

NATIONALISM AND THE DURATION OF INTERSTATE WAR

Gretchen Schrock-Jacobson

Ph.D. Candidate

Department of Political Science

The Pennsylvania State University

University Park, PA 16802

814-865-6230 (phone)

814-863-8979 (fax)

gus10@psu.edu

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We know quite a bit about what contributes to the length of international conflicts. Large military capabilities, difficult terrain, punishment strategies and military power parity increase interstate war duration.¹ Democratic regimes are less likely to engage in long wars because their governments fear eroding public support.² However, the role of nationalism in a state's decision to continue fighting has yet to be considered, even though it has been shown to be important in interstate conflict initiation and onset.³ If nationalism increases the propensity for states to participate in and initiate interstate war, it should also influence how long states engage in warfare.

Building upon Snyder, I argue that nationalism may not only justify involvement in an interstate war on the grounds of protecting the integrity and security of the "nation," but may also produce favorable conditions for extended war involvement.⁴ Nationalism mobilizes popular energies to the tasks of war, permits the suppression of opposition groups, and may provoke a "nationalist bidding war" between the masses and elite. As a result, it helps to generate the level of public support necessary for continued war involvement and, in turn, increases the duration of interstate war. However, different forms of nationalism may not have similar effects on a state's propensity for prolonged war participation. Different nationalisms may influence the course and duration of interstate conflict in different ways and to different degrees.

The purpose of this study is to extend Snyder's theory of nationalism and war to the question of interstate war duration, and then derive testable hypotheses. I also propose to move beyond the nonrandom sample of case studies that have characterized hypothesis testing in

¹ Bennett and Stam 1996; Slantchev 2004.

² Bennett and Stam 1998; Reiter and Stam 2002.

³ Mansfield and Snyder 1995.

⁴ Snyder 2000.

regards to nationalism and war initiation and onset. I test my expectations using data I collected on the existence and type of nationalism in the initiator and target states in each interstate war from 1816 to 1991.

Contrary to expectations, I find that nationalism in the initiator insignificantly decreases the duration of interstate war, while nationalism in the target insignificantly increases it. But if the analysis is limited to the twentieth century, these relationships become statistically significant, implying that how hard soldiers fight may be important in understanding the relationship between nationalism and interstate war duration. When nationalism is disaggregated into its civic, ethnic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary variants, I find little evidence that any specific type of nationalism systematically lengthens interstate war. For the most part, my findings challenge existing conceptions of nationalism's impact on international conflict, though it appears that nationalism plays a larger role in determining the duration of interstate war as time progresses.

These results are important for three reasons. First, they refine our theoretical and empirical understandings of the determinants of interstate war duration by demonstrating the limited role of nationalism and reinforcing the significance of military parity, terrain, contiguity, and democracy. As a result, they undermine Snyder's claim that nationalism is a key trigger of international conflict.⁵ Second, they suggest that the incorporation of cultural and ideational variables into our theories and statistical assessments of conflict behavior may not be especially informative. Third, they indicate that containing international conflict through a reduction of nationalist sentiment among belligerents may be unrealistic.

This article is organized as follows. The first section expands upon Snyder's theory of nationalist conflict by delineating the connection between nationalism, its various permutations,

⁵ Snyder 2000.

and interstate war duration.⁶ It also presents ten hypotheses. The second section describes the dataset, the operationalization of the variables, and the research design. The third section presents the results of the statistical analyses. The fourth section presents a discussion of the findings, and the last section concludes.

A THEORY OF NATIONALISM AND INTERSTATE WAR DURATION

According to some scholars, there is a relationship between the degree of nationalism within a state and that state's propensity for war. Mansfield and Snyder determine that, in emerging democracies, belligerent nationalism, propagated via elite persuasion campaigns, increases the probability that the state will experience violent conflict.⁷ Similarly, Snyder offers a series of case studies suggesting that democratization creates incentives for elites to promote nationalism, which increases the likelihood that the state will engage in interstate or intrastate war.⁸ However, these studies focus on nationalism's role in the onset or initiation of interstate war without adequately hypothesizing or analyzing the effects of nationalism on the duration of war. Yet, we can extend the proffered theories in ways that address the question of war duration.

At this point, I want to make clear that I do not directly test Mansfield and Snyder's or Snyder's theories.⁹ Instead, I use their arguments about the role of nationalism in promoting international conflict and the mechanisms behind this relationship to draw out implications for interstate war duration. I am only focusing on the second part of their causal chain (i.e. from nationalism to international conflict), ignoring the effect of regime type on nationalism and international conflict. I constrain myself in this way because I am interested in whether and how

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002, and 2005.

⁸ Snyder 2000.

⁹ Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002, and 2005; Snyder 2000.

nationalism and its variants influence international conflict behavior. In this regard, these scholars provide valuable theoretical knowledge.

If nationalism increases the probability of international conflict beyond the initial outbreak of war, it should influence how long conflicts last. Nationalism, defined as the doctrine that a people who perceive themselves as distinct should rule themselves in a political system that defends their distinctiveness, should increase the duration of interstate war for three reasons.¹⁰ These reasons derive from Mansfield and Snyder's and Snyder's theories of nationalism and violent conflict.¹¹

First, nationalism provides the domestic population with the common desire to protect its state which, in theory, expresses and ensures its unique cultural, historical, institutional, and/or ideological characteristics. It may also give the masses a sense of shared beliefs, attitudes, and goals in regards to the processes and outcomes of international relations. As a result of this potential conformity of ideas and interests, elites may try to construct and diffuse a form of nationalism amenable to their military ambitions.¹² With a favorable nationalism permeating the country, there will be less significant opposition to the state's international policies because most citizens will support their "nation" and believe that the state will protect the "national" welfare.

Second, nationalism provides elites with the opportunity to suppress opposition to their military policies, whether from political parties or individuals, by depicting them as threats to the "nation" and its interests. Characterizing the opposition as outside the realm of the "nation" and thus untrustworthy, renders them less attractive to the public as participants or leaders in the government. The opposition becomes a smaller menace to the integrity of the state's military agenda. In other words, nationalism can increase the percentage of citizens supporting the war

¹⁰ The definition is from Snyder 2000, 23.

¹¹ Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Snyder 2000.

¹² Snyder 2000.

by excluding certain groups or individuals from the arena of public debate. For example, Adolf Hitler was able to continue his aggressive military policies in part because he used nationalism to justify the silencing of liberals, Jews, and socialists, whom he portrayed as against the interests of the German *volk*.¹³

Third, if the masses collectively believe that the achievement of specific military objectives is in the “national” interest, they will encourage the constant pursuit of those objectives until they are reached, forcing state elites to maintain the appropriate international military policies.¹⁴ Military defeat or the failure to achieve the “national” goal may entail the loss of national prestige, or worse, the loss of self-rule. Therefore, the public, spurred on by the past nationalist rhetoric of state elites, demands that the state do everything it can (e.g. continue to fight) to forestall such an eventuality. The state is caught in a “nationalist bidding war” with its own citizens that it is unable to completely control.¹⁵ It may have little choice but to appease its constituents by prolonging the war in the hope of achieving the “national” objective.

Due to increased mass support, marginalized political opponents, and the constraints of a nationalist public, nationalist states should fight longer wars than non-nationalist states. The former states not only recognize the necessity of military success for the nation’s security, integrity, and international reputation. They also possess the requisite level of citizen support to pursue victory because nationalism unifies the masses through a common identity and permits

¹³ Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 26.

