

DYING FOR THE NATION: NATIONALISM AND INTERSTATE WAR SEVERITY

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July 13, 2009

Word Count: 12,119

ABSTRACT

Following Stern (1995), I argue that nationalism creates soldiers who are willing to die for their country by equating the nation with the family. If nationalism is present, interstate war severity should increase for three reasons, all of which build upon Snyder's (2000) theory of nationalist conflict. Nationalism mobilizes popular energies to the tasks of war, permits the suppression of opposition groups, and provokes a "nationalist bidding war." I test the claim that nationalism increases the severity of war using original data I collected about nationalism in the initiator and target states in each interstate war from 1816 to 1991. For the most part, the analysis supports the popular belief that nationalism increases the deadliness of wars. This conclusion implies that policymakers must learn to appreciate nationalism's power during wartime, and use this knowledge to limit the destructiveness of wars.

The death tolls of interstate wars are often staggering. The eight million killed in World War I, the 16 million in World War II, and the one million in both the Vietnam War and the Iran-Iraq War support this assertion (Marshall and Jagers 2007). But, what causes some conflicts to be deadlier than others? Several explanations have been proposed. Democracies are less likely to engage in costly wars because their governments fear eroding public support (Bennett and Stam 1996; Bennett and Stam 1998; and Reiter and Stam 2002). Wars with losing mixed regimes should have more fatalities because their leaders will likely suffer harsh penalties above and beyond the loss of power even if the death toll is moderate. They gamble for resurrection by prolonging the war, and thereby increase the probability of more battle deaths (Goemans 2000). A greater number of participants, flat or desert terrain, longer duration, and a higher total population are associated with more severe conflicts as well (Cioffi-Revilla 1991; Lacina 2006).

However, the role of nationalism in increasing the severity of warfare has yet to be considered, even though it is commonly believed to “sustain the most intense combat imaginable with the energies and the blood of millions of young men” (Posen 1993, 80). Furthermore, it has been shown to be important in interstate conflict initiation and onset (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). If nationalism increases the propensity for states to participate in and initiate interstate wars, it should also influence how violently they fight these wars.

I argue that nationalism creates soldiers who want to give their lives for their country and in the process, increases battlefield brutality. Individuals are ready to sacrifice for their nation because leaders are able to elicit identification with the nation and link it to emotions and norms associated with membership in primary groups (Stern 1995). Since individuals are predisposed

to die for their family's well-being, constructing the nation as a "family" has favorable effects on troop commitment, motivation, solidarity, and willingness to sacrifice.

If this nation-building exercise is successful, interstate war severity should increase for three reasons, all of which build upon Snyder's (2000) theory of nationalist conflict. Nationalism mobilizes popular energies to the tasks of war, permits the suppression of opposition groups, and may provoke a "nationalist bidding war" between the masses and elite. As a result, more citizens volunteer for military service and aggressively fight their enemies, increasing battle deaths. However, different forms of nationalism may not have similar effects on soldiers' propensity to sacrifice their lives for the nation. Different nationalisms may influence the intensity and brutality of interstate conflict in different ways and to different degrees.

The purposes of this study are to extend Snyder's theory of nationalism and war to the question of interstate war severity; connect it to Stern's (1995) argument about the relationship between the nation, the family, and the willingness to sacrifice; and derive and test specific hypotheses about nationalism and war severity. I also propose to move beyond the nonrandom sample of case studies that have characterized hypothesis testing in regards to nationalism and war initiation and onset. I test my expectations using data I collected on the existence and type of nationalism in the initiator and target states in each interstate war from 1816 to 1991. I thus assess the popular belief that nationalist conflicts are deadlier than non-nationalist ones.

I find that nationalism in the initiator significantly increases interstate war severity, especially in the twentieth century. Brutality further intensifies when nationalism characterizes both states. However, I find that nationalism in the target does not affect the deadliness of war. Lastly, the effect of nationalism on war severity depends on the type of nationalism. Based on

these results, I conclude that, in line with popular thought, nationalism generally leads to a greater loss of life in interstate wars.

These findings are noteworthy for three reasons. First, they indicate the theoretical and empirical importance of nationalism in understanding interstate war severity. In this regard, they demonstrate that the widely-accepted association between nationalism and deadly wars is correct. This conclusion supports Snyder's (2000) argument that nationalism is a key trigger of international conflict and Stern's (1995) claim that nationalism promotes military sacrifice when the nation is successfully equated with the family. Second, these results suggest that scholars should think about whether and how other cultural and ideational variables influence conflict behavior. Lastly, they imply that policymakers must recognize nationalism's power during wartime and address its dynamics so as to limit the destructiveness of wars.

This paper is organized as follows. The first section links Stern's (1995) theory of national sacrifice to an extension of Snyder's (2000) theory of nationalist conflict. It delineates the connection between nationalism, its permutations, and interstate war severity. It also presents ten hypotheses. The second section describes the dataset, the operationalization of the variables, and the research design. The third section presents the results of the statistical analyses and discusses the findings. The last section concludes.

A THEORY OF NATIONALISM AND INTERSTATE WAR SEVERITY

According to some scholars, there is a relationship between the degree of nationalism within a state and that state's propensity for war. Mansfield and Snyder (1995; 2002; 2005) determine that, in emerging democracies, belligerent nationalism, propagated via elite persuasion campaigns, increases the probability that the state will experience violent conflict. Similarly,

Snyder (2000) offers a series of case studies suggesting that democratization creates incentives for elites to promote nationalism, which increases the likelihood that the state will engage in war. However, these studies focus on nationalism's role in the onset or initiation of war without adequately hypothesizing or analyzing the effects of nationalism on the severity of war. Yet, we can extend the proffered theories in ways that address the question of severity.

Nationalism should not only raise the probability of international conflict, but should also create soldiers prepared to give their lives for their country and as a result, increase war's deadliness. "Nationalism increases the intensity of warfare, and specifically the ability of states to mobilize the creative energies and the spirit of self-sacrifice of millions of soldiers" (Posen 1993, 81). It is widely believed that nationalism, defined as the doctrine that a people who perceive themselves as distinct should rule themselves in a political system that defends their distinctiveness, has this effect (Snyder 2000, 23).

But, two questions arise. Why are individuals willing to sacrifice their lives for their nation in the first place? Second, how is this readiness connected to increased war severity? By addressing these questions in turn, we might begin to explain why nationalism is often associated with more vicious wars.

Stern (1995, 225) argues that individuals are prepared to give their lives for their nation because leaders convince them through various means to identify with the nation and associate it with emotions and norms they normally possess toward primary groups. By constructing the nation as an object of primordial attachment and manipulating the resulting emotional reactions and social pressures, leaders can mobilize citizens for war. To ensure that citizens are ready to make the ultimate sacrifice, they tie national identity symbolically to the groups to which people have the strongest and most primordial ties for which they are already willing to sacrifice (Stern

1995, 229-230). The nation becomes a “spiritual family” (Renan 1996, 52). The ubiquitous use of words and phrases like “mother tongue,” “fatherland,” and “defending the homeland” is one method of creating this “imagined national family.” However, their efforts must cause national identity to supersede other identities, especially if the latter demand that the sacrifice not be made (Stern 1995, 229).

If individuals are predisposed to fight and die for their families’ well-being and if the nation is successfully equated with a family, then it is logical to expect individuals to be inclined to sacrifice for their nation if necessary. Once people see their fellow nationals as kin, they empathize with them and gladly sacrifice for them, just as they would for a family member (Stern 1995, 230). Furthermore, nations provide individuals with a sense of identity, meaning, safety and security, just as families do (Langman 2006). When threats or attacks from “others” generate uncertainty about the continuation of these psychological benefits, greater loyalty is felt toward the nation (or the family) and the desire to sacrifice emerges. This explains why people often act in the national interest, even when it is not necessarily in their immediate interest.

