationship between the explanatory variables, globalism and traditional nationalism.ⁱⁱⁱ

The individual data are from the International Social Survey Programme's *National Identity II Survey* (2003). This survey is a cross-national representative sample of approximately 46,000 individuals in 34 countries.^{iv} It has detailed information about each respondent's national consciousness, national identity, and demographic attributes. The most important information for my analysis are the indicators of national pride and support for global integration, as well as the measures of the respondent's educational attainment, socioeconomic status, political affiliation, sex, age, place of residence, and employment sector.

The data on national economic prosperity are obtained from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators Online Database*. The data on public social protection are from the International Labor Organization's *Social Security Expenditure Database*. This database covers 124 countries and contains information regarding sickness, maternity, old-age, invalidity, survivors', family, employment injury, and unemployment benefits.

The data on each country's degree of global integration are from the *CSGR Globalisation Index*. This index measures the economic, social and political dimensions of globalization for 196 countries and territories on an annual basis from 1982 to 2004, and combines them into an

annual overall globalization score for each country or territory. The economic globalization sub-index measures trade, FDI, portfolio investment, foreign investment income, and employee compensation paid to non-resident workers and resident workers abroad. The social globalization sub-index measures foreign stock, foreign population flows, worker remittances, tourists, international phone calls, Internet users, film imports and exports, book and newspaper imports and exports, and international mail. The political globalization sub-index includes the number of foreign embassies in a country, UN peacekeeping operations in which a country participates, and memberships in international organizations.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the respondent's choice between four attitudes: traditional nationalism, globalism, enlightened nationalism, and anti-ism. The dependent variable's construction proceeded in three steps. First, I created a nationalism index, similar to that of Smith and Kim (2006). It was composed of the responses to the following six questions:

“Some people say that the following things are important for being truly

[NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not important.

How important do you think having been born in [COUNTRY] is?”

“How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

I would rather be a citizen of [COUNTRY] than of any other country in the world.

The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [COUNTRY NATIONALITY].

Generally speaking, [COUNTRY] is a better country than most other countries.

People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.”

“How proud are you of being [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]?”

For each question, lower scores indicate greater nationalism. Scores to these questions were summed, giving the nationalism index a range of 6 to 28. Respondents with scores between 6 and 17 were coded as strong nationalists, while those with scores between 18 and 28 were coded as weak nationalists.^v

Second, I constructed a globalism index. It was composed of the responses to the following five questions, which capture the economic, political, and cultural dimensions of globalization:

“How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?”

[COUNTRY] should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.

[COUNTRY’S] television should give preference to [COUNTRY] films and programmes.

Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in [COUNTRY].

International organizations are taking away too much power from the [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] government.

Increased exposure to foreign films, music, and books is damaging our national and local cultures.”

The responses vary from a minimum of 1 for individuals who give the response “agree strongly” to a maximum of 5 for those individuals giving the response “disagree strongly.” Scores to these questions were summed, giving the globalism index a range of 5 to 25. Respondents with scores between 5 and 15 were coded as globalization opponents, while those

with scores between 16 and 25 were coded as globalization supporters.

Third, the dependent variable *Attitude* was created. It equals 1 if the respondent is a weak nationalist and a globalization opponent (i.e. an anti), 2 if the respondent is a strong nationalist and a globalization supporter (i.e. an enlightened nationalist), 3 if the respondent is a weak nationalist and a globalization supporter (i.e. a globalist), and 4 if the respondent is a strong nationalist and a globalization opponent (i.e. a traditional nationalist). The number and percentage of respondents in the sample with each attitude is provided in Table 1.

Independent Variables

I hypothesize that four economic variables play a significant role in the choice between globalism and traditional nationalism: skill level, socioeconomic status, domestic economic prosperity, and public social protection expenditures. I use educational attainment as a proxy for skill level. *Education* is a categorical variable that measures the highest educational level or degree the respondent has completed. It equals 0 if the respondent has no formal qualification, 1 if they have the lowest formal qualification, 2 if they have above the lowest qualification, 3 if they completed the higher secondary level, 4 if they completed more than the higher secondary level, and 5 if they have a university degree.

SES is the respondent's self-placement on a scale of socioeconomic status ranging from 1 (the lowest class) to 10 (the highest class). While an objective measure of socioeconomic status (e.g. income) may be preferable to reduce measurement error, this indicator assesses the respondents' perception of their economic situation relative to others, which I argue has a greater impact on their opinion of the costs and benefits of globalization and nationalism than would their actual socioeconomic status.^{vi}

Domestic economic prosperity is measured as the logged GDP per capita in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. *GDP per capita* is interacted with *Education* to better assess the factor endowment model and theories of support for financial liberalization.