¹⁴ An illustration of how citizens will support the pursuit of military objectives perceived to be in the “national” interest is provided by Lewis (1988) in his discussion of Somali nationalism during the Ogaden War. He contends that the fighting in the Ogaden became “a national obsession.” “All interest focused on the progress of the war and the unofficial contribution to the war effort had unquestioned priority over all other activities” (236). All aspects of life in Somalia were affected. Government workers left their posts to fight for their ethnic kin in Ethiopia, while day care centers were turned into cottage factories for making uniforms. Radio reports of the war’s progress were followed with such interest that it became impossible to find transistor radios and batteries (236). With this level of domestic support, the political and military elite could not only be more confident of being able to sustain the war effort until their objectives were achieved, but also feel constrained to continue the fight. However, the Somali armed forces were defeated before conquering the Ogaden, mainly due to Soviet and Cuban military assistance to Ethiopia, not to decreasing nationalist sentiment.

¹⁵ Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Snyder 2000.

the political exclusion of opponents. The presence of nationalism in the initiator or the target should then increase the duration of interstate war. This expectation leads me to construct the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Nationalism in the initiator increases the duration of interstate war.

Hypothesis 2: Nationalism in the target increases the duration of interstate war.

However, the continuation of warfare is a function not only of each disputant's characteristics, but also how the disputants' respective characteristics interact. If both the initiator and target are nationalistic, then the duration of interstate war should be further increased, compared to a dyad in which only one state or neither of the states is nationalistic. Each side will be more likely to depict the other as a threat to its national sovereignty and power. If this occurs, the elites and masses in both states will want to continue fighting to ensure their national security and interests. Since both states desire a peace agreement favorable to their national welfare, the probability of early concessions or substantive negotiations is significantly reduced. If only one state is nationalistic, there is at least one participant to the dispute that will portray its opponent as a danger to national self-determination. Leaders and citizens in that state will be persuaded that they must continue fighting to prevent a loss of self-rule and obtain benefits for their nation. This intransigence will lower the prospects of early concessions or negotiations, but to a lesser degree than if both belligerents are nationalistic. These possibilities direct me to the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 3: Nationalism in the initiator and target increases the duration of interstate war more than nationalism in only the initiator or the target.

Hypothesis 4: Nationalism in the initiator or target increases the duration of interstate war more than if nationalism was present in neither the initiator nor the target.

However, nationalism is neither homogenous nor unchanging. It has assumed many forms since its birth as elites in different national contexts have altered it to promote their particular military and economic interests.¹⁶ Different nationalisms have defined the “nation,” its goals, and its enemies differently, thereby producing different national dynamics. Recognizing that various forms of nationalism exist and may diversely affect domestic political interactions, I would expect them to have different implications for the elite’s ability to maintain mass support, marginalize opponents, and satisfy the demands of a nationalist public. They should then have distinct effects on the continued involvement in war.

One methodological problem in examining the effect of different types of nationalism on interstate war duration is the array of contrasting classification schemes.¹⁷ I want to choose a categorization that will fairly test the proposed relationship between nationalism and interstate war duration. While each classification scheme has its own merits and scholars will disagree about their comparative usefulness, I follow the categories of nationalism proposed by Snyder for two reasons.¹⁸ First, Jack Snyder is one of the two scholars to hypothesize, though implicitly, about the relationship between the different types of nationalism and the duration of interstate

¹⁶ Greenfeld (1992) argues that the idea of the “nation” and nationalism emerged in England during the sixteenth-century and then spread across the European continent, all the while transforming itself to meet the political and social exigencies of each country.

¹⁷ See Breuilly 1993; Snyder 1976; Snyder 2000.

¹⁸ Snyder 2000, ch.2.

war.¹⁹ Since I expand on his hypotheses regarding nationalism and international conflict and I want to be consistent with his expectations, I employ his classification scheme. Second, he includes civic and ethnic nationalism, which are often used in case studies to explain the incidence of violent conflict.²⁰

Snyder divides nationalism into four categories on the basis of its collective appeals and criteria for inclusion in the national group.²¹ The categories are civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism, revolutionary nationalism, and counterrevolutionary nationalism, the main characteristics of which are listed in table 1. According to Snyder, each type of nationalism has a distinct influence on warfare, producing not only different types of violent conflict, but also different degrees and patterns of violence which may affect how long wars endure.²²

[Table 1 about here]

Snyder claims that “states embodying civic nationalisms are . . . the most prudent in their foreign relations” and more likely to extricate themselves from costly military ventures, implying that they should experience wars of shorter duration than other types of nationalist states.²³ The reasoning behind this contention is that most mature democracies either have civic nationalism (e.g. the United States) or have had their historic nationalism tempered by civic features (e.g. Germany). If mature democracies permit open criticism of government policies (which may help terminate or prevent costly wars) and mature democracies are often associated with civic nationalism, then we should expect states with civic nationalism to engage in shorter wars than those with other forms of nationalism. However, civic nationalism still provides elites with the

¹⁹ Snyder’s (2000) work is concerned with the relationship between nationalism and the onset of violent conflict in the context of democratizing countries. I will focus on conflict onset in later work as my current data set does not permit such an analysis.

²⁰ In contrast to Breuilly 1993; and Snyder 1976 and 1990.

²¹ Snyder 2000, 69.

²² Snyder 2000, 80.

²³ Snyder 2000, 82.

opportunity to increase public support for their military policies and limit the appeal of political opponents. It would lead to longer wars than if there were no nationalism. The following hypotheses are formed from these expectations.

Hypothesis 5: Civic nationalism in the initiator increases the duration of interstate war relative to no nationalism, but less than other forms of nationalism.

Hypothesis 6: Civic nationalism in the target increases the duration of interstate war relative to no nationalism, but less than other forms of nationalism.

Ethnic nationalism should render a state more prone to long wars than does civic nationalism because the ethnic nationalist state is less cost-conscious. The potential benefits of war are seen to be greater than its potential costs. If the ethnic nationalist state is victorious, it may achieve independence or acquire control and possibly sovereignty over territories inhabited by ethnic kin.²⁴ Ethnic nationalist states should continue fighting until they believe their ethnic group is sufficiently reunited under one political system and protected from “others.” In addition, the motivations of ethnic nationalist states for fighting often preclude consideration of the costs. Ethnic nationalism tends to entail issues of culture, language, and religion, which often are seen as zero-sum issues and less amenable to compromise. Therefore, capitulation and negotiation may be deemed unacceptable. The only option is warfare, regardless of its costs. However, the expansionism of ethnic nationalism has natural limits. An ethnic nationalist state should be less inclined to prolong violent conflict once its goal of a homogenized state or a

²⁴ Snyder 2000, 82.

sustainable pattern of domination is achieved.²⁵ These assertions lead to the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 7: Ethnic nationalism in the initiator increases the duration of interstate war relative to no nationalism and more so than civic nationalism.

Hypothesis 8: Ethnic nationalism in the target increases the duration of interstate war relative to no nationalism and more so than civic nationalism.

In contrast to ethnic nationalism, the military expansionism of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalisms does not have natural limits and states possessing these types of nationalism should have wars of the longest duration. Revolutionary nationalism has two characteristics that differentiate it from other forms of nationalism. First, it is oriented towards protecting the political revolution from its domestic and foreign enemies. Second, it is preoccupied with “the possibility of spreading the benefits of political transformation to potential revolutionists abroad”.²⁶ Revolutionary nationalists believe that spreading the revolution to other countries, as in the military campaigns of Napoleonic France, will obtain the security necessary for a successful and enduring revolution. “The revolutionary state’s goals for conquest are not necessarily limited to a finite set of historic or cultural objectives but are spurred by a more open-ended competition for security”.²⁷

Revolutionary nationalism shares one characteristic with counterrevolutionary nationalism: the perpetual need for external enemies to serve as internal unifiers.²⁸ However,

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Snyder 2000, 83.