If these nationalist campaigns are successful (in that citizens not only accept the existence of the nation, but also have a deep emotional attachment to it), the severity of interstate war should increase. The reasons derive from Snyder’s (2000) and Mansfield and Snyder’s (2005) theories of violent nationalist conflict.

First, nationalism leads to greater support for the state and its military policies. It provides the domestic population with the common desire to protect its state which, in theory, expresses and ensures its unique cultural, historical, institutional, and/or ideological characteristics. It also creates a sense of shared beliefs, attitudes, and goals in regards to the processes and outcomes of international relations. In other words, nationalism convinces the

citizenry that the state is the defender of the national family and that its military policies will guarantee its continued existence and strength. Both soldiers and citizens will then be more willing to sacrifice if that means national military objectives will be achieved.

Second, nationalism allows elites to suppress domestic opposition to their military policies, whether from political parties or individuals, by depicting them as threats to the “nation” and its interests. Characterizing the opposition as outside the realm of the “nation” and thus untrustworthy, renders it less attractive to the public as participants or leaders in the government. The opposition becomes a smaller menace to the integrity of the state’s nationalist project and in turn, to its military agenda. Leaders can more effectively connect the nation to the family as the opposition cannot challenge their conception of the national family and its primary attributes. Leaders can then more easily persuade their citizens to sacrifice.

Third, when exposed to nationalist propaganda, citizens are likely to encourage the aggressive pursuit of national military objectives until they are obtained. They collectively believe that the achievement of these goals is in the “national” interest and that their sacrifices may assist in their realization. Hence, they are inclined to inflict large costs on their enemies and willing to sustain heavy casualties before surrendering. Otherwise, they risk the loss of national prestige or worse, self-rule. The public, spurred on by the elite’s past nationalist rhetoric, demands that the state do everything it can to forestall such an eventuality. The state is caught in a “nationalist bidding war” with its own citizens that it is unable to control completely (Snyder 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 2005). It may have little choice but to appease its constituents by instigating and/or prolonging war, supplying soldiers with ever more deadly weapons, implementing risky strategies or tactics, and strengthening military recruitment efforts. These policies increase the opportunities for soldiers to die for their nation.

Due to mobilized popular energies, marginalized political opponents, and “nationalist bidding wars,” nationalist states should fight more severe wars than non-nationalist states. The former not only recognize the necessity of military success for national security, integrity, and reputation. They also have soldiers willing to fight to the death because nationalism portrays the nation as a family, unifies the masses through this representation, and excludes political dissent. The presence of nationalism in the initiator or the target should then increase interstate war severity. This expectation leads me to the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Nationalism in the initiator increases interstate war severity.

Hypothesis 2: Nationalism in the target increases interstate war severity.

The severity of warfare may also be a function of the interaction of the disputants’ respective characteristics. If both the initiator and target are nationalistic, then interstate war severity should be further increased, compared to a dyad in which one state or neither of the states is nationalistic. Each side is likely to depict the other as a national threat. Doing so may prolong the war’s duration and produce more fatalities as soldiers on both sides are willing to inflict and assume significant costs to protect their national security and power.

If only one state is nationalistic, at least one disputant will depict its opponent as a danger to national self-determination. That state’s leaders will persuade its soldiers that sacrificing their lives may prevent a loss of self-rule and even secure national benefits. The armed forces of the non-nationalist belligerent will be less emotionally attached to their nation, if they identify with a nation at all. As a result, they will be less motivated, less committed to the war aims and less desirous of national military glory through sacrifice. This interaction will increase battle deaths,

though to a lesser degree than if both states are nationalistic. These possibilities direct me to the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 3: Nationalism in the initiator and target increases interstate war severity more than nationalism in only the initiator or the target.

Hypothesis 4: Nationalism in the initiator or target increases interstate war severity more than if nationalism was present in neither the initiator nor the target.

However, nationalism is neither homogenous nor unchanging. It has assumed many forms since its birth as elites in different national contexts have altered it to promote their particular military and economic interests.¹ Different nationalisms have defined the “nation,” its goals, and its enemies differently, thereby producing different nationalist dynamics. Recognizing that various forms of nationalism exist and may diversely affect domestic political interactions, I would expect them to have different implications for the elite’s ability to elicit identification with the national family, mobilize popular energies to the tasks of war, marginalize opponents, and satisfy a nationalist public. They should then have distinct effects on the brutality of war.

One methodological problem in examining the effect of different types of nationalism on interstate war severity is the array of contrasting classification schemes (see Snyder 1976; Breuilly 1993; Snyder 2000). A categorization must be chosen that will fairly test the proposed relationship between nationalism and interstate war severity. While each classification scheme has its merits and scholars will disagree about their comparative usefulness, I follow the categories of nationalism proposed by Snyder (2000, ch. 2) for two reasons. First, Jack Snyder is

one of the two scholars to hypothesize, though implicitly, about the relationship between the different types of nationalism and war severity.ⁱⁱ Since I expand upon his hypotheses and I want to be consistent with his expectations, I employ his classification scheme. Second, he includes civic and ethnic nationalism, which are often used in case studies to explain the incidence of violent conflict (in contrast to Snyder 1976, 1990 and Breuilly 1993).

Snyder (2000, 69) divides nationalism into four categories on the basis of its collective appeals and criteria for inclusion in the national group. The categories are civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism, revolutionary nationalism, and counterrevolutionary nationalism, the main characteristics of which are listed in Table 1. According to Snyder (2000, 80), each type of nationalism influences warfare in a distinct manner, producing different types of violent conflict as well as different degrees and patterns of violence which may affect how vicious wars are.

[Table 1 about here]

Snyder (2000, 82) claims that “states embodying civic nationalisms are . . . the most prudent in their foreign relations” and more likely to extricate themselves from costly military ventures. They should then experience less severe wars than do other nationalist states. The reasoning is that most mature democracies either have civic nationalism (e.g. the United States) or have had their historic nationalism tempered by civic features (e.g. Germany). Since mature democracies permit open criticism of government policies and politicians are concerned about re-election, costly wars are likely to be prevented, terminated, or moderated. Too many coffins would be detrimental to the aggressive prosecution of foreign military policies, as evidenced by the U.S. Defense Department’s attempt to ban photographs of military coffins during the early years of the Iraq War. Because mature democracies are often associated with civic nationalism, states with civic nationalism should have wars with fewer fatalities than those with other forms

of nationalism. However, civic nationalism still allows elites to connect the nation to the family, increase public support for their military policies, limit the appeal of opponents and provide the context for “nationalist bidding wars.” It would lead to deadlier wars than if there were no nationalism. The following hypotheses derive from these expectations.

Hypothesis 5: Civic nationalism in the initiator increases interstate war severity relative to no nationalism, but less than other forms of nationalism.

Hypothesis 6: Civic nationalism in the target increases interstate war severity relative to no nationalism, but less than other forms of nationalism.

Ethnic nationalism should render a state more prone to deadlier wars than civic nationalism because the ethnic nationalist state is less cost-conscious. The potential benefits of war are seen to be greater than its potential costs. If the ethnic nationalist state is victorious, it may achieve independence or acquire control and possibly sovereignty over territories inhabited by ethnic kin (Snyder 2000, 82). Soldiers in such states should be willing to sacrifice and impose substantial costs on their enemies so that their ethnic group is sufficiently reunited under one political system and protected from “others.” Since the ethnic group is often described in familial terms, these tasks take on a greater importance.

The motivations of ethnic nationalist states for fighting frequently preclude cost considerations. Ethnic nationalism tends to entail issues of culture, language, and religion, which are commonly seen as zero-sum issues and less amenable to compromise. Therefore, capitulation, negotiation, and halfhearted fighting may be deemed unacceptable. The only option is aggressive warfare, despite its costs. However, the aspirations of ethnic nationalism have

natural limits. An ethnic nationalist state should be less inclined to extremely violent conflict once its goal of a homogenized state, a sustainable pattern of domination, or security from “others” is achieved (Snyder 2000, 82). These assertions suggest the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 7: Ethnic nationalism in the initiator increases interstate war severity relative to no nationalism and more so than civic nationalism.