The amount of public social protection is measured as the public social protection and health expenditures of each country as a percentage of GDP. For the previous two country-level variables, the data are from the year prior to the implementation of the *National Identity II Survey* in that country.

The variable *Party* captures political affiliation. It is a categorical variable that measures the respondent's self-placement on a left-right continuum for party preference or vote intention. It ranges from 1 if the respondent favors far-left parties to 5 if the respondent favors far-right parties. The variable *Sex* equals 0 for males and 1 for females.

Age is the age of the respondent in years. *Urban* equals 1 if the respondent indicated that they live in an urban area, the suburbs, a town, or a small city and 0 if the respondent indicated that they live in a country village or on a farm. *Public* equals 1 if the respondent works for the government, a publicly-owned firm, or a national industry and 0 otherwise.

The variable *Global Index* is the overall globalization index for each country in the year prior to the implementation of the *National Identity II Survey* in that country. This index ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating greater global integration.

Econometric Model

To determine the role of individual and national economic conditions on globalism and traditional nationalism, I employ a multilevel multinomial regression model. As previously mentioned, my dataset is comprised of individuals from 20 countries. While pooling individuals

across many countries has obvious advantages, it generates some estimation issues. Because one unit of analysis (individuals) is nested within another unit of analysis (countries), my data have a hierarchical structure and I must use multilevel regression modeling techniques. Otherwise, the fact that individuals from the same country may be more similar to each other than to individuals from a different country may lead to correlated residuals, underestimated standard errors, biased hypothesis tests and a violation of the independence assumption of OLS regression.

In addition, I am interested in the variation between countries in their citizens' propensity for globalism or traditional nationalism and the possible explanations for this variation. Traditional regression models would not adequately estimate the relationship between country-level factors and individual attitudes. Therefore, I estimate a multilevel multinomial regression model with explanatory variables at the individual and country levels.^{vii} I choose multinomial regression because the dependent variable is composed of four unordered categories. The model is shown below with i indexing each individual observation in country j . There are M possible categories of the outcome, *Attitude*, which takes on the value of m with $\text{Prob}(\text{Attitude} = m) = \varphi_m$, for $m = 1, \dots, M$.

$$\text{Prob}(\text{Attitude}_{ij} = 1) = \varphi_{1ij}, \quad (1)$$

$$\text{Prob}(\text{Attitude}_{ij} = 2) = \varphi_{2ij}, \quad (2)$$

$$\text{Prob}(\text{Attitude}_{ij} = 3) = \varphi_{3ij}, \quad (3)$$

$$\text{Prob}(\text{Attitude}_{ij} = 4) = \varphi_{4ij} = 1 - \varphi_{1ij} - \varphi_{2ij} - \varphi_{3ij}. \quad (4)$$

$$\eta_{mij} = \log(\varphi_{mij}/\varphi_{Mij}) \quad (5)$$

$$\eta_{mij} = \beta_{0j(m)} + \beta_{1j(m)}\text{Education}_{ij} + \beta_{2j(m)}\text{SES}_{ij} + \beta_{3j(m)}\text{Party}_{ij} + \beta_{4j(m)}\text{Sex}_{ij} + \beta_{5j(m)}\text{Age}_{ij} + \beta_{6j(m)}\text{Urban}_{ij} + \beta_{7j(m)}\text{Public}_{ij}, \quad (6)$$

$$\beta_{0j(m)} = \gamma_{00(m)} + \gamma_{01(m)}\text{Global Index}_j + \gamma_{02(m)}\text{Public Social Protection}_j +$$

$$\gamma_{03(m)}GDP\ per\ capita_j + u_{0j(m)}, \quad (7)$$

$$\beta_{1j(m)} = \gamma_{10(m)} + \gamma_{11(m)}GDP\ per\ capita_j + u_{1j(m)}, \quad (8)$$