²⁸ Ibid.

since counterrevolutionary nationalism is defined by its opposition to any group that wants to undermine the nation's traditional institutions, its impetus for internal unification comes from the desire to preserve tradition and the status quo. In contrast, revolutionary nationalist states seek internal unification through the desire to preserve a political revolution. Due to revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalism's constant maintenance of external adversaries in an attempt to rally the people behind the protection of the revolution or traditional institutions, states with these types of nationalism lack inherent limits on their continued involvement in war. They should prefer to remain at war because war provides them with a perpetual enemy they can use to persuade their citizens that the revolution or the status quo is threatened and that only by unifying behind the state and marginalizing opposition groups can they survive. These features of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalism suggest the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 9: Revolutionary or counterrevolutionary nationalism in the initiator increases the duration of interstate war relative to no nationalism and more so than civic and ethnic nationalism.

Hypothesis 10: Revolutionary or counterrevolutionary nationalism in the target increases the duration of interstate war relative to no nationalism and more so than civic and ethnic nationalism.

I have no *a priori* expectation of a substantial difference between the effects of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalism. Both depend on the constant identification of external enemies for the maintenance of internal cohesion, which precludes them from having inherent constraints on their military expansionism. The primary difference between

revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalism is their bases for national unification. I perceive no theoretical reason why this distinction should cause either type of nationalism to have a greater impact on interstate war duration than the other, especially in light of their similarities.

According to the previously outlined extension of Mansfield and Snyder's and Snyder's theory of nationalist conflict, nationalism should prolong interstate war.²⁹ However, some forms of nationalism should lengthen interstate war to a greater extent than others. If my hypotheses receive empirical support, it will indicate that their theory of nationalism and violent conflict is accurate in that nationalism does affect the dynamics of interstate war. It will also suggest that more cultural and ideational factors should be included in our theories and statistical analyses of interstate war duration.

DATA AND METHODS

The wars contained in the dataset are acquired from the Correlates of War (COW) Project, but are modified following Slantchev.³⁰ The COW requirements for system membership are relaxed and some multilateral wars are disaggregated into a series of smaller ones (i.e. World War II, the Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War). The easing of the system membership requirements alone includes 12 additional wars in the dataset. The dataset consists of 104 interstate wars from 1816 to 1991.

²⁹ Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Snyder 2000.

³⁰ Slantchev 2004.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the **Duration of War** in months. The data for this variable are obtained from Slantchev.³¹ The initiation of war is determined by its formal declaration, or, when this is nonexistent, by the beginning of intentional sustained fighting. “[A]n effected armistice, an implemented cease-fire, a preliminary treaty that ends active campaigning, a decisive battle that eliminates the opponent, or a formal capitulation” may signal war termination.³² The mean war duration is 13.94 months, but the median war duration is only 5.62 months. These statistics reflect a highly skewed distribution, resulting from the low number of observations in the right-hand tail of the distribution. Thirty-four wars last for more than one year and only 19 wars last for more than two years.

Independent Variables

General Nationalism Variables

As there is no pre-existing dataset on the existence of nationalism in general or its many permutations, I constructed my own variables and collected my own data using national histories and reference works on nationalism, governments, and political parties.³³ Following Snyder, I define nationalism as “the doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their culture, history, institutions, or principles should rule themselves in a political system that expresses and protects those distinctive characteristics.”³⁴ This definition expands upon Gellner’s standard conceptualization of nationalism as the doctrine that the political unit (the state) and the cultural

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid, 818.

³³ My coding of nationalism in the initiator and target for each interstate war is listed in Appendix A. I also provide an example of my coding procedures in Appendix B.

³⁴ Snyder 2000, 23.

unit (the nation) should be congruent.³⁵ It allows nations to be organized around characteristics other than culture and recognizes that the aim of nationalism can be something other than a sovereign state.

Nationalism is coded as existing in the initiator or target if there is evidence in the historical record that there was some form of nationalism in each state approximately five years prior to the outbreak of the war. Such evidence of nationalism may be one or more of the following events. First, a politically relevant nationalist party exists. A party is politically relevant if it achieves either a victory in a presidential election, a majority of seats in the national legislature, control of the most prominent positions in the cabinet, or the ability to affect the outcome of coalition building. Second, the state implements laws that restrict the rights, freedoms, and activities of groups not considered part of the “nation.” Examples of such laws could be restrictions on citizenship rights, use of a native language, membership in particular cultural or religious organizations, and/or political participation. Third, there is significant internal or external violence justified by nationalism on the part of the state. Fourth, the state initiates other military actions that it contends will protect the “nation” (e.g. troop mobilization or increased weapons procurement). See Appendix B for an example of how one war was coded.

Nationalism_{Initiator} is coded as 1 if some form of nationalism existed in the initiator within five years of the interstate war and 0 otherwise. **Nationalism_{Target}** is coded as 1 if some form of nationalism existed in the target within five years of the interstate war and 0 otherwise.³⁶

³⁵ Gellner 1983.

³⁶ I encountered several problematic cases while coding countries for their incidence of nationalism. First, there were two states with pan-nationalism. This type of nationalism poses a coding problem because it may challenge the existence of the state in which its proponents reside. Until 1967, Arab nationalism aimed to make the state and nation congruent, which would have dissolved many Arab states. Thus, pan-nationalism may render the state more vulnerable to early war termination due to a possible lack of domestic unity. On the other hand, this form of nationalism may generate support for the state’s military policies if the masses unite behind the pan-nationalist cause and perceive continued involvement in the war as a means of achieving its goals. Pan-nationalism may also justify the marginalization of political opponents.

A set of three variables will test the proposition that an increasing level of nationalism in the dyad further prolongs an interstate war. **Nationalism_{None}** equals 1 if neither of the states in the dyad is nationalistic and 0 otherwise. **Nationalism_{One}** equals 1 if only one state in the dyad is nationalistic and 0 otherwise. **Nationalism_{Two}** equals 1 if both states in the dyad are nationalistic and 0 otherwise.

I suspect that the effect of nationalism on interstate war duration may be contingent on the time period. By the mid-19th century, few countries possessed nationalism at the state level (i.e. Great Britain, France, and the United States). As the 19th century progressed, the idea of nationalism spread throughout Europe and influenced the government policies of Japan and China as they struggled against imperialism. In contrast, elite-driven nationalism was virtually impossible in the states of Latin America until elites centralized their governments and pacified their countrysides at the end of the 19th century.³⁷ Moreover, nationalism only became a possibility in Africa and some parts of Asia with decolonization and the independence movements of the mid-20th century. Not until the last decades of the 20th century did the potential for elite nationalism reach most areas of the world. Therefore, I account for how time influences the impact of nationalism on interstate war duration. Time is measured by **Year**,

The two cases of pan-nationalism were pan-Italianism and pan-Arabism. In the former case, I did not code any state as nationalist unless state elites espoused pan-Italian sentiment. No state was classified as having Italian nationalism because the major supporters of pan-Italianism were among the intelligentsia and the masses. In addition, the governments in question were either ruled by incoherent monarchies (e.g. Naples), revolutionary regimes (e.g. the Roman Republic), the Vatican, or realists (e.g. Count Camillo di Cavour, prime minister of Sardinia). In the case of pan-Arabism, I coded any country that exhibited it at the state level as nationalist (e.g. Egypt under Nasser), but designated it as having an “other” form of nationalism.

The second hard case was Turkey during its wars of independence (1919-1920). It was unclear whether the dissolving Ottoman Empire or Mustafa Kemal’s Turkish resistance movement was the effective government prior to the wars. It was Kemal’s resistance movement which was fighting France and Greece, but the Ottoman Empire was not officially extinct. If Kemal’s movement is considered the effective government, then Turkey possessed ethnic nationalism. If the Ottoman Empire was the effective government, then Turkey did not possess any nationalism because the state was in disarray. I coded Turkey as ethnic nationalist because it was Kemal’s movement that was engaged in military conflict and I presume that if Kemal’s movement was not considered the government, this war would not have entered the interstate war dataset.