Hypothesis 8: Ethnic nationalism in the target increases interstate war severity relative to no nationalism and more so than civic nationalism.

In contrast to ethnic nationalism, the ambitions of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalisms do not have natural limits and states with these types of nationalism should have the most severe wars. Revolutionary nationalism has two characteristics that differentiate it from other forms of nationalism. First, it wants to protect the political revolution from its domestic and foreign enemies. Second, it is preoccupied with “the possibility of spreading the benefits of political transformation to potential revolutionists abroad” (Snyder 2000, 82). Revolutionary nationalists believe that spreading the revolution to other countries, as in the military campaigns of Napoleonic France, will obtain the security necessary for a successful and enduring revolution. “The revolutionary state’s goals for conquest are not necessarily limited to a finite set of historic or cultural objectives but are spurred by a more open-ended competition for security” (Snyder 2000, 82). Thus, neighboring states may try to kill the revolution through preventive aggression so as to shield themselves from domestic revolution. The revolution is seen as precarious, threatened as it is by other states’ military precautions. This fact demands heightened aggression and greater sacrifice on the part of the revolutionary armed forces.

Revolutionary nationalism shares one characteristic with counterrevolutionary nationalism: the perpetual need for external enemies to serve as internal unifiers (Snyder 2000, 82). Since counterrevolutionary nationalism opposes any group wanting to undermine the nation's traditional institutions, internal unification comes from the desire to preserve the status quo. In contrast, revolutionary nationalism seeks domestic unity through the defense of the political revolution.

Due to these nationalisms' maintenance of external adversaries so that the people rally behind or against the revolution, states with these types of nationalism lack limits on warfare (Snyder 2000, 82-83). The unlimited nature of their warfare is enhanced by the uncertain future of the revolution or tradition and by the glorification of war and sacrifice as the means of guaranteeing their security. These arguments imply not only that there will be less reluctance in these states for initiating and prolonging war, but also for aggressively pursuing their military objectives. This aggression may entail the development of an overly permissive military culture and a cult of self-sacrifice, possibly increasing battle deaths and other atrocities. These features of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalism suggest the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 9: Revolutionary or counterrevolutionary nationalism in the initiator increases interstate war severity relative to no nationalism and more so than civic and ethnic nationalism.

Hypothesis 10: Revolutionary or counterrevolutionary nationalism in the target increases interstate war severity relative to no nationalism and more so than civic and ethnic nationalism.

I have no *a priori* expectation of a substantial difference between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalisms' effects. Both depend on the constant identification of external enemies to maintain internal cohesion and emphasize war and sacrifice as a means to combat the insecurity of the revolution or tradition. These characteristics preclude them from constraining their military ambitions. The primary difference between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalism is their bases for national unification. I see no theoretical reason why this distinction should cause either nationalism to affect interstate war severity more than the other, especially given their similarities.

According to Stern's (1995) argument about the "national family" and the desire to sacrifice and my extension of Snyder's (2000) theory of nationalist conflict, nationalism should increase interstate war severity. However, some forms of nationalism should cause more severe wars than others. If my hypotheses receive empirical support, it will indicate that the above theories of violent nationalist conflict are accurate in that nationalism does affect war dynamics. Leaders would then have to consider nationalism's powerful effects on the brutality of war when crafting their military policies. Finally, this study would suggest that more cultural and ideational factors should be considered in our explanations of war severity.

DATA AND METHODS

The wars in the dataset are from the Correlates of War (COW) Project, but are modified following Slantchev (2004). The COW requirements for system membership are relaxed and some multilateral wars are disaggregated into a series of smaller ones (i.e. World War II, the Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War). The reduced system membership requirements alone

add 12 wars to the dataset. The dataset consists of one observation per interstate war, for a total of 104 wars from 1816 to 1991.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is **Deaths**, measured as the number of total battle fatalities. The data are primarily from the COW Project, but for those wars excluded from the COW list of interstate and extrastate wars, I consulted Small and Singer (1982) and Clodfelter (2002).ⁱⁱⁱ

Since Slantchev (2004) divides three multilateral wars into smaller ones, total battle deaths for each smaller war had to be ascertained. I consulted Small and Singer (1982) and Clodfelter (2002) for the battle deaths of each belligerent in each of the major campaigns of World War II and the Vietnam War. I then added the combat fatalities for each campaign's initiator and target to estimate the total deaths on each battlefield. For example, the total fatalities in the Pacific Theater of World War II is the sum of Japanese and American deaths in that theater.

Due to data availability issues regarding the Persian Gulf War, I applied the following formula to approximate Iraqi battle fatalities in each smaller war:

$$\frac{\text{Duration of small war in months}}{\text{Duration of multilateral war in months}} \times \text{Total number of battle deaths.}$$

Each smaller war's duration is obtained from Slantchev (2004) and the multilateral war's duration is the sum of its component wars' durations. This formula provides a rough calculation of the battle deaths in each portion of the multilateral war, especially since it assumes that fatalities occur at a constant rate throughout the war. The battle fatality data for the United States and Kuwait are available through the COW Project.

Several qualifications should be made regarding the battle death data. In some cases, the available data included casualties and/or those dead of disease, while in others, information was only accessible for the initiator or target. For the War of the Cakes, various estimates were given so their mean was used. Therefore, I must emphasize that the data are approximations as the number of soldiers who gave their lives on the battlefield will never be truly known.

Independent Variables

General Nationalism Variables (C Head)

As there is no pre-existing dataset on the incidence of nationalism in general or its many permutations, I constructed my own variables and collected my own data using national histories and reference works on nationalism, governments, and political parties.^{iv} Following Snyder (2000, 23), I define nationalism as “the doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their culture, history, institutions, or principles should rule themselves in a political system that expresses and protects those distinctive characteristics.” This definition expands Gellner’s (1983) standard conceptualization of nationalism as the doctrine that the political unit (the state) and the cultural unit (the nation) should be congruent. It allows nations to be organized around characteristics other than culture and recognizes that the aim of nationalism can be something other than a sovereign state.

Nationalism exists in the initiator or target if there is evidence in the historical record that there was some form of nationalism in each state within five years of the outbreak of war. Such evidence of nationalism may be one or more of the following events. First, a politically relevant nationalist party is present. A party is politically relevant if it achieves either a victory in a presidential election, a majority of seats in the national legislature, control of the most prominent cabinet positions, or the ability to affect coalition building. Second, the state implements laws

limiting the rights, freedoms, and activities of groups not considered part of the “nation.” Such laws could be restrictions on citizenship rights, use of a native language, membership in specific cultural or religious organizations, and/or political participation. Third, there is significant internal or external violence justified by the state via nationalism. Fourth, the state takes other military actions that it contends will protect the “nation” (e.g. troop mobilization or increased weapons procurement). See Appendix B for an example of my coding procedures.

Nationalism_I is coded as 1 if the initiator had some form of nationalism within five years of the interstate war and 0 otherwise. **Nationalism_T** is coded as 1 if the target had some form of nationalism within five years of the interstate war and 0 otherwise.^v Three variables will allow me to test the proposition that increasing dyadic nationalism renders an interstate war more deadly. **Nationalism₀** equals 1 if neither state in the dyad is nationalistic and 0 otherwise. **Nationalism₁** equals 1 if only one state in the dyad is nationalistic and 0 otherwise. **Nationalism₂** equals 1 if both states in the dyad are nationalistic and 0 otherwise.