$$\beta_{2j(m)} = \gamma_{20(m)} + u_{2j(m)} \quad (9)$$

$$\beta_{3j(m)} = \gamma_{30(m)} + u_{3j(m)} \quad (10)$$

$$\beta_{4j(m)} = \gamma_{40(m)} \quad (11)$$

$$\beta_{5j(m)} = \gamma_{50(m)} + u_{5j(m)} \quad (12)$$

$$\beta_{6j(m)} = \gamma_{60(m)} + u_{6j(m)} \quad (13)$$

$$\beta_{7j(m)} = \gamma_{70(m)} \quad (14)$$

Equations 1 through 4 denote the probabilities with which *Attitude* takes on particular values. Equation 5 is the multinomial logit link function in which the outcome at the individual level is the log-odds of falling into category m relative to category M . Thus, M is the reference category. Equation 6 is the individual-level model. *Education*, *SES*, *Party*, and *Age* have been grand-mean centered to ease interpretation of the intercepts. The other individual-level predictors remain in their dummy variable metric. I model $\beta_{0j(m)}$, the intercept, as a function of three country-level variables, all grand-mean centered, as shown in Equation 7. Equation 8 shows that $\beta_{1j(m)}$, the *Education* variable's slope, is modeled as a function of *GDP per capita*, specifying a cross-level interaction. I view the other individual-level coefficients as random, except $\beta_{4j(m)}$ and $\beta_{7j(m)}$. The variance components of these latter coefficients are statistically insignificant in a χ^2 test.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

My predictions about the economic determinants of individual-level globalism and traditional nationalism are mostly borne out. Table 2 shows the relationship between the

independent and control variables and the log-odds of globalism relative to traditional nationalism.^{viii}

[Table 2 about here]

Holding *GDP per capita* at its mean, higher-skilled individuals are more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists. Each unit increase in educational attainment significantly increases the odds of the respondent supporting globalization and opposing nationalism by 58 percent. As a country's GDP per capita increases, higher-skilled individuals are even more inclined toward globalism relative to traditional nationalism. When GDP per capita is one unit above the mean, educational attainment increases the odds of globalism by 91 percent. These findings confirm Hypothesis 1, as well as the logic of the factor endowment model and theories of support for financial liberalization.

In contrast, Hypothesis 2 finds little support. While the direction of the *SES* coefficient corresponds with my expectations, it is insignificant. Perceptions of socioeconomic status do not affect the propensity for globalism or traditional nationalism.

But, the extent of national economic prosperity does, in accordance with Hypothesis 3. Holding *Education* at its mean, individuals in wealthier countries are more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists. Each unit increase in *GDP per capita* significantly increases the odds of globalism by 182 percent. A country's endowment of skilled labor and ability to formulate and implement policies that foster economic growth and increase standards of living are clearly vital to the predominance of globalism and the diminution of traditional nationalism.

The provision of substantial public social protection also matters. Individuals in countries with greater public social protection expenditures are significantly more prone to globalism than traditional nationalism, in line with Hypothesis 4. A one-unit increase in public

social protection expenditures translates into a 7 percent increase in the odds of globalism. When governments use social welfare policies, such as unemployment insurance, to combat the negative effects of globalization, individuals become less averse toward globalization because they may view a poor financial situation in the future as temporary.

Four control variables perform in the expected manner. Sex, age, place of residence and employment sector are all significantly related to the choice between globalism and traditional nationalism. Women are more likely to be globalists than men with the odds of a woman favoring globalization and rejecting nationalism 15 percent higher than a man's odds of doing so. Younger individuals are also more likely to favor globalism over traditional nationalism. A one-year increase in age translates into a 2 percent decrease in the odds of globalism. The same conclusion can be drawn about urbanites; they are predisposed toward globalism. Dwelling in an urban area increases the odds of globalism by 42 percent. In contrast, public sector employees are significantly less likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists. If an individual is employed in the public sector, the odds of globalist sentiments decrease by 16 percent.

Contrary to my expectations, individuals with right-leaning political views are significantly less likely to be globalists in comparison to traditional nationalists. A one-unit movement toward the right leads to a 32 percent decrease in the odds of globalism. This finding could be attributed to far-right parties. While center-right parties usually represent business interests and should be more amenable to globalization, far-right parties tend to speak for xenophobic and strongly nationalistic individuals. The coefficient for *Global Index* is negative and surprisingly insignificant. I conclude that individuals do not support globalization or traditional nationalism based on their country's level of global integration.^{ix}

Both individual- and country-level economic conditions are important for understanding

the origins of globalist and traditional nationalist attitudes. Individuals who are higher-skilled or residents of countries with greater economic prosperity or extensive public social protection are significantly more likely to be globalists. Yet, economic theories provide only a partial explanation as political affiliation, sex, age, place of residence, and employment sector are also significant. It is clear that individuals are not only affected by their personal characteristics and experiences, but also by the political, economic, and social environment in which they are embedded. If we ignore this latter effect, much information necessary to comprehend individual perceptions of globalization and nationalism would be lost.