³⁷ Centeno 2002.

which equals the year in which the interstate war began minus 1823, the year that the first interstate war in the dataset began. **Year** is then interacted with **Nationalism_{Initiator}** and **Nationalism_{Target}** to capture nationalism's global progression with each subsequent year.³⁸

Specific Nationalism Variables

I disaggregate the generalized nationalism variables for the initiator and target into separate variables representing civic, ethnic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary nationalism. Definitions for each type of nationalism are derived from Snyder so as to accurately test my extension of his theory of nationalism.³⁹ Each definition is based on the criteria for national membership and the nature of collective appeals.

Civic nationalism emphasizes loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions that promote justice, tolerance, and the rule of law and includes in the nation anyone born or who has lived for a long time within the nation's territory.⁴⁰ Thus, it is the most inclusive kind of nationalism as its requirements for national membership are fairly easy to fulfill. Civic nationalism most often occurs in democracies and in many ways can be considered a proxy for democracy. I coded a state as possessing civic nationalism if citizenship was based on birth or a process of naturalization, if the rule of law and fair political institutions played a prominent role in national life, and if there was a national desire to ensure liberty, tolerance, individual rights, and equal justice under the law. **Civic Nationalism_{Initiator}** and **Civic Nationalism_{Target}** are coded as 1 if civic nationalism existed in the initiator and the target, respectively, within five years of

³⁸ I chose this transformation of **Year** because it eases interpretation of the interaction term by allowing a value of 0 for **Year** to represent the year 1823, which approximates nationalism's infancy.

³⁹ Snyder 2000, 70.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

the interstate war and 0 otherwise. Post-revolutionary France is an example of a civic nationalist state.

Ethnic nationalism stresses the importance of common culture, language, religion, historical memory, and/or kinship in the construction and maintenance of the nation. It excludes anyone that does not have the necessary cultural, linguistic, religious and/or ethnic attributes.⁴¹ If the government favored one culture, language, religion, and/or ethnicity through laws, educational opportunities, business contracts, and/or the dispensation of patronage, that country may be ethnic nationalist. However, in order for the state to qualify, the historical record must also indicate that national membership depended on cultural, linguistic, religious and/or ethnic criteria and the political elite emphasized the intrinsic superiority and uniqueness of the associated cultural, linguistic, religious, and/or ethnic group. In many cases, the fulfillment of the above criteria point to a state that is controlled by a dominant ethnic group. **Ethnic Nationalism**_{Initiator} and **Ethnic Nationalism**_{Target} are coded as 1 if ethnic nationalism was present in the initiator and the target, respectively, within five years of the interstate war and 0 otherwise. Nazi Germany offers a prominent example of an ethnic nationalist state.

Revolutionary nationalism is a form of nationalism that frames the defense of the nation and its self-rule in terms of protecting a revolutionary political regime. It excludes anyone from national membership that threatens the stability of the revolutionary regime.⁴² I coded a state as revolutionary nationalist if it denied national membership to any group that it believed was trying to undermine the political revolution and if it implemented discriminatory laws or instigated violence against these same groups in order to preserve the revolutionary regime. As the previous criteria imply, a state resulting from a revolutionary victory is more likely to be

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

revolutionary nationalist than other types of states. **Revolutionary Nationalism_{Initiator}** and **Revolutionary Nationalism_{Target}** equal 1 if revolutionary nationalism existed in the initiator and target, respectively, within five years of the interstate war and 0 otherwise. Ethiopia, prior to the Ogaden War, provides an example of revolutionary nationalism.

Counterrevolutionary nationalism is a form of nationalism that perceives the well-being of the nation as primarily served by resistance to internal factions and external foes seeking to undermine the nation's traditional political, social, or economic institutions. It also excludes from national membership any social classes, religions, cultural groups, or adherents to "alternative" political ideologies that might change the status quo.⁴³ I coded a state as counterrevolutionary nationalist if the political elites described the nation with reference to the past, traditional institutions, the status quo, and/or social convention. In order for a state to be considered as counterrevolutionary nationalist, the elite had to employ nationalism in an attempt to maintain their dominant positions, forestall major political or social change, and/or protect the nation from the infiltration of "revolutionary" ideologies. The exclusion of anyone who opposed the political or social establishment from the nation also indicated counterrevolutionary nationalism. **Counterrevolutionary Nationalism_{Initiator}** and **Counterrevolutionary Nationalism_{Target}** equal 1 if counterrevolutionary nationalism was present in the initiator and the target, respectively, within five years of the interstate war and 0 otherwise. Italy under Benito Mussolini is an instance of a state with counterrevolutionary nationalism.

There is also a "no nationalism" variable, which serves as the base category in the empirical analysis.⁴⁴ The five variables of nationalism and the categories of nationalism they

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ There were cases in which nationalism was present, but did not conform to the categories of nationalism in my typology. I coded them as having an "other" form of nationalism. These cases are China, Egypt, El Salvador,

represent are exhaustive. However, it should be emphasized that the coding of the specific types of nationalism is not always unambiguous and in many cases, require a judgment call that could be challenged.

If the historical record indicates a state's elite employed more than one type of nationalism in their rhetoric and as justification for their actions, I used the most prominent and influential form of nationalism in coding that state's nationalism. If more references were made to the characteristics of one type of nationalism than another, the country was coded as having the former nationalism.⁴⁵

For example, after the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union clearly possessed revolutionary nationalism as it eliminated from the "pays legal" all members of the propertied classes and the clergy. In the 1922 constitution, it disenfranchised propertied society, people who hired labor, kulaks, priests, and officers in the White armies.⁴⁶ The emphasis on the protection of the communist revolution from the capitalist powers continued throughout the first half of the 20th century. However, Soviet leaders sometimes employed ethnic nationalist rhetoric and imagery in order to mobilize the citizens to the defense of the communist experiment. From 1936 to 1938, Josef Stalin purged the minority nationalities in a campaign of mass terror because he considered the Russian people as the true guardians of Marxism and would not accept "nationalist deviators," "bourgeois nationalists," or "counterrevolutionary-Trotskyite-diversionist-espionage" individuals or parties.⁴⁷ Because the Soviet leadership used Russian ethnic nationalism as one means of securing the communist revolutionary system and this policy

Honduras, Iraq, and Syria. I drop the dyads that contain these "other nationalist" states from the empirical analysis of the specific types of nationalism and interstate war duration, decreasing the number of observations to 86.

⁴⁵ The states with more than one type of nationalism are Thailand in the 1930s, the Soviet Union from the 1930s to the 1950s, and Turkey in the 1970s. I admit that coding the most prominent type of nationalism is a judgment call.

⁴⁶ Suny 1997, 146.

⁴⁷ Snyder 1976, 216.

was not consistently implemented, I considered the Soviet Union as a revolutionary nationalist state rather than an ethnic nationalist state.

Control Variables

The control variables are measured as in Slantchev.⁴⁸ **Military Parity** is measured as the absolute difference in army sizes, scaled between 0 and 1. In order for lower values to represent severe power asymmetries and higher values increasing power parity, the result is subtracted from 1. Military parity should be linked with longer wars not only because both sides may have difficulty obtaining military victory, but also because they have strong incentives to delay agreement and use warfare to reveal information about their relative strength.⁴⁹

Terrain measures the difficulty of terrain over which the majority of battles in a war are fought, using the procedures in Stam.⁵⁰ Higher values represent more difficult terrains, such as steep mountains or dense jungles, which should be associated with longer wars because movement becomes more challenging and large numbers of troops can be simply hidden from the opponent. Lower values indicate flat terrain or desert areas, which should be correlated with shorter wars because vehicles and troops can be more easily transported and the topography provides no cover for the opposing armies.⁵¹

Contiguity is based on the COW contiguity score. It equals 1 if the warring states are contiguous by land, 2 if they are separated by 12 miles of water or less, 3 if they are separated by 24 miles of water or less, 4 if they are separated by 150 miles of water or less, 5 if they are

⁴⁸ Slantchev 2004, 818-819.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 816.

⁵⁰ Stam 1996.