The effect of nationalism on interstate war severity may be contingent on the time period. By the mid-19th century, few countries possessed state-level nationalism (i.e. Great Britain, France, and the United States). As the 19th century progressed, the idea of nationalism spread throughout Europe and influenced the government policies of Japan and China as they struggled against imperialism. In contrast, elite-driven nationalism was virtually impossible in the Latin American states until leaders centralized their governments and pacified their countrysides at the close of the 19th century (Centeno 2002). Moreover, nationalism only became possible in Africa and some parts of Asia with decolonization and the independence movements of the mid-20th century. Not until the end of the 20th century did the potential for elite nationalism have a global reach. Therefore, I account for the interaction of time and nationalism in the empirical analysis.

Another reason to consider the relationship between time and nationalism is the advancements in military tactics and technology throughout the 19th and 20th centuries (e.g. mass armies, railroads, the machine gun, tanks, guided missiles, guerrilla warfare) that allowed soldiers to inflict greater fatalities on their enemies and raised the probability of their own demise. For example, the combination of the machine gun, quick-firing artillery pieces, and the modern rifle made World War I more lethal than previous wars with 85,000 British, 854,000 French, and 677,000 Germans killed, wounded, and captured in the first three months of the war (Dupuy 1984, 217). Nationalism creates the desire to sacrifice one's own life and kill as many enemy soldiers as possible. Increasingly deadly weapons and tactics provide the means of doing so. This suggests that, over time, wars should become more destructive. Time is measured by **Year**, which equals the year in which the interstate war began minus 1823, the year that the first interstate war in the dataset began. **Year** is then interacted with **Nationalism_I** and **Nationalism_T** to capture nationalism's global progression with each subsequent year.^{vi}

Specific Nationalism Variables (C Head)

I disaggregate the general nationalism variables above into separate variables representing civic, ethnic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary nationalism. Definitions for these nationalisms derive from Snyder (2000, 70) and are based on the criteria for national membership and the nature of collective appeals.

Civic nationalism emphasizes loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions that promote justice, tolerance, and the rule of law and includes in the nation anyone born or who has lived for a long time within the national territory (Snyder 2000, 70). Thus, it is the most inclusive nationalism as its requirements for national membership are fairly easy to fulfill. Civic

nationalism often occurs in democracies and may be considered a proxy for democracy. I coded a state as civic nationalist if citizenship was based on birth or a process of naturalization, if the rule of law and fair political institutions played a prominent role in national life, and if there was a national desire to ensure liberty, tolerance, individual rights, and equal justice under the law. **Civic Nationalism_I** and **Civic Nationalism_T** are coded as 1 if the initiator and the target had civic nationalism, respectively, within five years of the interstate war and 0 otherwise. Post-revolutionary France is an example of a civic nationalist state.

Ethnic nationalism stresses the importance of common culture, language, religion, historical memory, and/or kinship in constructing and maintaining the nation. It excludes anyone who does not have the necessary cultural, linguistic, religious and/or ethnic attributes (Snyder 2000, 70). If the government favored one culture, language, religion, and/or ethnicity through laws, educational opportunities, business contracts, and/or patronage, that country may be ethnic nationalist. However, for the state to qualify, the historical record must also indicate that national membership depended on cultural, linguistic, religious and/or ethnic criteria and the political elite emphasized the intrinsic superiority and uniqueness of the associated group. The fulfillment of the above criteria may point to a state controlled by a dominant ethnic group. **Ethnic Nationalism_I** and **Ethnic Nationalism_T** are coded as 1 if the initiator and the target were ethnic nationalist, respectively, within five years of the interstate war and 0 otherwise. Nazi Germany is a prominent example of an ethnic nationalist state.

Revolutionary nationalism frames national defense and self-rule in terms of protecting a revolutionary political regime. It excludes anyone from national membership that threatens the revolutionary regime's stability (Snyder 2000, 70). I coded a state as revolutionary nationalist if it denied national membership to any group that it believed was trying to undermine the political

revolution and if it implemented discriminatory laws or instigated violence against these groups in order to preserve the revolutionary regime. As these criteria imply, a state resulting from a revolutionary victory is more likely to be revolutionary nationalist than other states. **Revolutionary Nationalism_I** and **Revolutionary Nationalism_T** equal 1 if the initiator and the target were revolutionary nationalist, respectively, within five years of the interstate war and 0 otherwise. Ethiopia, prior to the Ogaden War, is an example of revolutionary nationalism.

Counterrevolutionary nationalism perceives the nation's well-being as primarily served by resistance to internal factions and external foes seeking to weaken the nation's traditional political, social, and/or economic institutions. It also excludes from national membership any social classes, religions, cultural groups, or adherents to "alternative" political ideologies that might change the status quo (Snyder 2000, 70). I coded a state as counterrevolutionary nationalist if the political elites described the nation with reference to the past, traditional institutions, the status quo, and/or social convention. For a state to be considered counterrevolutionary nationalist, the elite had to employ nationalism in an attempt to maintain their dominant positions, forestall political or social change, and/or protect the nation from "revolutionary" ideologies. The exclusion from the nation of anyone who opposed the establishment also indicated counterrevolutionary nationalism. **Counterrevolutionary Nationalism_I** and **Counterrevolutionary Nationalism_T** equal 1 if the initiator and the target were counterrevolutionary nationalist, respectively, within five years of the interstate war and 0 otherwise. Benito Mussolini's Italy is an example of a counterrevolutionary nationalist state.

A "no nationalism" variable is the base category in the empirical analysis.^{vii} The five variables of nationalism and the categories of nationalism they represent are exhaustive.

However, I must emphasize that the coding of the specific types of nationalism is not always unambiguous and in many cases, require a judgment call that could be challenged.

If the historical record indicated a state employed multiple types of nationalism in its rhetoric and as justification for its actions, I used the most prominent and influential one in coding that state's nationalism. If more references were made to the characteristics of one type of nationalism than another, the country was coded as having the former nationalism.^{viii}

For example, after the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union possessed revolutionary nationalism as it eliminated from the "pays legal" all members of the propertied classes and the clergy. In the 1922 constitution, it disenfranchised propertied society, people who hired labor, kulaks, priests, and White army officers (Suny 1997, 146). The emphasis on the communist revolution's protection from the capitalist powers continued throughout the first half of the 20th century. However, Soviet leaders sometimes employed ethnic nationalist rhetoric and imagery to mobilize the citizens to the defense of the communist experiment. From 1936 to 1938, Josef Stalin purged the minority nationalities in a campaign of mass terror because he saw the Russian people as the true guardians of Marxism and would not accept "nationalist deviators," "bourgeois nationalists," or "counterrevolutionary-Trotskyite-diversionist-espionage" individuals or parties (Snyder 1976, 216). Because Soviet leaders used Russian ethnic nationalism as one means of securing communism and this policy was inconsistently implemented, I considered the Soviet Union as a revolutionary nationalist state rather than an ethnic nationalist one.

Control Variables (C Head)

The control variables are measured according to Slantchev (2004, 818-819). **Duration** is the length of the interstate war in months. The initiation of war is determined by its formal

declaration, or, when this is nonexistent, by the beginning of intentional sustained fighting. “[A]n effected armistice, an implemented cease-fire, a preliminary treaty that ends active campaigning, a decisive battle that eliminates the opponent, or a formal capitulation” signal war termination (Slantchev 2004, 818). Longer wars should lead to greater fatalities because the belligerents have more opportunities to harm each other.

Total Population Reserves measures the total size of the populations (in billions) of the warring sides using the immediate pre-war numbers. **Total Military Personnel** measures the total size of the armies involved (in thousands of personnel) using the immediate pre-war numbers. Larger populations and militaries mean that more soldiers can potentially be sent into battle and the belligerents can be less concerned about conserving their fighting strength. As the number of soldiers on the battlefield increases, battle deaths should rise.

Terrain measures the difficulty of terrain over which the majority of battles in a war are fought, using the procedures in Stam (1999). Higher values represent tougher terrains, such as steep mountains or dense jungles, which should be related to less severe wars because the movement of vehicles becomes more challenging, forcing both sides to deploy in relatively small units. The number of soldiers involved per engagement is reduced and thus, fewer soldiers are killed. Lower values indicate flat terrain or desert areas, which should correlate with more severe wars. Vehicles and troops can be more easily transported, raising the number of soldiers involved per engagement. In addition, the topography provides no cover or concealment, making it easier to target the opponent (Lacina 2006, 281-282).