CONCLUSION

The conventional view of globalization, popularized by Friedman (1999) and Barber (1992), asserts that it produces two antagonistic groups. The first group opposes globalization because it supposedly diminishes national, religious, and communal differences. Instead, it embraces nationalism as a defense against the homogenization and instability wrought by global integration. In contrast, the second group supports globalization and opposes nationalism because the former may promote modernization and economic growth. But, the extant literature has not empirically examined whether individuals divide in this manner nor has it adequately theorized about how individuals choose between globalism and nationalism. Our current understanding of the demographic, socioeconomic, and political factors influencing this decision is, at best, partial. I have attempted to fill these gaps.

I first examined the distribution of individuals into globalists and nationalists to see whether a significant number of individuals remain nationalistic under globalization. I thus determined that Friedman's conceptualization of the "Lexus" and the "olive tree" has merit. I

found that the vast majority of individuals divide themselves in the manner he suggested. Roughly 62 percent of individuals in the sample are traditional nationalists, while almost 10 percent are globalists. Nationalism clearly persists at the individual level.

I argued that personal and national economic conditions explain the choice between globalism and traditional nationalism. Drawing upon the factor endowment model and theories of support for financial liberalization, I asserted that a higher skill level (especially in wealthier countries) and perceived socioeconomic status correlate with globalism. I also proposed that residence in a more prosperous country or one with greater public social protection expenditures encourage globalism. In order to account for the fact that economic theories may only partially clarify attitude formation, I controlled for various political and demographic characteristics of individuals, as well as the degree to which a country is globalized.

I tested these arguments using data from 11,354 individuals in 20 countries in 2003. I used a multilevel multinomial regression model to ascertain whether the prior variables influence the choice between four attitudes: globalism, traditional nationalism, enlightened nationalism, and anti-ism. I focused on the determinants of the first two attitudes so as to address directly the “Lexus”/“olive tree” dichotomy.

The economic explanations for the formation of globalist and traditional nationalist attitudes are mostly supported. Higher-skilled individuals and citizens of higher-income countries are significantly more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists. Furthermore, residence in a wealthier country increases the effect of skill level on the odds of globalism. Individuals with access to greater public social protection are also more disposed toward globalism. The country-level findings indicate that national characteristics must be considered when theorizing how globalist and traditional nationalist attitudes are constructed. However, an

individual's perceived socioeconomic status has no discernable impact.

As for the control variables, females and urbanites are significantly more inclined toward globalism, while older individuals, political rightists and public sector employees favor traditional nationalism. Interestingly, the level of a country's global integration has no effect on the odds of globalism compared to traditional nationalism.

The results of the empirical analysis suggest a few reasons for the enlightened nationalism on the part of some individuals (at least compared to traditional nationalism). It appears that the individual- and country-level economic factors proposed above are important for explaining this attitude as well (see Appendix A). For example, more educated individuals in higher-income countries are more likely to be enlightened nationalists than traditional nationalists. However, more theoretical and empirical work needs to be done in order to illuminate the degree of congruence between globalism and nationalist goals, at least in individuals' minds. I plan to pursue this line of inquiry in order to assess the validity of the popular claim that globalism and nationalism are incompatible and ascertain whether globalism reduces nationalism's violent tendencies.

Two other limitations of this paper suggest avenues for future research. First, the temporal domain of the empirical analysis is constrained to one year due to data availability. It would be useful to know how attitudes toward globalization and nationalism change over time, especially given changes in the degree and form of global integration, as well as governmental responses to these developments. To answer this question, panel data must be collected.

Second, globalization and nationalism are analyzed in their totality. Little attention was given to attitudes toward specific components of globalization and nationalism (e.g. the role of international organizations, the importation of cultural goods). The concepts of globalization and

nationalism should be decomposed to examine which aspects of these phenomena individuals accept or reject, when they do so, and the reasons behind these choices. There are many other directions for future research that will further clarify the sources of individual preferences for globalism and/or nationalism. But, this paper's theories and findings provide a useful starting point.