⁵¹ Ibid, 102.

separated by 400 miles of water or less and 6 if they are separated by more than 400 miles of water. This variable captures the difficulty of supplying troops and materiel over long distances.

Number of States indicates the total number of states involved in each war. Slantchev, following Blainey, argues that more actors imply longer wars.⁵² However, Bennett and Stam contend that as more states fight in a war, the war should decrease in duration due to potential collective action problems in the coalitions.⁵³ These conflicting hypotheses, which both find empirical support, lead me to no *a priori* expectation regarding the effect of the number of states on interstate war duration.

Democratic Initiator uses POLITY IV's "institutionalized democracy" score to classify democracies.⁵⁴ It ranges from 0 to 10, but I use a dummy variable version that equals 1 if the democracy score was greater than or equal to 6 and 0 otherwise. There are 22 democratic initiators in the dataset. Democratic initiators should be more likely than non-democratic initiators to have shorter wars because democracies tend to initiate wars they think they can win quickly so as to avoid the perils of declining public support over time.⁵⁵

Research Design

To analyze the effect of nationalism and its various permutations on interstate war duration, I use a dataset with one observation per interstate war, for a total of 104 observations. I employ an accelerated-failure time, log-normal hazard model with robust standard errors. The reasons for this choice of hazard model are threefold. First, the hazard function, both unconditional and conditional on the explanatory variables, is non-monotonic. The log-normal

⁵² Blainey 1988; Slantchev 2004.

⁵³ Bennett and Stam 1996.

⁵⁴ Marshall and Jagers 2007.

⁵⁵ Bennett and Stam 1998; Reiter and Stam 2002.

hazard model permits a hazard function like this. Second, the generalized gamma hazard model, which can test the validity of simpler parametric models, indicates that the log-normal hazard model is appropriate. Third, the log-normal hazard model has the smallest value for the Akaike Information Criterion, indicating that it is preferred over the other potential models.⁵⁶

First, I estimate the hazard model with **Nationalism_{Initiator}** and **Nationalism_{Target}**, the general nationalism variables for the initiator and the target. Second, to determine the effect on interstate war duration of dyads containing no nationalist states, one nationalist state, or two nationalist states, I include **Nationalism_{One}** and **Nationalism_{Two}** in the model. I exclude **Nationalism_{Initiator}** and **Nationalism_{Target}** from this specification because both are highly correlated with **Nationalism_{One}** and **Nationalism_{Two}**. **Nationalism_{None}** is the base category. Third, I interact both **Nationalism_{Initiator}** and **Nationalism_{Target}** with **Year** to account for the influence of time on nationalism's global diffusion. I also account for the relationship between time and nationalism by estimating a model only for the years after 1900. I assume that nationalism had a greater impact on interstate war duration in the twentieth century when more states had some form of nationalism. Lastly, I investigate the influence of different nationalisms in the initiator and target on interstate war duration.

⁵⁶ I checked the robustness of my findings by estimating an accelerated failure-time log-logistic hazard model, which also permits a non-monotonic hazard function. It does not alter most of the substantive findings. All variables maintain their level of statistical significance and direction with several exceptions. **Nationalism_{Initiator}** is significant at the 0.10 level in Model 1. **Military Parity** loses its significance in Model 3. **Military Parity** loses its significance and **Counterrevolutionary Nationalism_{Initiator}** is significant at the 0.10 level in Model 5.

I also checked the robustness of my findings by estimating a Cox proportional hazards model, which does not assume a particular parameterization of the baseline hazard. It does not alter most of the substantive findings. All variables maintain their level of statistical significance and direction with several exceptions. **Democratic Initiator** gains significance at the 0.10 level in Model 1 and Model 2. **Nationalism_{Initiator}** and **Military Parity** lose their significance and **Contiguity** gains significance at the 0.05 level in Model 4. **Contiguity** loses its significance in Model 5. It should be noted that all of the Cox proportional hazards models show evidence of violating the proportional hazards assumption.

ANALYSIS OF NATIONALISM AND INTERSTATE WAR DURATION

Table 2 presents the results from four models of interstate war duration. The first model includes the variables for nationalism in the initiator and the target, in addition to the control variables. Initiators that expound nationalism prior to the outbreak of an interstate war tend to fight shorter wars than initiators that do not, in contradiction to Hypothesis 1. However, this result is barely insignificant ($p = 0.13$).⁵⁷ A nationalistic target increases the duration of interstate war in comparison to a non-nationalistic target, but this result is also insignificant ($p = 0.43$). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is unsupported. It appears that nationalism in neither the initiator nor the target has a noticeable influence on the length of involvement in an interstate war. But the direction of the coefficients hint at the possibility that nationalist initiators fight so effectively that their wars tend to be shorter, while nationalist targets resist so successfully that their wars tend to be longer. Greater military parity, more difficult terrain, lesser contiguity, and a greater number of states involved all significantly increase the duration of interstate war. Democratic initiators decrease the length of war, but in a barely insignificant manner ($p = 0.13$).

[Table 2 about here]

The second model uses an alternative operationalization of nationalism in the warring dyad. **Nationalism_{One}** and **Nationalism_{Two}** measure whether nationalism in only one state in the dyad or both states in the dyad increase interstate war duration when compared to the complete absence of nationalism in the dyad. While the coefficients are negative, indicating that nationalism in one or both states decrease war duration, only the coefficient for **Nationalism_{One}** is statistically significant. This suggests that if one state in the dyad, whether it is the initiator or the target, is nationalistic, the length of the war is shortened because the nationalist state fights

⁵⁷ Statistical tests are two-tailed.

aggressively and effectively. Based on the above results, Hypothesis 3 and 4 must be rejected. It seems that nationalism in general does not strongly and unambiguously influence the duration of international military conflict.

However, it is possible that the unexpected results thus far are attributable to the contingent nature of nationalism. The existence of nationalism in particular countries and in turn, its effect on war duration, may depend on the time period. Nationalism did not become a global phenomenon until the twentieth century. Before that historical juncture, nationalism was present in only a few countries, primarily in Europe. Hence, the third model in table 2 interacts both **Nationalism_{Initiator}** and **Nationalism_{Target}** with **Year** to capture this relationship. Nationalism in the initiator still fails to have a discernible influence on interstate war duration. In contrast, nationalism in the target significantly increases the length of interstate war later in the study period. While nationalism in the target decreases interstate war duration in 1823 by 26 percent, it increases interstate war duration by 67 percent in 1900 and by 184 percent in 1950. However, these latter two effects may be partially offset by the fact that if the target is nationalistic, the year 1900 decreases interstate war duration by 9 percent, while the year 1950 decreases interstate war duration by 22 percent.⁵⁸

Model 4 employs another method for interacting nationalism with time. In this case, Model 1 is estimated only for the years 1900 to 1991, during which time nationalism should exert its greatest influence on interstate war duration. I find that **Nationalism_{Initiator}** significantly decreases interstate war duration, while **Nationalism_{Target}** significantly increases interstate war

⁵⁸ Interaction effects in hazard models are calculated differently from those in other regression models. The effect of nationalism in the target on interstate war duration in 1823 (year = 0) is calculated as $e^{-0.30} = 0.74$, which translates into a decrease of 26 percent. The effect of nationalism in the target in 1900 (year = 77) is calculated as $e^{-0.30} * (e^{0.01})^{(1900-1823)} = 1.67$, which translates into an increase of 67 percent. The effect of nationalism in the target in 1950 (year = 127) is calculated as $e^{-0.30} * (e^{0.01})^{(1950-1823)} \approx 2.84$, which translates into an increase of 184 percent. The effect of the year 1900 when the target is nationalistic is calculated as $(e^{-0.01})^{(1900-1823)} * (e^{0.01})^{(1900-1823)} = 0.91$, which translates into a decrease of 9 percent. The effect of the year 1950 when the target is nationalistic is calculated as $(e^{-0.01})^{(1950-1823)} * (e^{0.01})^{(1950-1823)} = 0.78$, which translates into a decrease of 22 percent.

duration. This result further suggests that nationalist initiators fight so hard that their wars tend to be shorter, while nationalist targets resist so well that their wars tend to be longer. Combining the latter conclusion with the results of Model 3, defensive nationalism appears to be more robust over time, compared to offensive nationalism. Yet, the main conclusion to be drawn from these two models is that nationalism seems to play a larger role in international conflict behavior as time progresses, but in unexpected and more nuanced ways. In both models in which nationalism's hypothesized conditionality on time is taken into account, the control variables remain fairly consistent in their direction and level of statistical significance.