Number of States indicates the total number of states in each war. Cioffi-Revilla (1991) argues that the number of states fighting and battle fatalities are positively related and that this relationship is found in all great power wars after 1815. However, Moul (1994, 164) disagrees

with his statistical methods and contends that “[k]nowing the extent of a war provides little purchase on the numbers killed fighting a war.” These conflicting hypotheses lead me to no *a priori* expectation regarding the effect of the number of states on interstate war severity.

Democratic Initiator uses POLITY IV’s “institutionalized democracy” score to classify democracies (Marshall and Jaggers 2007). It ranges from 0 to 10, but I use a dummy variable version that equals 1 if the democracy score was greater than or equal to 6 and 0 otherwise. Democratic initiators should be less likely than non-democratic initiators to have severe wars because democratic leaders tend to initiate wars they think they can win quickly with minimal casualties to avoid public backlash and ensure their political survival (Siverson 1995; Bennett and Stam 1996; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow 2003).

Research Design

Since the dependent variable is the number of battle fatalities during an interstate war, I use an event-count model.^{ix} Event-count models modify the basic regression model using maximum likelihood estimators and by accounting for both distribution and a continuous underlying process (Krain 1997, 344; King 1989b, 128). Events such as battle deaths are usually not independent of each other and cannot be assumed to have a distribution like that of a dependent variable in an OLS regression, especially since they are unable to take on negative values or, in some cases, zero (see Krain 1997, 344). Since OLS regression models presume that negative and zero values are included in the distribution of events, using these estimation procedures yields “surprisingly large inefficiencies and nonsensical results” (King 1989a, 126). Furthermore, estimates may be biased and/or inconsistent (Long and Freese 2006, 349).

I employ a zero-truncated negative binomial event-count model for two reasons. First, it is designed for data in which observations with an outcome of zero are excluded from the sample. Second, if overdispersion exists and a Poisson model is used, the estimated β s will be biased and inconsistent. In addition, the estimated probabilities will be biased (Long and Freese 2006, 382-383). The dependent variable **Deaths** exhibits serious overdispersion. Its mean is 236,422, while its variance is 1.25×10^{12} . The likelihood-ratio test of the hypothesis $H_0: \alpha = 0$ for each model shows strong overdispersion, indicating that the correlation between events is substantial. Based on these results, the Poisson model is inappropriate because it assumes that events are independent and the variance and mean of the dependent variable are equal.

First, I estimate the zero-truncated negative binomial event-count model with **Nationalism_I** and **Nationalism_T**, the general nationalism variables for the initiator and the target. Second, to determine the effect on interstate war severity of dyads containing no nationalist states, one nationalist state, or two nationalist states, I include **Nationalism₁** and **Nationalism₂** in the model. I exclude **Nationalism_I** and **Nationalism_T** from this specification because both are highly correlated with **Nationalism₁** and **Nationalism₂**. **Nationalism₀** is the base category. Third, I interact both **Nationalism_I** and **Nationalism_T** with **Year** to account for the influence of time on nationalism's global diffusion. I also account for the relationship between time and nationalism by estimating a model only for the 20th century when more states were nationalistic. Lastly, I assess the effect of different types of nationalism in the initiator and target on interstate war severity. In all the models, I use robust standard errors.

ANALYSIS OF NATIONALISM AND INTERSTATE WAR SEVERITY

Table 2 presents the results of four models of interstate war severity. The first model includes the variables for nationalism in the initiator and target, as well as the control variables. Initiators that promote nationalism prior to an interstate war fight significantly deadlier wars than initiators that do not, in line with Hypothesis 1. A nationalist initiator increases the expected number of battle fatalities by a factor of 2.74, holding all other variables constant.^x Nationalism in the target also increases the expected number of battle deaths, but this effect is insignificant. Hypothesis 2 is unsupported. This finding suggests that initiators are selective in who they fight, and if they choose a nationalist foe, they pick one unlikely to put up much of a fight in terms of fatalities. In fact, 51 percent of the nationalist targets in the dataset experience defeat or agree to concessions. A longer duration, more military personnel, tougher terrain, and more belligerents significantly increase the expected number of battle fatalities. Greater population reserves and democratic initiators are associated with significantly less deadly wars.

The second model uses an alternative operationalization of nationalism in the warring dyad. **Nationalism₁** and **Nationalism₂** measure whether nationalism in one state or both states in the dyad increase interstate war severity compared to the complete absence of nationalism. Hypothesis 3 and 4 find support. If nationalism is present in one state, the expected number of battle deaths increases by a factor of 3.04. But, if it is present in both states, the expected number of battle deaths increases by a factor of 3.38. More nationalism in the warring dyad leads to more fatalities. It is therefore important for scholars to consider how belligerents' nationalisms interact to produce certain international conflict behaviors. Based on these findings, I conclude that nationalism in general strongly influences the severity of international military conflict.

However, nationalism's effect on battle deaths may be stronger in more recent conflicts than in earlier ones. First, nationalism did not become a global phenomenon until the 20th century. Second, advancements in military tactics and technology allow nationalist soldiers to inflict greater enemy fatalities and make their own deaths more likely. Models 3 and 4 present two methods of interacting nationalism with time. Model 3 interacts **Nationalism_I** and **Nationalism_T** with **Year**, while model 4 estimates model 1 only for the 20th century.

The findings are contradictory regarding the link between nationalism, time, and battle deaths. In both models, nationalism in the initiator significantly increases interstate war severity, but model 3 indicates that this relationship is not conditional on time. The interaction term is insignificant. Interestingly, the effect of initiator nationalism is quite substantial. When the initiator is nationalistic, the expected number of fatalities increases by a factor of 5.03.

Model 4 demonstrates that the impact of initiator nationalism on interstate war severity is more substantial in the 20th century than across the entire sample period. During the 20th century, nationalism in the initiator increases the expected number of battle deaths by a factor of 2.95, holding all other variables constant, compared to 2.74 in the full sample period. Combining these results with those of model 3, nationalism is not unequivocally conditional on time in the context of interstate war severity. But, at the very least, these models demonstrate the robustness of the finding that nationalism in the initiator increases interstate war severity.

Nationalism in the target insignificantly affects interstate war severity in both models 3 and 4. This result further undermines Hypothesis 2. The conclusion that only nationalism in the initiator affects the brutality of interstate war is maintained. In both models in which nationalism's hypothesized conditionality on time is taken into account, the control variables remain fairly consistent in their direction and statistical significance.

Disaggregating nationalism into its variants indicates that some forms of nationalism increase interstate war severity, while others decrease it. Holding all other variables constant, ethnic and counterrevolutionary nationalism in the initiator significantly increase the expected number of battle deaths by a factor of 3.76 and 2.19, respectively. Hypotheses 7 and 9 find some support. In contrast to the previous findings regarding target nationalism, counterrevolutionary nationalism in the target has the largest positive effect of all nationalisms, partially supporting Hypothesis 10. It significantly raises the expected number of battle deaths by a factor of 30.06.

Surprisingly, civic nationalism in the initiator and revolutionary nationalism in the target significantly decrease battle fatalities, contrary to Hypotheses 5 and 10. The coefficient for **Civic Nationalism_I** may be absorbing some of democracy's hypothesized negative effect on battle deaths since the coefficient for **Democratic Initiator** is insignificant and civic nationalism and democracy are often linked. Civic nationalism in the initiator lowers the expected number of fatalities by a factor of 0.39. But, an explanation for the negative coefficient of **Revolutionary Nationalism_T** is not apparent, given revolutionary nationalism's supposedly unlimited warfare. Revolutionary nationalism in the target reduces the expected number of battle fatalities by a factor of 0.46. The other initiator and target nationalisms do not influence interstate war severity, refuting the remaining hypotheses. For the most part, nationalism, when disaggregated into its various forms, does not unambiguously affect the brutality of war.