**Table 1: A Cross-Tabulation of Nationalism and Globalism in 32 Countries
in 2003**

	Weak nationalist	Strong nationalist	Total
Globalization opponent	2,783 (9.25%)	18,597 (61.82%)	21,380 (71.07%)
Globalization supporter	2,951 (9.81%)	5,752 (19.12%)	8,703 (39.09%)
Total	5,734 (19.06%)	24,349 (80.94%)	30,803 (100%)

**Table 2: Conditional Model of Individual-Level Globalism
Versus Traditional Nationalism**

	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>
Individual Level		
<i>Intercept</i>	-2.565***	0.261
<i>Education</i>	0.459***	0.059
<i>SES</i>	0.019	0.027
<i>Party</i>	-0.384***	0.073
<i>Sex</i>	0.140**	0.068
<i>Age</i>	-0.025***	0.004
<i>Urban</i>	0.354**	0.144
<i>Public</i>	-0.180**	0.074
Country Level		
<i>Global Index</i>	-0.229	1.257
<i>Public Social Protection</i>	0.064**	0.026
<i>GDP per capita</i>	1.038*	0.548
Cross-Level Interaction		
<i>Education x Log GDP per capita</i>	0.189*	0.108
Variance Components		
Var (u ₀)	1.084***	--
Var (u ₁)	0.030***	--
Var (u ₂)	0.004	--
Var (u ₃)	0.078***	--
Var (u ₅)	0.0002***	--
Var (u ₆)	0.235**	--

*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

**Appendix A: Conditional Model of Individual-Level Enlightened
Nationalism Versus Traditional Nationalism**

	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>
Individual Level		
<i>Intercept</i>	-1.485***	0.142
<i>Education</i>	0.265***	0.046
<i>SES</i>	0.081***	0.023
<i>Party</i>	0.003	0.037
<i>Sex</i>	-0.207***	0.051
<i>Age</i>	-0.015***	0.003
<i>Urban</i>	0.381***	0.129
<i>Public</i>	-0.206***	0.058
Country Level		
<i>Global Index</i>	0.390	0.631
<i>Public Social Protection</i>	0.034**	0.013
<i>GDP per capita</i>	0.978***	0.276
Cross-Level Interaction		
<i>Education x Log GDP per capita</i>	0.221**	0.081
Variance Components		
Var (u ₀)	0.266***	--
Var (u ₁)	0.023***	--
Var (u ₂)	0.004	--
Var (u ₃)	0.012	--
Var (u ₅)	0.0002***	--
Var (u ₆)	0.233*	--

*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

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ⁱ The measurement of individual-level globalism and nationalism will be explained below. Data are from the International Social Survey Programme's *National Identity II Survey*. Bulgaria and New Zealand are excluded from this cross-tabulation. Bulgarians were not asked a question that forms part of the nationalism index, while New Zealanders were not asked a question included in the globalism index.

ⁱⁱ The cross-tabulation of the Czech respondents is not informative because there are few observations.

ⁱⁱⁱ These countries are Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Fourteen countries were excluded due to issues of data availability.

^{iv} The number of individuals in the empirical analysis decreases to 11,354 because I limit the analysis to citizens and because there is missing data.

^v I chose this cutoff because it divides the range into roughly equal halves. The cutoff between the globalization supporters and opponents was chosen for the same reason.

^{vi} It may seem that *Education* and *SES* measure similar constructs and should not be included in the same model. However, their correlation in the estimation sample is only 0.29.

^{vii} Robust standard errors cannot be computed for my model.

^{viii} To determine whether there is enough variation at the country level to warrant its estimation and explanation, I estimated a model with no predictors at either level. For individuals residing in a country with a "typical" rate of globalism and traditional nationalism (that is, for a country with the random effects equal to zero), the log-odds of

globalism is less than the log-odds of traditional nationalism, $\gamma_{00(3)} = -1.980$, $p < 0.001$. The log-odds of anti-ism and enlightened nationalism are also less than the log-odds of traditional nationalism, $\gamma_{00(1)} = -2.062$, $p < 0.001$ and $\gamma_{00(1)} = -1.151$, $p < 0.001$, respectively. There is significant variation across countries in the log-odds of globalism (relative to traditional nationalism), $u_{0(3)} = 1.031$, $p < 0.001$. There is also significant variation across countries in the log-odds of anti-ism and enlightened nationalism (relative to traditional nationalism), $u_{0(1)} = 0.622$, $p < 0.001$ and $u_{0(2)} = 0.447$, $p < 0.001$, respectively.

^{ix} I substituted the *KOF Globalization Index* (Dreher 2006 and Dreher, Gaston and Martens 2008) for the *CSGR Globalization Index*. The results are similar with three exceptions. *GDP per capita*, its interaction with *Education*, and *Sex* became insignificant.