It is plausible that the surprising findings above regarding the relationship between nationalism and interstate war duration is a consequence of collapsing all forms of nationalism into one general indicator, despite Snyder's argument that civic, ethnic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary nationalisms have different internal dynamics and different implications for violent conflict.⁵⁹ By discriminating between the types of nationalism, I may be able to determine not only whether nationalism in general matters for interstate war duration, but also which specific forms of nationalism matter and how they are important.

Model 5 in Table 3 estimates the relationship between interstate war duration and the presence of specific nationalisms in the initiator and the target. Most striking about the results is the lack of consistency in the coefficient estimates for the indicators of specific nationalisms. Civic nationalism in the initiator increases interstate war duration. However, civic nationalism in the target decreases it. Ethnic nationalism and revolutionary nationalism in the initiator decrease interstate war duration, but these nationalisms in the target increase it. Lastly, counterrevolutionary nationalism in the initiator and the target both decrease the length of interstate wars.

⁵⁹ Snyder 2000.

[Table 3 about here]

Most of the previous relationships are statistically insignificant. Revolutionary nationalism in the initiator and the target significantly influence interstate war duration. The effect of ethnic nationalism in the initiator is also significant. But, only Hypothesis 10 finds some empirical support, as the coefficients for **Revolutionary Nationalism**_{Initiator} and **Ethnic Nationalism**_{Initiator} are in the opposite direction from what was hypothesized.⁶⁰ The rest of the hypotheses are not confirmed, leading to the conclusion that for the most part, nationalism, when disaggregated into its various forms, has little explanatory power in regards to continued state participation in war.⁶¹

In an attempt to test the robustness of this unexpected finding, I conducted a block log-likelihood ratio test on Model 5. The rationale for this technique is that the duration models may be unable to distinguish between the individual effects of civic, ethnic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary nationalism due to unknown multicollinearity between some combination of these variables and the control variables. It may, nevertheless, be possible that, as a group, they add significant explanatory power to the model of interstate war duration. In order to conduct the block log-likelihood ratio test, I first estimate the model with all the variables and obtain its log-likelihood. Then, I estimate the model without the group of nationalism variables and attain its log-likelihood. I subtract the latter log-likelihood from the former and multiply by

⁶⁰ The direction of the coefficients for **Ethnic Nationalism**_{Initiator} and **Revolutionary Nationalism**_{Initiator} suggest that nationalist initiators fight so aggressively and effectively that their wars are significantly shorter than non-nationalist initiators.

⁶¹ If the analysis of the specific nationalisms is limited to the 20th century, this conclusion is further supported because it produces similar results. The only exceptions are the insignificance of **Revolutionary Nationalism**_{Initiator} and the significance of **Counterrevolutionary Nationalism**_{Target}. Counterrevolutionary nationalism in the target decreases the duration of 20th century interstate war contrary to Hypothesis 10.

two. I assess this value in a χ^2 test with degrees of freedom equal to the number of excluded variables. A statistically significant difference implies that including the nationalism variables improves the model as a whole, in spite of the insignificance of each individual nationalism variable.⁶²

The block log-likelihood ratio test indicates that the nationalism variables as a group significantly improve the model of interstate war duration. The difference in the log-likelihoods is significant at the 0.05 level, indicating that the exclusion of the nationalism variables would substantially decrease the model's explanatory power. This conclusion contradicts the previous results. However, the block log-likelihood test does not indicate how these types of nationalism influence the length of interstate war. It is unclear from the statistical models and the block log-likelihood test whether I can reject the null hypothesis that civic, ethnic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary nationalisms have no effect on interstate war duration. Therefore, I can only conclude that nationalism has an ambiguous impact on the duration of interstate war and further study is warranted.

CONCLUSIONS

The theoretical argument, which extends Mansfield and Snyder's and Snyder's theory of nationalism and violent conflict, suggests that nationalism ought to prolong interstate war for three reasons.⁶³ First, the elite use of nationalism and its emphasis on shared beliefs, attitudes, and goals unify the populace. Such national unification fosters public support for continued involvement in an interstate war deemed to further the "national" interest. Second, nationalism allows the elite to marginalize opponents to its military policies by characterizing them as a

⁶² See Bennett and Stam 2004, 66.

⁶³ Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Snyder 2000.

threat to the achievement of “national” goals. Third, the more nationalistic a state is, the more likely it is to keep fighting due to the constraining demands of a nationalist public. But the results of the statistical analysis cast some doubt on these claims and previous understandings of the relationship between nationalism and international conflict.

In Snyder’s case studies of interstate war, democratizing governments promote nationalism among their citizens to the point that the domestic political environment not only demands war, but also expects war to continue until the “national” objective is achieved.⁶⁴ However, this expectation finds little support when the analysis is expanded from newly democratic states to all warring dyads. Nationalism appears not to have a systematic effect on how long states fight in interstate wars. This conclusion persists if nationalism is measured in general terms or is disaggregated into its various forms. The statistical tests indicate that there is no consistent and significant relationship between nationalism and interstate war duration in the period from 1815 to 1991.

However, when the analysis is limited to the twentieth century, nationalism in the initiator significantly reduces interstate war duration and nationalism in the target significantly increases it. This result suggests nationalist initiators fight so hard that their wars are shortened. In contrast, when targets fight aggressively in defense of their nation, their wars are lengthened. Therefore, we might want to consider the effect of nationalism on how aggressively soldiers fight in order to understand the role of nationalism in interstate war duration. In this regard, there may be a relationship between the severity and the duration of interstate wars in the context of nationalism. But, this relationship may obtain only after the concept of nationalism has fully matured and reached every corner of the globe.

⁶⁴ Snyder 2000.

For the most part, my results challenge not only Snyder's implicit hypotheses, but also popular conceptions of the role of nationalism in the prolongation of warfare.⁶⁵ Reformulation of our theories in regards to this relationship is required. The findings also demonstrate that the value of including cultural and ideological variables in our theories and statistical analyses of interstate war duration is overwhelmed by the strong and consistent explanatory power of such political, military, and geographical variables as democracy, military parity, and contiguity.

Most studies of interstate war duration focus on how military capabilities, difficult terrain, punishment strategies and/or military power parity prolong wars, whereas the presence of democracy shortens them.⁶⁶ While these explanations are informative, they do not consider the role of nationalism in the decision to continue fighting, despite the fact that it has been shown to be important in the initiation and onset of violent international conflict.⁶⁷ This study is the first that quantitatively measures nationalism and examines its statistical relationship to a facet of interstate war. Future studies may uncover a different relationship between nationalism and the duration of interstate war, especially since there are many ways in which this study can be improved and refined. Investigating the effects of nationalism on interstate war duration is a research agenda that deserves further attention. By pursuing this line of inquiry, we may better understand why wars last as long as they do.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Bennett and Stam 1996 and 1998; Reiter and Stam 2002; Slantchev 2004.

⁶⁷ Mansfield and Snyder 1995.