Nonetheless, the specific nationalism variables as a whole are important for explaining the deadliness of war. A block log-likelihood ratio test shows that these variables as a group significantly improve the model of interstate war severity. The difference in the log-likelihoods is significant at the 0.001 level, indicating that these variables' exclusion would substantially

decrease the model's explanatory power. Yet, the block log-likelihood test does not specify how these types of nationalism influence the violence of interstate war.

Three conclusions emanate from the results of Model 5. First, counterrevolutionary nationalism increases battle fatalities. Second, the other forms of nationalism have an unclear relationship to interstate war severity. Third, nationalism as a whole is associated with interstate war severity in an ambiguous and complex manner and further study is warranted.^{xi}

CONCLUSION

The theoretical argument centers on the claim that nationalism creates soldiers who are willing to die for their country and as a result, increases interstate war severity. It combines Stern's (1995) proposed relationship between the nation, the family, and the desire to sacrifice with an extension of Snyder's (2000) theory of nationalist conflict. Due to elite persuasion campaigns that construct the nation as a "family," individuals have the same emotions and norms toward the nation that they ordinarily have for other primary groups. The most important of these norms is dying for the family's well-being, which translates into a willingness to sacrifice for the national interest (Stern 1995).

If the nation is successfully portrayed as a family, interstate war severity should increase for three reasons, all of which derive from Snyder (2000). Nationalism mobilizes popular energies to the tasks of war, permits the suppression of opposition groups, and provokes a "nationalist bidding war." Consequently, nationalism encourages violent aggression toward national enemies, increasing battle deaths.

For the most part, the results of the statistical analysis substantiate these claims and demonstrate that the conventional wisdom on the deadliness of nationalist conflicts is accurate.

Nationalism is theoretically and empirically important to understanding interstate war severity. In this regard, Snyder's (2000) argument that nationalism is central to international conflict and Stern's (1995) assertion that nationalism promotes sacrifice are supported.

While nationalism does not have a consistently positive relationship to interstate war severity, I find that nationalism in the initiator significantly increases battle deaths, especially in the 20th century. Fatalities also rise with more nationalism among the belligerents. Yet, nationalism in the target does not affect the brutality of war. When nationalism is disaggregated into its variants, only counterrevolutionary nationalism has a constant positive and significant effect on interstate war severity, though ethnic nationalism in the initiator increases battle deaths.

These findings suggest that scholars should further consider whether and how nationalism and other cultural and ideational variables influence conflict behavior and resolution, especially given the relative scarcity of such studies in international relations (Cederman 2002). Most studies of interstate war severity focus on the relationship between the brutality of war and regime type, the number of participants, terrain, conflict duration, and total population size. While these explanations are informative, they ignore how nationalism creates soldiers who willingly die for their country and unleashes domestic dynamics that contribute to destructive wars. This is despite the fact that in many case studies, nationalism has been shown to be significant in the initiation and onset of violent international conflict.

This study is one of the first that quantitatively measures nationalism and examines its statistical relationship to a facet of interstate war (see Schrock-Jacobson 2008). Future research may uncover a different relationship between nationalism and interstate war severity since this study can be improved and refined. It would be useful to collect more data on the existence of

nationalism across states to assess quantitatively the relationship between nationalism and war initiation, and thereby glean a more complete view of nationalism's role in the conduct of war.

Investigating the effects of nationalism on the deadliness of war is a research agenda that deserves further attention. Not only will the popular belief that nationalism promotes extremely violent wars be scrutinized, but a better understanding of why wars are often so deadly will be achieved. By following this path of inquiry, the international community may be able to develop more effective policies that limit human suffering during wartime.

Table 1: Relationship of the Different Types of Nationalism to Interstate War Severity

Type of Nationalism	Main Characteristics	Consequences for Violent Conflict	Hypothesized Effect on Interstate War Severity
Civic	Emphasis on loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions that are perceived as just and effective. Inclusion in the group depends on birth or long-term residence within nation's territory.	Cost-conscious foreign policy	Slight increase
Ethnic	Emphasis on common culture, language, religion, shared historical experience, and/or shared kinship. Inclusion in the national group depends on these criteria.	High conflict until domination of the ethnic homeland is achieved	Moderate increase
Revolutionary	Emphasis on the defense of a political revolution that brings to power a regime that governs for the nation. Inclusion in the group depends on support for the political revolution.	Open-ended external conflict	Large increase
Counterrevolutionary	Emphasis on resistance to internal factions that seek to undermine the nation's traditional institutions. Any social classes, religions, cultural groups, or political ideological opponents that are deemed "enemies of the nation" are excluded from the national group	Open-ended external conflict	Large increase

Source: The descriptions of the variants of nationalisms and the proposed consequences for violent conflict are obtained from Snyder (2000).

Table 2. The Effect of Nationalism on Interstate War Severity: Zero-truncated negative binomial regression models, robust standard errors in parentheses

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4 (year ≥ 1900)
Nationalism _I	1.008*** (0.349)	--	1.615* (0.894)	1.082** (0.443)
Nationalism _I * Year	--	--	-0.007 (0.011)	--
Nationalism _T	0.213 (0.372)	--	1.129 (0.795)	-0.044 (0.453)
Nationalism _T * Year	--	--	-0.009 (0.009)	--
Nationalism ₁	--	1.113*** (0.411)	--	--
Nationalism ₂	--	1.217*** (0.429)	--	--
Year	--	--	0.001 (0.007)	--
Months	0.046*** (0.006)	0.046*** (0.006)	0.047*** (0.005)	0.049*** (0.007)
Total population reserves	-2.374*** (0.817)	-2.363*** (0.838)	-1.576** (0.727)	-1.899*** (0.624)
Total military personnel	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.0004*** (0.0001)
Terrain	1.521** (0.710)	1.353* (0.749)	1.087 (0.683)	0.946 (0.872)
Number of states	0.128*** (0.043)	0.129*** (0.043)	0.149*** (0.035)	0.160*** (0.042)
Democratic initiator	-1.003*** (0.342)	-1.027*** (0.359)	-0.859** (0.357)	-0.455 (0.487)
Constant	7.257*** (0.550)	7.277*** (0.549)	7.349*** (0.703)	7.398*** (0.750)
Ln(alpha)	0.352 (0.111)	0.348 (0.112)	0.279 (0.105)	0.213 (0.131)
N	104	104	104	61
χ^2	226.76	227.76	315.43	247.13
DF	8	8	11	8
Prob.> χ^2	<0.0001	<0.0001	<0.0001	<0.0001
Log-likelihood	-1159.304	-1158.998	-1154.3341	-695.642

*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 3. The Effect of Specific Nationalisms on War Severity: Zero-truncated Negative Binomial Regression Model, robust standard errors in parentheses

	Model 5
Civic nationalism _I	-0.936* (0.545)
Ethnic nationalism _I	1.325*** (0.460)
Revolutionary nationalism _I	0.363 (0.568)
Counterrevolutionary nationalism _I	0.784* (0.444)
Civic nationalism _T	-0.507 (0.478)
Ethnic nationalism _T	0.032 (0.387)
Revolutionary nationalism _T	-0.781* (0.434)
Counterrevolutionary nationalism _T	3.403*** (1.013)
Months	0.051*** (0.006)
Total population reserves	1.304 (2.458)
Total military personnel	0.0004*** (0.0001)
Terrain	1.898*** (0.645)
Number of states	0.153*** (0.050)
Democratic initiator	0.278 (0.512)
Constant	6.787*** (0.492)
Ln(alpha)	0.202 (0.134)
N	86
χ^2	470.49
DF	14
Prob.> χ^2	<0.0001
Log-likelihood	-956.965

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix A: Nationalism and interstate wars, 1816-1991

War name	Year began	Initiator	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)	Target	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)
Franco-Spanish	1823	France	1	civic	Spain	0	N/A
First Anglo-Burmese	1823	Burma	0	N/A	Britain	1	civic
Cisplatina	1825	Brazil	0	N/A	Argentina	0	N/A
Second Russo-Persian	1826	Persia	0	N/A	Russia	0	N/A
Russo-Turkish	1828	Russia	0	N/A	Turkey	0	N/A
Peru-Bolivia Confederation	1836	Chile	0	N/A	Peru	0	N/A
War of the Cakes	1838	France	1	civic	Mexico	0	N/A
First British-Afghan	1838	Britain	1	civic	Afghanistan	0	N/A
Second Turko-Egyptian	1839	Turkey	0	N/A	Egypt	0	N/A
Uruguayan Dispute	1845	France	1	civic	Argentina	0	N/A
Mexican-American	1846	Mexico	0	N/A	United States	1	civic
Austro-Sardinian	1848	Sardinia	0	N/A	Austria	0	N/A
First Schleswig-Holstein	1848	Prussia	0	N/A	Denmark	0	N/A
Roman Republic	1849	France	1	civic	Papal States	1	revolutionary
La Plata	1851	Brazil	0	N/A	Argentina	0	N/A
Second Anglo-Burmese	1852	Britain	1	civic	Burma	0	N/A

Appendix A (continued)

War name	Year began	Initiator	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)	Target	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)
Crimean	1853	Britain	1	civic	Russia	0	N/A
Anglo-Persian	1856	Britain	1	civic	Persia	0	N/A
Franco-Austrian	1859	Austria	0	N/A	France	1	civic
First Spanish-Moroccan	1859	Spain	0	N/A	Morocco	0	N/A
Italo-Roman	1860	Sardinia	0	N/A	Papal States	0	N/A
Two Sicilies	1860	Sardinia	0	N/A	Naples	0	N/A
Franco-Mexican	1862	France	1	civic	Mexico	0	N/A
Ecuadorian-Colombian	1863	Ecuador	0	N/A	Colombia	0	N/A
Second Schleswig-Holstein	1864	Prussia	1	counterrevolutionary	Denmark	1	ethnic
Triple Alliance	1864	Paraguay	0	N/A	Brazil	0	N/A
American Union	1865	Chile	0	N/A	Spain	0	N/A
Seven Weeks	1866	Prussia	1	counterrevolutionary	Austria	0	N/A
British-Abyssinian	1868	Britain	1	civic	Ethiopia	0	N/A
Franco-Prussian	1870	France	1	civic	Prussia	1	counterrevolutionary
Central American 1876	1876	Guatemala	0	N/A	El Salvador	0	N/A
Russo-Turkish	1877	Russia	1	ethnic	Turkey	0	N/A
Pacific	1879	Chile	0	N/A	Peru	0	N/A
Anglo-Egyptian	1882	Britain	1	civic	Egypt	0	N/A
Tonkin	1883	China	1	other	France	1	civic
Central American 1885	1885	Guatemala	0	N/A	El Salvador	0	N/A

Appendix A *(continued)*

War name	Year began	Initiator	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)	Target	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)
Serbo-Bulgarian	1885	Serbia	1	ethnic	Bulgaria	0	N/A
Franco-Siamese	1893	France	1	civic	Siam	0	N/A
Sino-Japanese	1894	Japan	1	ethnic	China	1	other
Second Italo-Ethiopian	1895	Italy	0	N/A	Ethiopia	0	N/A
Greco-Turkish	1897	Greece	1	ethnic	Turkey	0	N/A
Spanish-American	1898	United States	1	civic	Spain	0	N/A
Second Boer	1899	Orange Free State	0	N/A	Britain	1	civic
Boxer Rebellion	1900	Britain	1	civic	China	1	other
Sino-Russian	1900	Russia	1	ethnic	China	1	other
Russo-Japanese	1904	Japan	1	ethnic	Russia	1	ethnic
Central American 1906	1906	Guatemala	0	N/A	El Salvador	0	N/A
Central American 1907	1907	Nicaragua	0	N/A	Honduras	0	N/A
Second Spanish-Moroccan	1909	Spain	0	N/A	Morocco	0	N/A
Tripolitanian	1911	Italy	0	N/A	Turkey	0	N/A
First Balkan	1912	Bulgaria	1	ethnic	Turkey	0	N/A
Second Balkan	1913	Bulgaria	1	ethnic	Turkey	1	ethnic
World War I	1914	Germany	1	counterrevolutionary	Britain	1	civic
Hungarian-Allies	1919	Hungary	0	N/A	Czechoslovakia	0	N/A

Appendix A *(continued)*

War name	Year began	Initiator	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)	Target	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)
Franco-Turkish	1919	France	1	civic	Turkey	1	ethnic
Russo-Polish	1920	Poland	1	ethnic	USSR	1	revolutionary
Greco-Turkish	1920	Greece	1	ethnic	Turkey	1	ethnic
Lithuanian-Polish	1920	Poland	1	ethnic	Lithuania	1	ethnic
Sino-Soviet	1929	USSR	1	revolutionary	China	1	other
Mukden Incident	1931	Japan	1	ethnic	China	1	other
Chaco	1932	Bolivia	1	counterrevolutionary	Paraguay	0	N/A
Saudi-Yemeni	1934	Saudi Arabia	0	N/A	Yemen	0	N/A
Italo-Ethiopian	1935	Italy	1	counterrevolutionary	Ethiopia	0	N/A
Sino-Japanese	1937	Japan	1	ethnic	China	1	other
Lake Khasan	1938	USSR	1	revolutionary	Japan	1	ethnic
Khalkin Gol	1939	Japan	1	ethnic	USSR	1	revolutionary
WWII: German-Polish	1939	Germany	1	ethnic	Poland	1	ethnic
WWII: German-French	1940	Germany	1	ethnic	France	1	civic
Russo-Finnish	1939	USSR	1	revolutionary	Finland	0	N/A
WWII: German-Danish	1940	Germany	1	ethnic	Denmark	0	N/A
WWII: German-Norwegian	1940	Germany	1	ethnic	Norway	0	N/A
WWII: German-Belgian	1940	Germany	1	ethnic	Belgium	0	N/A

Appendix A *(continued)*

War name	Year began	Initiator	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)	Target	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)
WWII: German-Dutch	1940	Germany	1	ethnic	Netherlands	0	N/A
WWII: Western	1940	Germany	1	ethnic	Britain	1	civic
WWII: Italo-Greek	1940	Italy	1	counterrevolutionary	Greece	1	ethnic
Vichy France-Thailand	1941	Thailand	1	ethnic	Vichy France	1	counterrevolutionary
WWII: German-Yugoslav	1941	Germany	1	ethnic	Yugoslavia	0	N/A
WWII: Great Patriotic War	1941	Germany	1	ethnic	USSR	1	revolutionary
WWII: Pacific	1941	Japan	1	ethnic	United States	1	civic
First Kashmir	1947	Pakistan	1	ethnic	India	1	civic
Israeli War of Independence	1948	Egypt	1	other	Israel	1	ethnic
Korean	1950	North Korea	1	ethnic	United States	1	civic
Sinai	1956	Israel	1	ethnic	Egypt	1	other
Hungarian Revolution	1956	USSR	1	revolutionary	Hungary	0	N/A
Himalayan	1962	China	1	other	India	1	civic
Vietnam	1964	United States	1	civic	North Vietnam	1	revolutionary
Second Kashmir	1965	Pakistan	1	ethnic	India	1	civic
Six-Day	1967	Israel	1	ethnic	Egypt	1	other
Israeli-Egyptian	1969	Egypt	1	other	Israel	1	ethnic

Appendix A (continued)