Table 1. Relationship of the different types of nationalism to interstate war duration

Type of nationalism	Main characteristics	Consequences for violent conflict	Hypothesized effect on interstate war duration^a
Civic	Emphasis on loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions that are perceived as just and effective. Inclusion in the group depends on birth or long-term residence within the nation's territory.	Low internal conflict Cost-conscious foreign policy	Slight increase in duration
Ethnic	Emphasis on common culture, language, religion, shared historical experience, and/or shared kinship. Inclusion in the national group depends on these criteria.	High conflict until domination of the ethnic homeland is achieved	Moderate increase in duration
Revolutionary	Emphasis on the defense of a political revolution that brings to power a regime that governs for the nation. Inclusion in the group depends on support for the political revolution.	Open-ended external conflict	Large increase in duration
Counterrevolutionary	Emphasis on resistance to internal factions that seek to undermine the nation's traditional institutions. Any social classes, religions, cultural groups, or political ideological opponents that are deemed "enemies of the nation" are excluded from the national group.	Open-ended external conflict	Large increase in duration

Source: The descriptions of the variants of nationalisms and the proposed consequences for violent conflict are obtained from Snyder 2000.

Table 2. The effect of nationalism on war duration: Accelerated-failure time log-normal duration models, robust standard errors in parentheses

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4 (year ≥1900)
Nationalism _{Initiator}	-0.49 (0.33)	--	0.28 (0.52)	-0.98** (0.47)
Nationalism _{Initiator} * Year	--	--	-0.01 (0.01)	--
Nationalism _{Target}	0.22 (0.29)	--	-0.30 (0.50)	0.81* (0.47)
Nationalism _{Target} * Year	--	--	0.01* (0.01)	--
Nationalism _{One}	--	-0.67* (0.37)	--	--
Nationalism _{Two}	--	-0.31 (0.36)	--	--
Year	--	--	-0.01*** (0.00)	--
Military parity	0.99** (0.39)	1.11*** (0.39)	0.76* (0.39)	1.00** (0.49)
Terrain	3.35*** (0.59)	3.40*** (0.58)	3.10*** (0.54)	4.05*** (0.77)
Contiguity	0.24*** (0.07)	0.26*** (0.07)	0.17*** (0.07)	0.17 (0.11)
Number of states	0.14*** (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.05)
Democratic initiator	-0.46 (0.30)	-0.44 (0.30)	-0.62** (0.28)	-0.42 (0.41)
Constant	-1.87*** (0.57)	-1.90*** (0.54)	-0.85 (0.61)	-2.35*** (0.58)
Sigma	1.30 (0.08)	1.29 (0.08)	1.21 (0.08)	1.28 (0.10)
N	104	104	104	61
χ^2	80.73	82.88	148.99	84.44
DF	7	7	10	7
Prob.> χ^2	<0.0001	<0.0001	<0.0001	<0.0001
Log likelihood	-174.62	-174.02	-167.60	-101.54

*** $p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ * $p < .10$

Table 3. The effect of specific nationalisms on war duration: Accelerated-failure time log-normal duration models, robust standard errors in parentheses

	Model 5
Civic nationalism _{Initiator}	0.39 (0.42)
Ethnic nationalism _{Initiator}	-1.13*** (0.38)
Revolutionary nationalism _{Initiator}	-1.23** (0.52)
Counterrevolutionary nationalism _{Initiator}	-0.82 (0.52)
Civic nationalism _{Target}	-0.01 (0.39)
Ethnic nationalism _{Target}	0.50 (0.48)
Revolutionary nationalism _{Target}	1.10** (0.52)
Counterrevolutionary nationalism _{Target}	-0.61 (0.41)
Military parity	1.07** (0.46)
Terrain	2.93*** (0.60)
Contiguity	0.11* (0.06)
Number of states	0.25*** (0.04)
Democratic initiator	-0.60** (0.33)
Constant	-1.50** (0.60)
Sigma	1.14 (0.08)
N	86
χ^2	162.65
DF	13
Prob.> χ^2	<0.0001
Log likelihood	-133.55

*** $p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ * $p < .10$

Appendix A: Nationalism and interstate wars, 1816-1991

War name	Year began	Initiator	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)	Target	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)
Franco-Spanish	1823	France	1	civic	Spain	0	N/A
First Anglo-Burmese	1823	Burma	0	N/A	Britain	1	civic
Cisplatina	1825	Brazil	0	N/A	Argentina	0	N/A
Second Russo-Persian	1826	Persia	0	N/A	Russia	0	N/A
Russo-Turkish	1828	Russia	0	N/A	Turkey	0	N/A
Peru-Bolivia Confederation	1836	Chile	0	N/A	Peru	0	N/A
War of the Cakes	1838	France	1	civic	Mexico	0	N/A
First British-Afghan	1838	Britain	1	civic	Afghanistan	0	N/A
Second Turko-Egyptian	1839	Turkey	0	N/A	Egypt	0	N/A
Uruguayan Dispute	1845	France	1	civic	Argentina	0	N/A
Mexican-American	1846	Mexico	0	N/A	United States	1	civic
Austro-Sardinian	1848	Sardinia	0	N/A	Austria	0	N/A
First Schleswig-Holstein	1848	Prussia	0	N/A	Denmark	0	N/A
Roman Republic	1849	France	1	civic	Papal States	1	revolutionary
La Plata	1851	Brazil	0	N/A	Argentina	0	N/A
Second Anglo-Burmese	1852	Britain	1	civic	Burma	0	N/A

Appendix A (*continued*)

War name	Year began	Initiator	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)	Target	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)
Crimean	1853	Britain	1	civic	Russia	0	N/A
Anglo-Persian	1856	Britain	1	civic	Persia	0	N/A
Franco-Austrian	1859	Austria	0	N/A	France	1	civic
First Spanish-Moroccan	1859	Spain	0	N/A	Morocco	0	N/A
Italo-Roman	1860	Sardinia	0	N/A	Papal States	0	N/A
Two Sicilies	1860	Sardinia	0	N/A	Naples	0	N/A
Franco-Mexican	1862	France	1	civic	Mexico	0	N/A
Ecuadorian-Colombian	1863	Ecuador	0	N/A	Colombia	0	N/A
Second Schleswig-Holstein	1864	Prussia	1	counterrevolutionary	Denmark	1	ethnic
Triple Alliance	1864	Paraguay	0	N/A	Brazil	0	N/A
American Union	1865	Chile	0	N/A	Spain	0	N/A
Seven Weeks	1866	Prussia	1	counterrevolutionary	Austria	0	N/A
British-Abyssinian	1868	Britain	1	civic	Ethiopia	0	N/A
Franco-Prussian	1870	France	1	civic	Prussia	1	counterrevolutionary
Central American 1876	1876	Guatemala	0	N/A	El Salvador	0	N/A
Russo-Turkish	1877	Russia	1	ethnic	Turkey	0	N/A
Pacific	1879	Chile	0	N/A	Peru	0	N/A
Anglo-Egyptian	1882	Britain	1	civic	Egypt	0	N/A
Tonkin	1883	China	1	other	France	1	civic
Central American 1885	1885	Guatemala	0	N/A	El Salvador	0	N/A

Appendix A *(continued)*

War name	Year began	Initiator	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)	Target	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)
Serbo-Bulgarian	1885	Serbia	1	ethnic	Bulgaria	0	N/A
Franco-Siamese	1893	France	1	civic	Siam	0	N/A
Sino-Japanese	1894	Japan	1	ethnic	China	1	other
Second Italo-Ethiopian	1895	Italy	0	N/A	Ethiopia	0	N/A
Greco-Turkish	1897	Greece	1	ethnic	Turkey	0	N/A
Spanish-American	1898	United States	1	civic	Spain	0	N/A
Second Boer	1899	Orange Free State	0	N/A	Britain	1	civic
Boxer Rebellion	1900	Britain	1	civic	China	1	other
Sino-Russian	1900	Russia	1	ethnic	China	1	other
Russo-Japanese	1904	Japan	1	ethnic	Russia	1	ethnic
Central American 1906	1906	Guatemala	0	N/A	El Salvador	0	N/A
Central American 1907	1907	Nicaragua	0	N/A	Honduras	0	N/A
Second Spanish-Moroccan	1909	Spain	0	N/A	Morocco	0	N/A
Tripolitanian	1911	Italy	0	N/A	Turkey	0	N/A
First Balkan	1912	Bulgaria	1	ethnic	Turkey	0	N/A
Second Balkan	1913	Bulgaria	1	ethnic	Turkey	1	ethnic
World War I	1914	Germany	1	counterrevolutionary	Britain	1	civic
Hungarian-Allies	1919	Hungary	0	N/A	Czechoslovakia	0	N/A