War Name	Year began	Initiator	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)	Target	Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)	Type of nationalism (if present)
Football	1969	El Salvador	1	other	Honduras	1	other
Bangladesh	1971	Pakistan	1	ethnic	India	1	civic
Yom Kippur	1973	Egypt	1	counterrevolutionary	Israel	1	ethnic
Turko-Cypriot	1974	Turkey	1	counterrevolutionary	Cyprus	1	ethnic
North Vietnam-South Vietnam	1975	North Vietnam	1	revolutionary	South Vietnam	0	N/A
Ogaden	1977	Somalia	1	ethnic	Ethiopia	1	revolutionary
Vietnamese-Cambodian	1977	Vietnam	1	revolutionary	Cambodia	1	revolutionary
Ugandan-Tanzanian	1978	Uganda	0	N/A	Tanzania	0	N/A
First Sino-Vietnamese	1979	China	1	other	Vietnam	1	revolutionary
Iran-Iraq	1980	Iraq	1	counterrevolutionary	Iran	1	revolutionary
Falklands	1982	Argentina	1	counterrevolutionary	Britain	1	civic
Lebanon	1982	Israel	1	ethnic	Syria	1	other
Second Sino-Vietnamese	1987	China	1	other	Vietnam	1	revolutionary
Iraq-Kuwait	1990	Iraq	1	other	Kuwait	0	N/A
Persian Gulf	1991	United States	1	civic	Iraq	1	other

Appendix B: An example of the coding procedures

Interstate war: Serbo-Bulgarian

Start date: 1885

Initiator: Serbia

Target: Bulgaria

Existence and type of nationalism in the initiator: Yes, ethnic

Reasons: I code Serbia as ethnic nationalist primarily because Snyder considers it to be so during the 19th century (Snyder 2000, 169-180). Since I incorporate an extension of Snyder's theory of nationalist conflict into my argument, I should use his coding where possible.

In the case of Serbia, the government promoted nationalism as a way of mobilizing mass support for the Obrenovic dynasty, various state-building projects, and international military actions. Most importantly, it used nationalism to protect the state's independence in the face of potential threats from the Austrian and Ottoman empires. The public school system disseminated the idea that only a strong, unified state could defend the Serbian nation from foreign domination.

This nationalism was ethnic for two reasons. First, civic nationalism was virtually impossible. The civic-territorial institutions were too weak and disordered to serve as a basis for popular loyalty. The democratic procedures that existed were often violated, preventing liberal principles from flourishing. Second, the Obrenovic dynasty was seen as illegitimate because it could not claim any historic right to rule. In order to gain some semblance of legitimacy, it insisted that it would protect Serbian national interests. Third, the state played a central role in defining what it meant to be a Serb and rendering this definition salient for the populace.

The Serbian government's actions prior to the war with Bulgaria were nationalist in nature. After an electoral setback in 1883, Milan Obrenovic sought to use nationalism as a means of generating popular support for a conservative government. An opportunity to do so presented itself when Bulgaria annexed Rumelia, a formerly Ottoman region populated by Bulgarians. Milan argued that any increase in Bulgaria's size would shift the balance of power against Serbia and Bulgaria should compensate Serbia with some territory. When this suggestion was rejected, Milan invaded Bulgarian territory with disastrous results. Because nationalist manipulations were attempted by the government, I code Serbia as nationalist prior to this war.

Existence and type of nationalism in the target: No

Reasons: The Bulgarian state was non-nationalist for several reasons. First, it was a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire according to the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. As such, it had to acknowledge the suzerainty of the sultan. Therefore, its independence was incomplete. Second, its foreign policy was dominated by Russian interests. While the Bulgarian government wanted to unite Eastern Rumelia and Macedonia with the Bulgarian state, it feared Russia's reaction and took no action. Only after a secret organization undertook a coup in Eastern Rumelia to unite it with Bulgaria did Prince Alexander accept the union. Third, the period from 1880 to 1884 was characterized by constitutional instability and heated debate between the prince, the national assembly, and the political parties, not the desire for territorial expansion (see Hall 2000; Kellas 2004; Crampton 2005).

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ⁱ Greenfeld (1992) argues that the idea of the “nation” and nationalism emerged in England during the sixteenth-century and then spread across the European continent, all the while transforming itself to meet the political and social exigencies of each country.

ⁱⁱ Snyder’s (2000) work is concerned with the relationship between nationalism and the onset of violent conflict in the context of democratizing countries. I will focus on conflict onset in later work as my current dataset does not permit such an analysis.

ⁱⁱⁱ These wars are the Cisplatin War, the War of the Peru-Bolivia Confederation, the War of the Cakes, the First British-Afghan War, and the Second Turko-Egyptian War.

^{iv} My coding of nationalism in the initiator and target of each interstate war is listed in Appendix A. I provide an example of my coding procedures in Appendix B.

^v I encountered several problematic cases while coding countries for their incidence of nationalism. First, there were two states with pan-nationalism. This type of nationalism poses a coding problem because it may challenge the existence of the state in which its proponents reside. Until 1967, Arab nationalism aimed to make the state and nation congruent, which would have dissolved many Arab states. Because the state does not adequately represent the nation, pan-nationalism may render soldiers less willing to sacrifice so that the state will achieve its military objectives. On the other hand, this form of nationalism may generate support for the state’s military policies if the masses unite behind the pan-nationalist cause and perceive aggressive fighting as a means of achieving its goals. Pan-nationalism may also justify political opponents’ marginalization and provoke nationalist bidding wars.

The two cases of pan-nationalism were pan-Italianism and pan-Arabism. I did not code any state as nationalist unless state elites espoused pan-nationalist sentiment. No state was classified as having Italian nationalism because the major supporters of pan-Italianism were among the intelligentsia and the masses. In addition, the governments in question were either ruled by incoherent monarchies (e.g. Naples), revolutionary regimes (e.g. the Roman Republic), the Vatican, or realists (e.g. Count Camillo di Cavour, prime minister of Sardinia). I considered Egypt prior to its wars with Israel (except the 1973 war), Syria, and Iraq in the early 1990s as Arab nationalist, but coded them as having an “other” form of nationalism.

The second hard case was Turkey during its war of independence (1919-1920). It was unclear whether the dissolving Ottoman Empire or Mustafa Kemal’s Turkish resistance movement was the effective government prior to the wars. It was the resistance movement which fought France and Greece, but the Ottoman Empire was not

officially extinct. If Kemal's movement is considered the effective government, then Turkey was ethnic nationalist. If instead it was the Ottoman Empire, then Turkey was not nationalist because the state was in disarray. I coded Turkey as ethnic nationalist because it was Kemal's movement that was engaged in military conflict and I presume that if his movement was not considered the government, this war would not be in the interstate war dataset.

^{vi} I chose this transformation of **Year** because it eases interpretation of the interaction term by allowing a value of 0 for **Year** to represent the year 1823, which approximates nationalism's infancy.

^{vii} There were cases in which nationalism existed, but did not conform to the nationalism categories in my typology. I coded them as having an "other" form of nationalism. These cases are China, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, Iraq, and Syria. I drop the dyads with these "other nationalist" states from the empirical analysis of the specific types of nationalism and interstate war severity, decreasing the number of observations to 86.

^{viii} The states with multiple types of nationalism are Thailand in the 1930s, the Soviet Union from the 1930s to the 1950s, and Turkey in the 1970s. I admit that coding the most prominent type of nationalism is a judgment call.

^{ix} According to the COW Project, a military conflict can only be considered a war when battle fatalities are equal to or greater than 1,000. However, some wars in my dataset have estimated battle fatalities less than 1,000. I tested my results' robustness by excluding these cases. They do not substantially change coefficient direction, magnitude, or significance.

^x The factor change is calculated by taking the exponential of the coefficient.

^{xi} I plan to undertake a project in the future that will investigate the relationship between nationalism and civil war severity, and thus further illuminate the role of nationalism in producing violent conflict.