Appendix A *(continued)*

War name	Year began	Initiator	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)	Target	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)
Franco-Turkish	1919	France	1	civic	Turkey	1	ethnic
Russo-Polish	1920	Poland	1	ethnic	USSR	1	revolutionary
Greco-Turkish	1920	Greece	1	ethnic	Turkey	1	ethnic
Lithuanian-Polish	1920	Poland	1	ethnic	Lithuania	1	ethnic
Sino-Soviet	1929	USSR	1	revolutionary	China	1	other
Mukden Incident	1931	Japan	1	ethnic	China	1	other
Chaco	1932	Bolivia	1	counterrevolutionary	Paraguay	0	N/A
Saudi-Yemeni	1934	Saudi Arabia	0	N/A	Yemen	0	N/A
Italo-Ethiopian	1935	Italy	1	counterrevolutionary	Ethiopia	0	N/A
Sino-Japanese	1937	Japan	1	ethnic	China	1	other
Lake Khasan	1938	USSR	1	revolutionary	Japan	1	ethnic
Khalkin Gol	1939	Japan	1	ethnic	USSR	1	revolutionary
WWII: German-Polish	1939	Germany	1	ethnic	Poland	1	ethnic
WWII: German-French	1940	Germany	1	ethnic	France	1	civic
Russo-Finnish	1939	USSR	1	revolutionary	Finland	0	N/A
WWII: German-Danish	1940	Germany	1	ethnic	Denmark	0	N/A
WWII: German-Norwegian	1940	Germany	1	ethnic	Norway	0	N/A
WWII: German-Belgian	1940	Germany	1	ethnic	Belgium	0	N/A

Appendix A *(continued)*

War name	Year began	Initiator	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)	Target	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)
WWII: German-Dutch	1940	Germany	1	ethnic	Netherlands	0	N/A
WWII: Western	1940	Germany	1	ethnic	Britain	1	civic
WWII: Italo-Greek	1940	Italy	1	counterrevolutionary	Greece	1	ethnic
Vichy France-Thailand	1941	Thailand	1	ethnic	Vichy France	1	counterrevolutionary
WWII: German-Yugoslav	1941	Germany	1	ethnic	Yugoslavia	0	N/A
WWII: Great Patriotic War	1941	Germany	1	ethnic	USSR	1	revolutionary
WWII: Pacific	1941	Japan	1	ethnic	United States	1	civic
First Kashmir	1947	Pakistan	1	ethnic	India	1	civic
Israeli War of Independence	1948	Egypt	1	other	Israel	1	ethnic
Korean	1950	North Korea	1	ethnic	United States	1	civic
Sinai	1956	Israel	1	ethnic	Egypt	1	other
Hungarian Revolution	1956	USSR	1	revolutionary	Hungary	0	N/A
Himalayan	1962	China	1	other	India	1	civic
Vietnam	1964	United States	1	civic	North Vietnam	1	revolutionary
Second Kashmir	1965	Pakistan	1	ethnic	India	1	civic
Six-Day	1967	Israel	1	ethnic	Egypt	1	other
Israeli-Egyptian	1969	Egypt	1	other	Israel	1	ethnic

Appendix A (continued)

War Name	Year began	Initiator	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)	Target	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)
Football	1969	El Salvador	1	other	Honduras	1	other
Bangladesh	1971	Pakistan	1	ethnic	India	1	civic
Yom Kippur	1973	Egypt	1	counterrevolutionary	Israel	1	ethnic
Turko-Cypriot	1974	Turkey	1	counterrevolutionary	Cyprus	1	ethnic
North Vietnam-South Vietnam	1975	North Vietnam	1	revolutionary	South Vietnam	0	N/A
Ogaden	1977	Somalia	1	ethnic	Ethiopia	1	revolutionary
Vietnamese-Cambodian	1977	Vietnam	1	revolutionary	Cambodia	1	revolutionary
Ugandan-Tanzanian	1978	Uganda	0	N/A	Tanzania	0	N/A
First Sino-Vietnamese	1979	China	1	other	Vietnam	1	revolutionary
Iran-Iraq	1980	Iraq	1	counterrevolutionary	Iran	1	revolutionary
Falklands	1982	Argentina	1	counterrevolutionary	Britain	1	civic
Lebanon	1982	Israel	1	ethnic	Syria	1	other
Second Sino-Vietnamese	1987	China	1	other	Vietnam	1	revolutionary
Iraq-Kuwait	1990	Iraq	1	other	Kuwait	0	N/A
Persian Gulf	1991	United States	1	civic	Iraq	1	other

Appendix B: An example of the coding procedures

Interstate war: Serbo-Bulgarian

Start date: 1885

Initiator: Serbia

Target: Bulgaria

Existence and type of nationalism in the initiator prior to the war: Yes, ethnic

Reasons: I code Serbia as ethnic nationalist primarily because Snyder considers it to be so during the 19th century.⁶⁸ Since I examine an extension of Snyder's theory of nationalist conflict, it makes sense that I use his coding of nationalist states where possible.

In the case of Serbia, the government promoted nationalism as a way of mobilizing mass support for the Obrenovic dynasty, various state-building projects, and international military actions. Most importantly, it used nationalism as a means for protecting the state's independence in the face of potential threats from the Austrian and Ottoman empires. The Serbian state used the public school system to disseminate the idea that only a strong, unified state could protect the Serbian nation from foreign domination.

This nationalism was ethnic for two reasons. First, civic nationalism was virtually impossible. The civic-territorial institutions were too weak and disordered to serve as a basis for popular loyalty. The democratic procedures that existed were often violated, preventing liberal principles from flourishing. Second, the Obrenovic dynasty was seen as illegitimate because it could not claim any historic right to rule. In order to gain some semblance of legitimacy, it insisted that it would protect Serbian national interests. Third, the Serbian state played a central role in defining what it meant to be a Serb and rendering this definition salient for the populace.

⁶⁸ Snyder 2000, 169-180.

The actions of the Serbian government prior to the war with Bulgaria were also nationalist in nature. After an electoral setback in 1883, Milan Obrenovic sought to use nationalism as a means of generating popular support for a conservative government. An opportunity to do so presented itself when Bulgaria annexed Rumelia, a formerly Ottoman region populated by Bulgarians. Milan argued that any increase in Bulgaria's size would shift the balance of power against Serbia and Bulgaria should compensate Serbia with some territory. When this suggestion was rejected, Milan invaded Bulgarian territory with disastrous results. Because nationalist manipulations were attempted by the government, I code Serbia as nationalist prior to this war.

Existence and type of nationalism in the target prior to the war (1/0): No

Reasons: The Bulgarian state was considered non-nationalist for several reasons. First, it was a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire according to the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. As such, it had to acknowledge the suzerainty of the sultan. Therefore, its independence was incomplete. Second, its foreign policy was dominated by Russian interests. While the Bulgarian government wanted to unite Eastern Rumelia and Macedonia to the Bulgarian state, it feared the reaction of Russia and took no action. Only after a secret organization undertook a coup in Eastern Rumelia to unite it to Bulgaria did Prince Alexander accept the union. Third, the period from 1880 to 1884 was primarily characterized by constitutional instability and heated debate between the prince, the national assembly, and the political parties, not the desire for territorial expansion.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ See Crampton 2005; Hall 2000; and Kellas 2004.

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